State v. Stands

Decision Date24 March 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20200179,20200179
Citation956 N.W.2d 366
Parties STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Michael Lee STANDS, Defendant and Appellant
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Derek K. Steiner, Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.

VandeWalle, Justice.

[¶1] Michael Lee Stands appealed from a criminal judgment and an order denying his motion to suppress evidence after entering a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or deliver methamphetamine and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.

I

[¶2] On November 5, 2019, Officer Heidi Witzel with the Fargo Police Department initiated a traffic stop when Stands failed to stop at a stop sign. Stands exited the vehicle and stood at its rear left fender. Witzel testified that Stands kept putting his hands in his pockets. Stands did not provide Witzel with identification, but gave her his name and date of birth. After acquiring his name and date of birth, Witzel went back to her patrol vehicle. At that point, Witzel requested a drug dog come to the scene and ran a records check on Stands. Witzel then exited her patrol vehicle and went back over to Stands. The records check later revealed Stands did not have current driving privileges.

[¶3] After exiting her patrol vehicle, Witzel directed Stands to move to the rear of it. Witzel then asked Stands, "Do you have anything on you I should know about right now?" and "Can I search you?" Witzel testified that Stands raised his hands at shoulder height, mumbled, and "shook his head yes."

[¶4] When Stands raised his hands, Witzel said she observed what appeared to be a silver scale in Stands’ pocket. Witzel took the scale out of his pocket and noticed what she believed to be meth residue on it. She also located a pipe and cash on Stands during the search. After the search of Stands’ person, Witzel detained him and placed him in the back of her patrol car. Stands told Witzel he was a user and "had used approximately five hours ago."

[¶5] Approximately thirty-five minutes after the initial stop, Detective Bret Witte arrived with a drug detection dog. The dog positively alerted on Stands’ vehicle, and the vehicle was searched. Methamphetamine was discovered in the vehicle.

[¶6] On appeal, Stands argues he did not consent to the search of his person. He also argues the traffic stop was unlawfully extended when Witzel asked if he had anything on him, if she could search him, and subsequently searched him. Additionally, Stands argues the stop was unlawfully extended when officers detained him and waited for a drug dog to arrive on the scene.

II

[¶7] Our standard of review for a district court's decision on a motion to suppress is well established:

In reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the district court's findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We will affirm a district court's decision on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Our standard of review recognizes the importance of the district court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.

State v. Hawkins , 2017 ND 172, ¶ 6, 898 N.W.2d 446 (quoting State v. Odom , 2006 ND 209, ¶ 8, 722 N.W.2d 370 ).

III

[¶8] Stands argues he did not provide consent for Witzel to search him. The United States and North Dakota Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; N.D. Const. art. I, § 8.

Warrantless searches are unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Consent is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. The scope of an individual's consent is determined by considering what an objectively reasonable person would have understood the consent to include. The reasonableness inquiry is applied to the understanding of an officer who is conducting a search. Whether a search exceeds the scope of consent is a factual question, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.

Odom , 2006 ND 209, ¶¶ 9-10, 722 N.W.2d 370 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Consent must be proven by clear and positive testimony." State v. Mitzel , 2004 ND 157, ¶ 17, 685 N.W.2d 120. "Consent must be unequivocal." Id. Shrugging is insufficient to constitute consent. See id.

[¶9] Here, the district court found Stands gave Witzel consent to search his person. After Witzel asked to search him, the court noted Stands shrugged, mumbled, nodded, and lifted his hands before Witzel began searching him. Witzel understood Stands’ actions as manifesting consent to search his person.

[¶10] Although a shrug is not enough to manifest a person's consent, Stands also mumbled, nodded, and lifted his hands according to Witzel's testimony. Nodding is understood broadly as manifesting agreement or consent. Stands also raised his hands allowing Witzel to easily search him. These two actions taken together would allow an objectively reasonable person to understand Stands was consenting to a search of his person. Therefore, sufficient competent evidence exists showing Stands’ consented to the search of his person, and the district court's finding that Stands consented is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

IV

[¶11] Stands contends Witzel unlawfully extended the traffic stop by asking if he had anything on him, if she could search him, and subsequently searching him. "When conducting a traffic stop, an officer can temporarily detain the traffic violator at the scene of the violation." State v. Fields , 2003 ND 81, ¶ 8, 662 N.W.2d 242. "[A] reasonable period of detention includes the amount of time necessary for the officer to complete his duties resulting from the traffic stop." Id. (quoting State v. Mertz , 362 N.W.2d 410, 412 (N.D. 1985) ). Those duties may include:

Request[ing] the driver's license and registration, request[ing] that the driver step out of the vehicle, request[ing] that the driver wait in the patrol car, conduct[ing] computer inquiries to determine the validity of the license and registration, conduct[ing] computer searches to investigate the driver's criminal history and to determine if the driver has outstanding warrants, and mak[ing] inquiries as to the motorist's destination and purpose.

Id. (quoting United States v. Jones , 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) ). "As a result, an investigative detention may continue as long as reasonably necessary to complete these duties." State v. Phelps , 2017 ND 141, ¶ 10, 896 N.W.2d 245.

[¶12] In State v. Vetter , we examined a traffic stop where an officer asked a question outside the purposes of the stop. 2019 ND 138, ¶ 4, 927 N.W.2d 435. Similar to Stands, the defendant in Vetter argued the scope and duration of the stop was unlawfully extended because the officer asked whether the defendant had anything illegal in his car. Id. We explained, "Because a routine traffic stop is relatively brief, it is more like a Terry stop’ than an arrest."

Id. at ¶ 6. "Unrelated inquiries are permitted during a stop as long as they do not prolong the stop and extend the time the individual is detained." Id. "Our cases have held that after the completion of the traffic stop duties, if the officer continues the seizure, he violates the Fourth Amendment ‘unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion for believing that criminal activity is afoot.’ " Id. at ¶ 8 (quoting Fields , 2003 ND 81, ¶ 10, 662 N.W.2d 242 ).

[¶13] "[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention." Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Although, a traffic stop " ‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket." Id. at 354-55, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ). "However an ‘officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ " Vetter , 2019 ND 138, ¶ 9, 927 N.W.2d 435 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) ).

[¶14] In Vetter , the defendant alleged the officer prolonged the traffic stop when the officer asked a question about illegal contents in the vehicle and handed off the ticket writing to another officer. 2019 ND 138, ¶ 14, 927 N.W.2d 435. The time it took to complete these actions took less than a minute. Id. at ¶ 15. We held this short amount of time did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. Id. "Absent evidence of an officer deliberately delaying a stop so that, for example, a drug-detecting dog may arrive, such minor inefficiencies in traffic stops are unlikely to establish a Fourth Amendment violation." Id. at ¶ 16 (internal citation omitted). Requests for consent to search are permissible so long as they do not prolong and "measurably extend the duration of the stop." See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(e) (6th ed. 2020). "The Fourth Amendment does not call us to scrutinize traffic stops for unnecessary casual conversation or impose a constitutional mandate for time efficiency over incidental questions or conversation." Vetter , at ¶ 18.

[¶15] At the time Witzel asked Stands if he had anything on him and if she could search him, the purposes of the traffic stop had not been completed. Witzel had not issued Stands a warning or a ticket. Sh...

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3 cases
  • State v. Lelm
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 8, 2021
    ...fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law. State v. Stands , 2021 ND 46, ¶ 7, 956 N.W.2d 366 (quoting State v. Hawkins , 2017 ND 172, ¶ 6, 898 N.W.2d 446 ). [¶9] "The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I......
  • State v. Marsolek
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • September 30, 2021
    ...fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law. State v. Stands , 2021 ND 46, ¶ 7, 956 N.W.2d 366 (quoting State v. Hawkins , 2017 ND 172, ¶ 6, 898 N.W.2d 446 ). [¶9] This Court in State v. Vetter set forth the law on when a traffic sto......
  • State v. Nupdal
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 17, 2021
    ... ... 19-03.4-01(5), which refers to scales used to weigh or measure previously produced controlled substances.[8] The State cites two cases in which it argues a defendant was charged with felony possession of drug paraphernalia for possessing a scale: State v. Stands , 2021 ND 46, 956 N.W.2d 366, and State v. Apland , 2015 ND 29, 858 N.W.2d 915. In Stands , we analyzed whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to continue detaining the defendant after discovering a scale with methamphetamine residue on his person. 2021 ND 46, 18, 956 N.W.2d 366. In ... ...

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