State v. Stanfield

• Decision Date: 27 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 16291,16291
• Citation: 733 P.2d 822,112 Idaho 601
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David J. STANFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 822

733 P.2d 822

112 Idaho 601

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David J. STANFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16291.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Feb. 27, 1987.

Neal S. Stivers, Deputy Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. by Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and David R. Minert, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BURNETT, Judge.

We are asked to decide whether a district judge should have reduced an indeterminate seven-year sentence imposed for lewd conduct. The question is presented by David Stanfield, who stands convicted upon his plea of guilty to a charge of lewd conduct with his seven-year-old daughter. After the time to appeal the judgment had elapsed, but within the time allowed by I.C.R. 35, Stanfield filed a motion seeking reduction of his sentence. He requested that the sentence be changed to probation so he could be released from prison and could participate in a community-based mental health program. The district judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. For reasons explained below, we affirm.

A Rule 35 motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627, 550 P.2d 130 (1976). Such a motion essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was, for any reason, unduly severe. State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 (Ct.App.1984). The issue presented on appeal is whether the facts presented in connection with the motion, when viewed in the context of information already in the record, show that discretion was abused in failing to grant the leniency requested. State v. Goldman, 109 Idaho 1031, 712 P.2d 732 (Ct.App.1985).

In this case, the seven-year indeterminate sentence was well within statutory limits. See I.C. § 18-6607 (now codified at I.C. § 18-1508). For the purpose of appellate review, and not as a prediction of actual parole, the duration of confinement under an indeterminate sentence is deemed to be one-third of its facial term. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.1982). Here the period of confinement on which we base our review is one-third of seven years, or twenty-eight months. The criteria for determining whether such confinement should have been reduced under Rule 35 are the same as those which would apply to appellate review of the original sentence. State v. Lopez, supra. These criteria, articulated in our Toohill decision, embrace the primary objective of protecting society and the ancillary goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.

The record compiled at the original sentencing disclosed that Stanfield committed violent and depraved acts upon his seven-year-old daughter. On numerous occasions he bound her and forced her to perform acts of oral sex or anal intercourse. The presentence investigation report noted that Stanfield might pose a continuing threat to the girl unless confined. He had no prior criminal record.

At the hearing on the Rule 35 motion, Stanfield's counsel adduced testimony from two psychologists at the Idaho State Correctional Institute (ISCI). Both witnesses declared that psychological treatment was essential to Stanfield's eventual rehabilitation. The psychologist assigned to Stanfield stated that treatment alternatives at the ISCI were limited, although mental health programs were expected to improve with expansion of the prison's professional staff. He further testified as follows:

Q. From your point of view as a therapist, as the person who has been working with Mr. Stanfield, and not getting into the other considerations that His Honor has to...