State v. Stanislaw

Decision Date26 January 1990
Docket NumberNo. 88-131,88-131
Citation153 Vt. 517,573 A.2d 286
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Vermont v. Lance STANISLAW.

Shelley A. Hill, Windsor County State's Atty., and Mark T. Cameron, Deputy State's Atty., White River Junction, and Adele V. Pastor, Dept. of State's Attys., Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee.

Peter F. Langrock and Anna E. Saxman of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Middlebury, for defendant-appellant.

Before ALLEN, C.J., PECK, DOOLEY and MORSE, JJ., and BARNEY, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

The defendant is charged with involuntary manslaughter for committing the unlawful act of furnishing a minor with alcohol, in violation of 7 V.S.A. § 658, thereby causing her death. Following his arraignment, defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the information failed to charge an offense and that his warrantless arrest without probable cause violated his rights under the United States and Vermont Constitutions. He also moved to suppress statements he made to the investigating officers. The trial court denied the motions and granted an interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

According to the affidavits of probable cause filed with the information, a minor arrived at a party with a fifth of Bacardi 151 Rum in her possession. She drank heavily from the fifth of rum and left the party with four friends. After leaving the party, the minor "passed out" near Artistic Woodworks, a business owned and operated by defendant. One of the minor's friends asked defendant if they could leave her in defendant's office because it was cold outside. Defendant replied that they could, but they were to come back to check on her. The friends placed the minor inside Artistic Woodworks, where she later succumbed to alcohol poisoning. At the time of her death, approximately one-fourth of the liquor remained in the bottle. The accompanying affidavit also alleged that on the day of the party a witness saw the minor, in search of liquor, approach a man the witness believed to be the defendant and that a liquor store employee recalled selling a fifth of Bacardi 151 Rum to defendant on the same evening that the foregoing events took place.

On February 5, 1987, two Vermont State Police detectives drove to Artistic Woodworks and arrested the defendant without a warrant. The arresting officers testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that some of defendant's co-workers were present at the time of the arrest and one said that a lawyer would be contacted. The defendant did not respond to this statement. The officers testified they placed defendant in the police cruiser and administered Miranda warnings. The defendant subsequently gave both oral and written statements to the police. The State filed an information on the following day charging defendant with involuntary manslaughter.

Defendant contends dismissal is required because the information failed to charge an offense and the officers arrested him without probable cause. Defendant argues for the suppression of all post-arrest statements made to the police on the grounds they were not given voluntarily and were taken in violation of his right to counsel.

The trial court ruled that involuntary manslaughter requires merely an involuntary act with death resulting, and that the State was not required to charge or prove a mental element of recklessness or negligence. The trial court concluded the information sufficiently charged the offense and denied defendant's motion to dismiss. In addition, the trial court ruled the information and affidavit set forth facts adequate to support a finding of probable cause to believe defendant committed the unlawful act of furnishing a minor with alcohol, thereby causing the victim's death. These facts, according to the trial court, gave the police probable cause to arrest and charge the defendant with manslaughter. The trial court further held that the defendant's arrest did not require a warrant because it was made at a public place of business. The trial court, therefore, denied defendant's second motion to dismiss.

The trial court also refused to suppress any of defendant's post-arrest statements to police. The court found that defendant failed to invoke his right to counsel, that defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and that he provided the police with a voluntary confession.

The defendant then moved for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5(b). The trial court granted the motion and the following questions of law were certified to this Court:

1. Are the information and affidavit of probable cause, alleging the strict liability crime of illegal act involuntary manslaughter (providing liquor to a minor with the death of the minor resulting) legally valid in Vermont?

2. Should defendant's statements to the police be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest under the United States and Vermont Constitutions?

3. Should defendant's statements to the police be suppressed as taken in violation of defendant's right to counsel under the United States and Vermont Constitutions?

4. Should defendant's statements to the police be suppressed as involuntarily made under the United States and Vermont Constitutions?

I.

The State asserts that involuntary manslaughter occurs where an individual unintentionally causes the death of another by the commission of an unlawful act. The prosecution, according to the State, must prove only the intent required for the illegal act and need not show any intent to commit manslaughter. Therefore, one who engages in an unlawful act bears the burden of strict criminal liability for any deaths caused by the act. Criminal liability follows regardless of whether the underlying illegal act constitutes a felony, misdemeanor, or regulatory violation, and even where the act itself is a strict liability offense. We disagree. "The flaw in the concept is that a person may be convicted of unlawful-act manslaughter even though the person's conduct does not create a perceptible risk of death." State v. Pray, 378 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Me.1977).

The information charged defendant with the violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2304 which provides: "A person who commits manslaughter shall be fined not more than $3000.00, or imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 15 years, or both." The statute establishes only the punishment for manslaughter. It does not specify the required intent or any other element of the offense. The absence of an intent element, however, does not end the inquiry. "When the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea required for a particular offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute creates a strict liability offense, but will try to determine the intent of the Legislature." State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 307, 561 A.2d 392, 398 (1989) (quoting State v. Audette, 149 Vt. 218, 221, 543 A.2d 1315, 1317 (1988)).

To decide whether the Legislature intended to impose strict criminal liability, we turn first to the common law, for we presume the Legislature has acted "against the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). Vermont common law recognized the crimes of involuntary and voluntary manslaughter. See State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378, 383 (1862); State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491, 516 (1860). This Court has repeatedly referred to involuntary manslaughter as a "killing caused by an unlawful act, but not accompanied with any intention to take life." See State v. Norton, 147 Vt. 223, 233, 514 A.2d 1053, 1060 (1986); State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 598, 458 A.2d 1109, 1111 (1983). The trial court read this statement as dispensing with any mens rea requirement. As the context of earlier decisions makes clear, however, the statement merely serves to distinguish involuntary from voluntary manslaughter, which requires a specific intent to kill. See In re Estate of Mahoney 126 Vt. 31, 35, 220 A.2d 475, 478 (1966); McDonnell, 32 Vt. at 517. Therefore, our common law precedents do not establish what level of intent, if any, in the commission of the underlying unlawful act is necessary to sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

We must turn to general principles from which the material element of a crime can be derived. "It is well established that at least with crimes having their origin in the common law, intent generally remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense." State v. Day, 150 Vt. 119, 122, 549 A.2d 1061, 1063 (1988). Therefore, in the absence of an express contrary indication from the Legislature, we must assume involuntary manslaughter as defined by 13 V.S.A. § 2304 implicitly contains an element of mens rea. Audette, 149 Vt. at 221, 543 A.2d at 1317.

The mens rea component of a crime embodies "one of the criminal law's most basic principles: a person is not criminally liable for causing a bad result if he or she did not have some culpable mental state with respect to that result." State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 573, 580, 470 A.2d 676, 681 (1983). Therefore, "[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500, 71 S.Ct. 857, 862, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). When presented with questions of statutory interpretation similar to those at issue here, this Court has recognized the fundamental importance of mens rea and applied the general rule that "[u]nless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature, ... a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time." Audette, 149 Vt. at 220, 543 A.2d at 1316 (quoting State v. Hanson, 141 Vt. 228, 232, 446 A.2d 372, 374 (1982) (citations omitted)). We have implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly written in the statute. See State v. Francis, ...

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