State v. Stanko

• Decision Date: 23 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-486,97-486
• Citation: 292 Mont. 192,974 P.2d 1132,55 St. Rep. 1302
• Parties: , 1998 MT 321 STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rudy STANKO, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1132

974 P.2d 1132

292 Mont. 192, 1998 MT 321

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rudy STANKO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 97-486.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued Oct. 14, 1998.

Submitted Nov. 17, 1998.

Decided Dec. 23, 1998.

Penelope S. Strong (argued), Attorney at Law; Livingston, for Appellant.

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General (argued); Patricia J. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Nickolas C. Murnion, Garfield County Attorney; Jordan, for Respondent.

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 The defendant, Rudy Stanko, was charged by a complaint filed in the Justice Court for Garfield County with failing to drive in a reasonable and prudent manner in violation of § 61-8-303(1), MCA. Following trial by jury, he was found guilty of that offense and was sentenced. He appealed his conviction to the District Court for the Sixteenth Judicial District in Garfield County where he was recharged by information with the same offense. In District Court, he again pled not guilty, moved to dismiss the charge against him on the basis that the statute pursuant to which he was charged was unconstitutionally vague, and following denial of that motion, received a second jury trial. He was again convicted and sentenced and now appeals that conviction to this Court. We reverse the judgment of the District Court.

¶2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether § 61-8-303(1), MCA, is so vague that it violates the Due Process Clause found at Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Since the State of Montana was the prevailing party in the District Court, we will accept those facts from the record which are most favorable to the State. See State v. Crisp (1991), 249 Mont. 199, 204, 814 P.2d 981, 984; City of Whitefish v. O'Shaughnessy (1985), 216 Mont. 433, 437, 704 P.2d 1021, 1024. Viewed from that perspective, the following facts form the basis for the arrest and conviction of Rudy Stanko for violating § 61-8-303(1), MCA, Montana's "basic rule" regarding ¶4 Kenneth Breidenbach is a member of the Montana Highway Patrol who, at the time of trial and the time of the incident which formed the basis for Stanko's arrest, was stationed in Jordan, Montana. On March 10, 1996, he was on duty patrolling Montana State Highway 24 and proceeding south from Fort Peck toward Flowing Wells in "extremely light" traffic at about 8 a.m. on a Sunday morning, when he observed another vehicle approaching him from behind.

the speed at which vehicles can be operated on Montana's highways.

¶5 At Flowing Wells, where Highway 24 intersects with Montana State Highway 200, he stopped or slowed, made a right-hand turn, and proceeded west on Highway 200. About one-half mile from that intersection, in the first passing zone, the vehicle which had been approaching him from behind passed him. He caught up to the vehicle and trailed the vehicle at a constant speed for a distance of approximately eight miles while observing what he referred to as the two or three second rule. He explained that the two or three second rule meant that he maintained a distance between the two vehicles that it would take two to three seconds to travel at the speeds at which the vehicles were being operated. He testified that he clocked the vehicle ahead of him at a steady 85 miles per hour during the time that he followed it. At that speed, the distance between the two vehicles was from 249 to 374 feet.

¶6 When Stanko's vehicle reached a point where the road was wide enough to pull over safely, Officer Breidenbach signaled him to pull over and issued him a ticket for violating § 61-8-303(1), MCA. The basis for the ticket was the fact that Stanko had been operating his vehicle at a speed of 85 miles per hour at a location where Officer Breidenbach concluded it was unsafe to do so.

¶7 The officer testified that the road at that location was narrow, had no shoulders, and was broken up by an occasional frost heave. He also testified that the portion of the road over which he clocked Stanko included curves and hills which obscured vision of the roadway ahead. However, he acknowledged that at a distance of from 249 to 374 feet behind Stanko, he had never lost sight of Stanko's vehicle. The roadway itself was bare and dry, there were no adverse weather conditions, and the incident occurred during daylight hours. Officer Breidenbach apparently did not inspect the brakes on Stanko's vehicle or make any observation regarding its weight. The only inspection he conducted was of the tires, which appeared to be brand new. He also observed that it was a 1996 Camaro, which was a sports car, and that it had a suspension system designed so that the vehicle could be operated at high speeds. He also testified that while he and Stanko were on Highway 24 there were no other vehicles that he observed, that during the time that he clocked Stanko on Highway 200 they approached no other vehicles going in their direction, and that he observed a couple of vehicles approach them in the opposite direction during that eight-mile stretch of highway.

¶8 Although Officer Breidenbach expressed the opinion that 85 miles per hour was unreasonable at that location, he gave no opinion what would have been a reasonable speed, nor did he identify anything about Stanko's operation of his vehicle, other than the speed at which he was traveling, which he considered to be unsafe.

¶9 Stanko testified that on the date he was arrested he was driving a 1996 Chevrolet Camaro that he had just purchased one to two months earlier and which had been operated fewer than 10,000 miles. He stated that the brakes, tires, and steering were all in perfect operating condition, the highway conditions were perfect, and he felt that he was operating his vehicle in a safe manner. He conceded that after passing Officer Breidenbach's vehicle, he drove at a speed of 85 miles per hour, but testified that because he was aware of the officer's presence he was extra careful about the manner in which he operated his vehicle. He felt that he would have had no problem avoiding any collision at the speed that he was traveling. Stanko testified that he was fifty years old at the time of trial, drives an average of 50,000 miles a year, and has never had an accident.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Is § 61-8-303(1), MCA, so vague that it violates the Due Process Clause found at Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution?

¶11 Stanko contends that § 61-8-303(1), MCA, is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give a motorist of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the speed at which he or she violates the law, and because it delegates an important public policy matter, such as the appropriate speed on Montana's highways, to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on a case-by-case basis.

¶12 The State denies that Montana's "basic rule" is unconstitutionally vague, but contends that even if it is impermissibly vague as applied in some situations, Stanko does not have standing to challenge the statute facially because his conduct in this case was clearly prohibited by the statute and "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy (1974), 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L.Ed.2d 439, 458.

¶13 We conclude that operating a relatively new motor vehicle, which is concededly in excellent condition, at a speed of 85 miles per hour, on a clear day during daylight hours, on a dry road in rural Montana with no significant traffic in the area, is not so clearly prohibited by the speed restriction found in § 61-8-303(1), MCA, that Stanko lacks standing to challenge that statute for facial vagueness.

¶14 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law. We review a district court's application of the Constitution to determine if it is correct. See State v. Schnittgen (1996), 277 Mont. 291, 295-96, 922 P.2d 500, 503.

¶15 We presume that all statutes are constitutional. It is the duty of courts, if possible, to construe statutes in a manner that avoids unconstitutional interpretation. See State v. Nye (1997), 283 Mont. 505, 510, 943 P.2d 96, 99; State v. Lilburn (1994), 265 Mont. 258, 266, 875 P.2d 1036, 1041, cert. denied (1995), 513 U.S. 1078, 115 S.Ct. 726, 130 L.Ed.2d 630; State v. Ytterdahl (1986), 222 Mont. 258, 261, 721 P.2d 757, 759; Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely (1981), 193 Mont. 378, 382, 632 P.2d 300, 303.

¶16 When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the party making the challenge bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute is unconstitutional, and any doubt is to be resolved in favor of the statute. See Nye, 283 Mont. at 510, 943 P.2d at 99; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148, 902 P.2d 14, 17-18; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3, 873 P.2d 230, 231.

¶17 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised on two different bases: (1) because the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) because it is vague as applied in a particular situation. See Nye, 283 Mont. at 513, 943 P.2d at 101; Martel, 273 Mont. at 149, 902 P.2d at 18; City of Choteau v. Joslyn (1984), 208 Mont. 499, 505, 678 P.2d 665, 668.

¶18 Stanko contends that § 61-8-303(1), MCA, to the extent that it regulates speed at which vehicles can be operated on Montana's highways without providing a numerical limit, is facially vague and, therefore, violates Article II, Section 17, of Montana's Constitution, which guarantees to Montana's citizens due process of law.

¶19 Section 61-8-303(1), MCA, provides as follows:

A person operating or driving a vehicle of any character on a public highway of this state shall drive the vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed no greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation, taking into account the...