State v. Stanko, No. 26442.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Toal
• Citation: 658 S.E.2d 94,376 S.C. 571
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Stephen Christopher STANKO, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 25 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 26442.

658 S.E.2d 94 376 S.C. 571 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Stephen Christopher STANKO, Appellant. No. 26442. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard September 20, 2007. Decided February 25, 2008. Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.

[658 S.E.2d 95]

Chief Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, and Appellate Defender Katherine H. Hudgins, both of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL:

A jury convicted Appellant Steven C. Stanko of murder, assault and battery with intent to kill, criminal sexual conduct, two counts of kidnapping, and armed robbery and recommended Appellant be sentenced to death. In his appeal, Appellant raises issues regarding 1) the limitation of the scope of voir dire and 2) the omission of a statutory mitigating factor from the jury charges in the penalty phase. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of two brutal attacks in a string of violent crimes committed in Georgetown County. The State alleged Appellant strangled his girlfriend and attempted to murder her daughter by slitting her throat in the course of a robbery and sexual assault of the two women. At trial, Appellant did not deny committing the crimes, but alleged that he was insane.

During voir dire, Appellant attempted to question a potential juror as to her views on the insanity defense. The State immediately objected to this line of questioning. The trial judge sustained the objection and ruled that Appellant could ask potential jurors whether they could consider affirmative defenses "and list them all," but could not ask jurors whether they would consider the specific affirmative defense of insanity. After the parties discussed the issue, Appellant indicated he was "abandoning" asking potential jurors questions specifically regarding the insanity defense.

After the State presented its case in chief, Appellant presented expert witnesses in order to prove his insanity defense. The experts testified that medical examinations of Appellant's brain revealed a frontal lobe abnormality. Three of Appellant's experts testified that the frontal lobe abnormality impaired his ability to control his impulses and exercise proper judgment. One of Appellant's experts testified that he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong as required under South Carolina law. See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 577-78, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007) (a defendant is considered legally insane if, at the time of the offense, he lacked the capacity to distinguish moral or legal right from wrong). In rebuttal, the State presented experts who testified that Appellant was able to distinguish between right and wrong and, therefore, could be held criminally responsible for his actions. The trial court submitted a jury charge on the insanity defense and instructed the jury that, in order to be found not guilty by reason of insanity, Appellant had to show by a preponderance

658 S.E.2d 96

of the evidence that he had a mental disease or defect that made him unable to distinguish right from wrong. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-10 (2006). At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury declined to find Appellant not guilty by reason of insanity and returned a guilty verdict as to all counts.

The trial proceeded to the penalty phase, and during the conference to determine the appropriate jury charges, the trial court informed the parties that it intended to charge the jury on two statutory mitigating factors provided in S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) and (6).¹ Appellant did not request a charge on any additional statutory mitigating factors and indicated that he had no objection to the jury charges.

At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended Appellant be sentenced to death. This appeal followed, and Appellant raises the following issues for review:

I. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow Appellant to ask potential jurors about their feelings and viewpoints concerning the defense of insanity during voir dire?

II. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on an additional and unrequested statutory mitigating circumstance?

LAW/ANALYSIS I. Voir Dire

Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to question potential jurors about their feelings on the insanity defense during voir dire. We disagree.

Initially, we question whether this issue is preserved for review. After the trial court ruled that Appellant could not ask potential jurors about their views on the insanity defense, Appellant indicated that he was "abandoning" this line of questioning, thereby suggesting he accepted the trial court's ruling. See State v. George, 323 S.C. 496, 510, 476 S.E.2d 903, 911 (1996) (no issue is preserved for appellate review if the objecting party accepts the trial courts ruling and does not contemporaneously make an additional objection).

In any event, Appellants argument fails on the merits. The scope of voir dire and the manner in which it is conducted are generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 23, 596 S.E.2d 475, 479 (2004). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial courts ruling is based on an error of law. State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000). A capital defendants right to voir dire, while grounded in statutory law, is also rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. To constitute reversible error, a limitation on questioning must render the trial fundamentally unfair. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); State v. Hill, 361 S.C. 297, 308, 604 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2004).

Appellant argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury as a result of the trial courts ruling precluding counsel from questioning potential jurors on their view of the insanity defense. Appellant claims the insanity defense is a controversial legal issue and...