State v. Stanley

• Decision Date: 03 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 35600.,35600.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Steven K. STANLEY.

161 Conn.App. 10

125 A.3d 1078

STATE of Connecticut

v.Steven K. STANLEY.

No. 35600.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 18, 2015.

Decided Nov. 3, 2015.

Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Anthony J. Spinella, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BEACH, KELLER and MIHALAKOS, Js.

BEACH, J.

The defendant, Steven K. Stanley, appeals from the judgment of conviction of 100 counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a–223,¹ stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–181c, and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–62. On appeal, he claims that (1) his conviction of violation of a protective order was based on insufficient evidence, (2) discovery violations regarding his and the victim's cell phone records deprived him of his constitutional rights, (3) the trial court erred in declining to suppress or to strike his and the victim's cell phone records, and (4) his constitutional rights were violated when the same judge who had signed the warrant for his arrest also denied his motion to suppress evidence that had formed, in part, the basis for the application in support of the arrest warrant. We are not persuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim² had had a dating relationship. On February 10, 2012, the victim called the police from a bar and reported that she feared for her safety because the defendant was making threatening phone calls to her from the parking lot of the bar. After Officer Jason Guerrera of the East Hartford Police Department arrived, the defendant was detained in the vicinity of Guerrera's police cruiser, awaiting a ride from his son. He made threatening phone calls to the victim while so detained. Guerrera overheard the calls. The defendant was arrested and handcuffed.

Following this incident, on February 14, 2012, the court issued a protective order that required the defendant "not [to] contact [the victim] in any manner, including by written, electronic or telephone contact...." Despite this order, the defendant phoned the victim between forty and ninety times a day for a period of time. On at least one occasion the defendant offered to buy the victim a drink at a bar that she frequented.

On March 18, 2012, the victim called the police to report that the defendant was violating the protective order by telephoning her constantly. East Hartford police Officer Robert A. Vanacore responded by going to her residence and taking her statement. Later that day, the victim called the police a second time; she then reported that the defendant had appeared in front of her house, and, "burn[ing] rubber," drove his motorcycle away at a high rate of speed. The victim's roommate, Gene Lavigne, also gave a statement to the police, confirming that the defendant had driven his motorcycle by the house. While police were interviewing the victim, the defendant called and spoke to her three times.³

The victim put the cell phone on speaker so that East Hartford police Officer Daniel Zaleski and Vanacore⁴ were able to overhear the calls.

Vanacore sought and obtained the defendant's phone records. After reviewing the records and discovering that approximately 1750 phone calls from the defendant's cell phone to the victim's cell phone had been made between February 14, 2012, and March 24, 2012, Vanacore requested an arrest warrant for the defendant. The state originally charged the defendant with 372 counts, but later filed an amended information that included 102 counts, specifically, 100 counts of criminal violation of a protective order, one count of stalking in the first degree, and one count of threatening in the second degree.

The defendant chose to represent himself, and following a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of all 102 counts. The court sentenced the defendant to eighteen years imprisonment with twelve years special parole and imposed a standing criminal protective order. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant claims that his conviction of 100 counts of violation of a protective order was not supported by sufficient evidence. The defendant admitted that the calls were made from his cell phone, but he argues that the state failed to prove that he personally made the phone calls to the victim. He argues that the number on her caller identification function was blocked. The victim testified that she recognized the defendant's voice on two occasions only. The state argues that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction in that (1) the victim's phone records listed the calls as having been made from the defendant's cell phone number; (2) the victim identified the defendant's voice on several occasions; (3) the defendant showed consciousness of guilt by writing to his sons to ask them to testify that they made the phone calls; and (4) the defendant demonstrated other intimidating and harassing behavior that was consistent with the repeated phone calls. We agree with the state that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction of violation of a protective order. Although there was direct evidence that the defendant made only a limited number of the calls, there was circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant made the calls as charged in the amended information.⁵

"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....

"We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt....

"Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct.... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.... In evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The [jury] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.... Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Binnette, 86 Conn.App. 491, 496–97, 861 A.2d 1197 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 902, 868 A.2d 745 (2005).

In support of the charges, the state presented the testimony of the victim, who received the calls, police officers who overheard one of the threatening phone calls, and the victim's phone records. The jury had before it evidence of more than 1750 calls made from the defendant's cell phone to the victim's cell phone. The jury also heard evidence regarding the failed relationship between the victim and the defendant, and his previously threatening behavior. The victim identified his voice on three phone calls made on March 18, 2012.⁶ The defendant also wrote letters to family members advising them to testify that they had made phone calls to the victim. The jury reasonably could have inferred from this evidence that it was the defendant himself who made all of the phone calls reflected in the victim's phone records. None of the defendant's witnesses⁷ testified that they made many of the calls from the defendant's cell phone, as he contended.⁸ We conclude that the defendant's conviction of violation of a protective order was based on sufficient evidence.

II

The defendant claims that the state failed to provide him with his phone records and the victim's phone records in a timely manner and that he therefore was deprived of (1) his right to confront the witnesses against him and (2) his right to present a defense.⁹

Additional facts are helpful to the resolution of the defendant's claims. The police obtained the defendant's phone records at the outset of the investigation. The defendant moved for discovery, including requests for "all facts of [the] arrest" and "all evidence."¹⁰ The court, C. Taylor, J., granted the motions on February 21, 2012, and May 8, 2012. The defendant subsequently made several motions for the court to order the state to comply with the prior orders and turn over several items, including relevant phone records relating to both the defendant and the victim. On August 17, 2012, at a hearing before Judge Fuger, the state said that it did not have either the defendant's phone records or the victim's phone records, but that if it did obtain them, it would disclose them to the defendant. Judge Fuger said that if the state attempted to introduce the records without having first provided them to the defendant, he would not allow them into evidence. The defendant eventually obtained at least a substantial part, if not all, of his phone records. The state reported...