State v. Stanley

Decision Date07 February 1991
Docket NumberNo. CR-87-0289-AP,CR-87-0289-AP
Citation167 Ariz. 519,809 P.2d 944
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Milo McCormick STANLEY, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court
OPINION

JAMES D. HATHAWAY, Court of Appeals Judge, Department A.

JURISDICTION

Milo McCormick Stanley (Stanley) appeals from his convictions of two counts of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death for killing his daughter and to life imprisonment for killing his wife. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4033 and -4035.

ISSUES

Stanley contends: (1) his confession and subsequent incriminating statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of his constitutional right to legal counsel; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant because it was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and because the evidence supporting probable cause was improperly obtained; (3) the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained pursuant to the consent search because law enforcement personnel were already on the premises and because the alleged consent was invalid under the circumstances; (4) the trial court should have granted Stanley's motion to voir dire the trial judge for possible bias or prejudice; (5) a change of venue should have been granted; (6) the death sentence imposed for the murder of his daughter was disproportionate and excessive under the circumstances; and, (7) Arizona's death penalty statute is unconstitutional.

FACTS

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on June 19, 1986, Stanley reported to the Clarkdale Police that his wife and five-year-old daughter had gone for a walk at about 10:45 p.m. and had not returned. Police officers and family members began searching the community for the woman and child.

At about 9:30 the next morning, two of Stanley's wife's sisters went to the business owned by Stanley and his father, a Volkswagen garage. There they saw the car the missing woman had driven the previous evening. Stanley's father gave the women permission to look through the car and they found one of Stanley's wife's shoes and one of the missing child's shoes. They also noted an offensive odor in the automobile. They reported these findings to the Clarkdale Police Department, telling the officers their sister and niece had worn the shoes the night before.

One of the sisters returned to the garage that afternoon. Finding it locked, she went to Stanley's apartment and asked his mother for the keys. Stanley gave his mother the keys and she gave them to the sister, who then returned to the garage. Looking through the car again, she discovered what she believed to be bloodstains. Later, the second sister arrived at the shop and she too saw the bloodstains. They also reported this to the Clarkdale Police.

Upon receiving this new information, five officers accompanied the sisters to the garage and entered the premises. They found a shell casing to a small calibre firearm and some bloody socks in the car.

At about 5:30 p.m. the same day, officers went to Stanley's apartment and requested that he and his father accompany them to the garage. They obtained written consent from both Stanley and his father to search the garage. While officers continued to search the premises pursuant to the consent given, Stanley agreed to accompany an investigator (Saravo) to the county building for further interviewing regarding his missing wife and child. After advising Stanley of his Miranda rights, Saravo asked him for permission to search his apartment. Stanley signed a consent form. During questioning, Stanley stated that he did not wish to say anything more until he could speak with a lawyer. He was extremely emotional at this time.

Meanwhile, pursuant to the signed consent forms, officers searched the garage and discovered a blood-soaked blanket and seat cover in a trash can located inside the business premises. They then returned to the county building to secure a search warrant. While there, they told Saravo what they had found. Saravo communicated to Stanley that foul play was suspected and disclosed the items that had been found at the garage.

Stanley again became extremely emotional and began to cry. After a short while, Saravo asked whether Stanley was all right. Stanley then confessed that he had shot his wife and daughter. The officers questioned him in an attempt to determine whether the victims might still be alive. Stanley responded that they were dead, and the officers asked where the bodies could be found. Stanley then recounted the events of the previous evening and the area where he had hidden the bodies.

During this time, a search warrant had been drafted and the officers sought a magistrate to issue the document. The magistrate was not at home, but his wife was able to contact him and advised him that he was needed at the county building. When he arrived there, he learned that everyone was at the garage. The magistrate then proceeded to the garage, entered, and sat at a desk just inside the door where he reviewed the affidavit and issued the warrant.

Police found the bodies of Stanley's wife and daughter alongside Allen Springs Road at the location indicated by Stanley. Stanley's wife had been shot three times, the child had been shot once.

CONFESSION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Stanley contends the trial court erred in admitting his statements to the officers because they were involuntary and obtained in violation of his right to counsel. He argues that because he was given his Miranda warnings and thereafter invoked his right to counsel, all interrogation should have ceased. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981); State v. Finehout, 136 Ariz. 226, 665 P.2d 570 (1983). He asserts that the right to curtail questioning must be scrupulously honored and that a confession is prima facie involuntary, see Finehout, 136 Ariz. at 229, 665 P.2d at 573, unless the state shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntarily made. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978). Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that Stanley's statements to Saravo were voluntarily made.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear and manifest error. State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 733 P.2d 1090 (1987). The trial court determined there was neither a Miranda nor an Edwards violation because Stanley was not in custody at the time of Saravo's questioning. We agree. Miranda warnings are required only when police officers question a suspect who is in custody. State v. Perea, 142 Ariz. 352, 690 P.2d 71 (1984). In this case, Stanley received Miranda warnings in connection with requests for consent to search the garage and his residence. These warnings were not required. State v. Dean, 112 Ariz. 437, 543 P.2d 425 (1975); State v. King, 140 Ariz. 602, 684 P.2d 174 (App.1984).

Whether one is in custody is determined objectively: Under the circumstances, would a reasonable person feel deprived of his freedom of action? State v. Carrillo, 156 Ariz. 125, 750 P.2d 883 (1988). Factors indicative of custody include: (1) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present; (2) the site of the interrogation; (3) the length and form of the investigation; and, (4) whether the investigation had focused on the accused. State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 700 P.2d 488 (1985).

In the present case, law enforcement was activated by a call from Stanley into a search for his wife and daughter when he reported them missing. During the search and investigation, Saravo testified that Stanley was asked if he would accompany Saravo to the county building to "talk to him about, you know, things we had found." Stanley voluntarily agreed to accompany him. He was not handcuffed; indeed, he was told he was not under arrest and was not a suspect. Stanley was wearing a hunting knife and was not disarmed. Although the Cottonwood Police Station was not very far from the garage, Stanley was questioned at Saravo's office in the county building, which also was not far from the garage.

At the time of questioning, the investigation's focus was on a search for missing persons initiated by Stanley himself, not on a homicide. While Saravo had suspicions about Stanley, there was no direct evidence of his involvement. Testimony during the hearing on the motion to suppress was unequivocal that Stanley was free to leave. During the interview, he left the office unescorted to get something to drink and use the restroom. He remained in the office once Saravo stated that the interview was terminated and while Saravo was putting away the tape recorder. There was neither a display of weapons nor physical contact or use of language indicating that Stanley's presence or statements were compelled. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 3051, 65 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1980). Applying the Carter factors to this case, we agree that Stanley was not in custody.

Stanley argues that it is irrelevant whether he was in custody because that only determines if Miranda warnings were required. He contends that because he had been given his Miranda warnings in conjunction with the consent to search requests, and because he invoked his rights, questioning should have stopped at that time under Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487, 101 S.Ct. at 1886, 68 L.Ed.2d at 388.

Because no such...

To continue reading

Request your trial
99 cases
  • State v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • May 24, 2022
    ...the resultant premeditated murder of that child is the ultimate perversion of the parent/child relationship."); State v. Stanley , 167 Ariz. 519, 529, 809 P.2d 944, 954 (1991) ("When a father kills his own child, his actions cannot be characterized as sensible, nor can his state of mind be ......
  • State v. West
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1993
    ...present. Later cases have found additional factors to be appropriate considerations, but they are not present here. State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 529, 809 P.2d 944, 954, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014, 112 S.Ct. 660, 116 L.Ed.2d 751 (1991) (relationship between defendant and victim); State ......
  • U.S. v. Ramirez
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • August 8, 1995
    ...S.Ct. at 2123), cert. denied sub nom. Young v. New Hampshire, 485 U.S. 1008, 108 S.Ct. 1474, 99 L.Ed.2d 703 (1988); State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 526, 809 P.2d 944, 950-51 (disapproving magistrate's actions but upholding warrant in circumstances), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014, 112 S.Ct. 6......
  • State v. Lavers
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 23, 1991
    ...have reviewed one recent case that involved the same three aggravating factors found to exist in this case for count I. State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 809 P.2d 944 (1991). Finally, we have reviewed cases in which this court reduced the sentence imposed to life imprisonment. E.g., State v.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Cases Cited: Arizona Supreme Court.
    • United States
    • State Bar of Arizona Arizona Supreme Court Part H Cases Cited(Chapter 68. - 69.) 69. Cases Cited: Arizona Supreme Court.
    • Invalid date
    ...807 P.2d 1109 (1991) (PCR review, relief denied) (cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875 (1991)) (for Serna I, see 163 Ariz. 260).• State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 809 P.2d 944 (1991) (death penalty affirmed) (on a mountain road, the defendant shot and killed his wife and child) (aggravation: multiple......
  • Appendix F Table of Authorities
    • United States
    • State Bar of Arizona DUI Trial Notebook (2021 Ed.) Appendix F Table of Authorities
    • Invalid date
    ...62 State v. Stabler, 162 Ariz. 370, 783 P.2d 816 (App. Div. 2, 1989...........................................30 State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 809 P.2d 944 (1991).................................................................30 State v. Stanley, 217 Ariz. 253, 172 P.3d 848 (App. Div. 1......
  • § 3.7 MIRANNDA RIGHTS
    • United States
    • State Bar of Arizona DUI Trial Notebook (2021 Ed.) 3 Contact
    • Invalid date
    ...the defendant actually asks for an attorney. See also Chapter 4, Right to Counsel During Testing. § 3.7.1 Custody State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 523, 809 P.2d 944, 948 (1991) The determination of custody is an objective test of whether a reasonable person would feel that he was deprived o......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT