State v. Steele, 76-2086
| Decision Date | 26 July 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-2086,76-2086 |
| Citation | 348 So.2d 398 |
| Parties | The STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Ralph Howard STEELE, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty. and John P. Durant, Asst. State Atty., for petitioner.
Colin Guy, Miami, for respondent.
Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ.
This is a traffic infraction proceeding in which a motorist was adjudged guilty of a traffic offense and fined. The circuit court reversed and the State petitions this court for a writ of certiorari.
The issue presented for review is whether a hearing officer on a traffic infraction hearing may precede the hearing with an opening statement discouraging charged motorists from pleading not guilty by giving a law lecture on alleged frivolous defenses to traffic infractions and, in particular, stating that there is no defense to a traffic infraction involving a rear-end collision except total brake failure. We hold that such an opening statement is improper as a general rule and in particular constitutes a basis to recuse the judge in a traffic infraction proceeding conducted thereafter in which a motorist is charged with a traffic offense involving an alleged rear-end collision. We, accordingly, find no departure from the essential requirements of law in the circuit court's reversal of the traffic infraction conviction herein and deny the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
On February 22, 1976, the respondent Ralph Steele was issued a traffic ticket for careless driving resulting in a rear-end collision in violation of Section 316.030, Florida Statutes (1975). On April 25, 1976, the case came on for a trial before a hearing officer, the Honorable Judge James Rainwater of the County Court of Dade County, Florida.
Prior to calling the case, the judge made a lengthy opening statement to the courtroom of ticketed motorists whose cases were on the court calendar for that evening. In the statement, he gave a law lecture on alleged frivolous defenses to various offenses, the import of which was to discourage not guilty pleas. Specifically, he stated that under the law there was no defense to a traffic offense involving a rear-end collision except total brake failure. He emphasized that he did not want to hear any defenses which he thought were frivolous. He did not explain basic court procedures, the various pleas which could be entered or any of the rights of the ticketed motorists.
The judge then called the respondent Steele's case along with a companion case. The respondent Steele was represented by counsel who entered a plea of not guilty to the charge and requested the judge to recuse himself from the case based upon his opening statement. The following proceedings took place:
"(DEFENSE COUNSEL): On behalf of the Defendant Steele, my name is Colin Guy. I represent him, and we would enter a plea of not guilty at this time.
Your Honor, I have a motion to make at this time.
I would ask the Judge, this Honorable Court to recuse itself from this type of case. It is a rear end collision and you made a specific statement that there is no defense to a rear end collision.
THE COURT: There is none.
Your motion is denied. That is the law and I am not going to repeat myself by telling you about the law.
Obviously, there is no other excuse. It might be in a civil case, but not in a traffic case because you run into the rear of someone, then you are guilty unless you have brake failure.
If you do not have brake failure, anything you tell me is simply in mitigation of what happened.
There is no defense.
Prior to taking testimony, the judge qualified his statements on the alleged law of rear-end collisions by announcing that he had been talking only of a "true rear-end collision" by which he meant to exclude a case where "somebody cuts in front of you."
The judge took testimony thereafter which revealed that in the early evening hours of February 22, 1976, the respondent Steele was driving his car south in the left hand lane on South Dixie Highway in Dade County, Florida. It had been raining earlier and it was still drizzling. The traffic was moderate to heavy. Traveling ahead of the Steele vehicle was a large van which blocked Steele's view of the traffic ahead of the van. Steele was traveling within the 45 mph speed limit at the time at about 34-40 mph. The van then switched lanes suddenly revealing just ahead in Steele's lane, a vehicle in the process of stopping for another vehicle which in turn was stopped to make a left hand turn off South Dixie Highway. Steele applied his brakes immediately but they did not take hold causing him to rear-end the vehicle stopped ahead of him. This vehicle in turn rear-ended the vehicle stopped ahead of it.
At the close of the evidence, defense counsel argued to the judge that Steele was not guilty of careless driving because the accident under the circumstances was unavoidable due to the sudden appearance of the stopped vehicle on a fast-moving thoroughfare after the van had changed lanes together with the unexpected brake failure of the Steele vehicle. The judge found the defendant guilty as charged and fined him $100 plus $4 court costs.
The respondent Steele appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. Section 318.16(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The circuit court heard the appeal and entered an order reversing the conviction with directions to afford the defendant a new trial before another hearing official. The circuit court concluded that the judge should have recused himself in view of his opening statement to the ticketed motorists which in effect pre-judged the respondent's case prior to hearing any evidence. The State now petitions this court for a writ of certiorari seeking to quash the circuit court's decision.
It is the established law of this State that every litigant, including the State in criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of the court to scrupulously guard this right of the litigant and to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any manner where his qualification to do so is seriously brought into question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit and place the judiciary in a compromising attitude which is bad for the administration of justice. Crosby v. State, 97 So.2d 181 (Fla.1957); State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); State ex rel. Mickle v. Rowe,100 Fla. 1382, 131 So. 331 (1930).
A judge must not only be impartial, he must leave the impression of impartiality upon all those who attend court. Anderson v. State, 287 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). The attitude of the judge and the atmosphere of the courtroom should be such that no matter what charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause is before the court, the judge can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum which is everything a court represents: impartiality and justice. The due process guarantee of a fair trial can mean nothing less than this. State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939).
The prejudice of a judge is a delicate question for a litigant to raise but when raised as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a modicum of reason, the judge in question should be prompt to recuse himself. No judge under any circumstances is warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is shadowed or even questioned. Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); State ex rel. Aguiar v. Chappell, 344 So.2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
In the instant case, the judge delivered an opening statement to the respondent and the other ticketed motorists in the court audience which placed in question his impartiality to sit on the respondent's case. He gave a law lecture on defenses to traffic charges the import of which was to discourage the entry of...
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