State v. Steffes

• Decision Date: 27 May 1970
• Citation: 90 Adv.Sh. 551,465 P.2d 905,2 Or.App. 163
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Earl Porter STEFFES, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 905

465 P.2d 905

2 Or.App. 163

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Earl Porter STEFFES, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Oregon, Department 1.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 19, 1970.

Decided March 5, 1970.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1970.

Review Denied May 27, 1970.

Ken C. Hadley, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.

Billy L. Williamson, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George Van Hoomissen, Dist. Atty., Portland.

Before SCHWAB, C.J., and FORT and BRANCHFIELD, JJ.

BRANCHFIELD, Judge.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of the crime of robbery by putting in fear, not being armed with a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, which sentence was subsequently vacated following a habitual criminal proceeding, and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On January 3, 1968, Portland city police received information that a man named Earl, a recent releasee from the Oregon State Penitentiary, was involved in a series of hotel robberies and that the man was staying at a hotel in Portland. When the police checked the list of persons recently released from the Oregon State Penitentiary, they found the name of the defendant. Several pictures, including the defendant's, were shown to the victims of the hotel robberies. These victims picked out the defendant's picture as being that of the robber.

The police went to the hotel where the defendant was staying and inquired as to whether the defendant was registered there. Upon learning that he was, the officers asked the hotel clerk to accompany them to the defendant's room. By that time it was after 10:00 p.m. When the officers and the desk clerk arrived at the defendant's room, the clerk knocked on the door, then unlocked it and stepped aside. The police officers entered the room, turning on the light. They made a quick search of the room for the defendant but found that he was not there. The desk clerk returned to his duties, two officers stayed in the defendant's room to await his return, and two other officers waited in a room down the hall. A short time later the defendant returned, and when he opened the door he was immediately placed under arrest.

While the officers were in the room looking for the defendant, they observed a toy pistol and a pair of dark glasses lying on top of the dresser. In the closet they found the clothes which answered the description of clothing worn by the perpetrator of the hotel robberies. They made no further search at that time, but searched the room more thoroughly after the arrest of the defendant. The officers took possession of the articles which they thought might be related to the robberies and returned with them and the defendant to the police station.

The defendant claims error in the failure of the trial court to suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest. Defendant concedes that the police had probable cause for his arrest but claims the search and seizure were illegal because the police did not comply with the Oregon statute requiring them to give notice of their office and announce their purpose. ¹ He argues that even though he was not in the room at the time the officers entered, the officers did not know he was absent and therefore they were not excused from complying with the ritual of the 'knock and announce' rule. If the arrest was improper, the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

In People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. den. 352 U.S. 858, 77 S.Ct. 81, 1 L.Ed.2d 65 (1956), the California court found that strict compliance with the knock and announce rule might not always be required. The court said:

'It must be borne in mind that the primary purpose of the constitutional guarantees is to prevent unreasonable invasions of the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, and when an officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to make an arrest and as an incident to that arrest is authorized to make a reasonable search, his entry and his search are not unreasonable. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with section 844. Moreover, since the demand and explanation requirements of section 844 are a codification of the common law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limited by the common law rules that compliance is not required if the officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose. (Citations omitted). Without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide these questions in the first instance. * * *'

In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 741 (1963), the court said:

'* * * Assuming that the officers' entry by use of a key obtained from the manager is the legal equivalent of a 'breaking,' see Keiningham v. United States, 109 App.D.C. 272, 276, 287 F.2d 126, 130 (1960) it has been recognized from the early common law that such breaking is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances. * * *'

Some discussion is advisable concerning the recent case of Duke v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, Cal., 82 Cal.Rptr. 348, 461 P.2d 628 (December 4, 1969). In that case the police received a complaint from the petitioner's wife in the early morning hours that petitioner had slapped and beaten her, that she was afraid of him, and that he had a newly acquired bottle of red pills in the bathroom. She informed the police that the front door was unlocked, and she gave them permission to enter the house to find out what the pills were and to arrest her husband. The police officers went to petitioner's home, knocked on the front door, and waited about 30 seconds, but heard no response or any other noise. They did not identify themselves as police officers or explain the purpose of their desire for admission, but opened the door and walked into petitioner's bedroom where he was sleeping. He was placed under arrest and the red pills were seized as evidence and found to be a dangerous drug. The California Supreme Court held no exigent circumstances existed to excuse compliance with the statute requiring them to announce the purpose of their visit. The permission by the wife to enter the house was held to be insufficient to excuse the police from complying with that law. However, the court reaffirmed its reliance upon the rule expressed in People v. Maddox, supra, and other California cases which permit a police officer to enter a home without first knocking and announcing the purpose of the entry where the police possess information which might lead them reasonably to believe that evidence may be destroyed, a culprit escape or that the police might face increased peril.

In this case the police knew that the defendant had just been released from the penitentiary and that the hotel clerks who were robbed had stated that the robber used a gun in each case. Thus they had reasonable grounds to believe that tarrying in the hall outside the defendant's door might expose them to danger. In determining the lawfulness of the entry and the existence of probable cause, the court should concern itself only with what the officers reasonably believed at the time of their entry. There were exigent circumstances in this case which justified the officers in entering Steffes' room without first announcing their purpose.

The state called a Mr. Sifkowirtz as a witness in the trial. Mr. Sifkowirtz had been sitting in the lobby of a hotel at the time the defendant robbed the clerk of that hotel. As he took the witness stand, and before he had answered any questions, the witness suffered a heart attack. The jury was promptly excused and the witness was taken to a hospital. The heart attack was not serious but, due to the witness's advanced age and condition, his doctor...