State v. Stegnik
| Decision Date | 22 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 104,072.,104,072. |
| Citation | 297 P.3d 311 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Cory A. STEGNIK, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; John J. Kisner, Jr., Clark V. Owens II, and Warren M. Wilbert, judges.
Shawn E. Minihan, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ATCHESON, P.J., BUSER and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
Following a plea agreement, Cory Stegnik pled guilty to three sex offenses. Prior to sentencing, however, Stegnik filed a pro se motion to dismiss his trial counsel and withdraw his pleas. On appeal, Stegnik contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to appoint conflict-free counsel and denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He also argues that his lifetime postrelease supervision term constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Upon our review of Stegnik's arguments and the record on appeal, we conclude the district court did not err and, therefore, affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the district court.
On February 14, 2009, K.G.A., a 14–year–old girl and K.D.F., a 13–year–old girl, went to the Stegnik's home to “hang out” with Stegnik, who was 18 years old, and his 19–year–old friend, Alex Jacobs. Stegnik provided several alcoholic beverages to both girls and, as a result, they became very intoxicated. According to K.D.F., Stegnik and Jacobs then sexually assaulted them. K.D.F. claimed she was “basically too intoxicated to react to the severity of the situation,” and she passed out while the boys were taking advantage of her and K.G.A. K.D.F. also indicated that K.G.A. “passed out” shortly after consuming the alcoholic beverages.
Jacobs and Stegnik were interviewed by the police. Jacobs advised that prior to the party, a friend of Stegnik's bought them $70 worth of “booze” because Jacobs and Stegnik planned to “get the girls drunk and have a four way.” Jacobs confirmed that the girls became “really drunk.” He recalled that K.G.A. appeared to have “ ‘pure alcohol poisoning’ “ because “ ‘she couldn't walk every time she tried to stand up,’ “ and when she “tried to open her eyes you couldn't see her pupils.” For his part, Stegnik was asked by the police if he understood why he was brought to the police station. Stegnik responded, ‘ “I believe so, I am being charged with statutory rape.’ “ Stegnik also stated that he did not know the girls' ages prior to the party, but after “they got drunk,” the girls told him “they were fourteen.”
On February 19, 2009, the State charged Stegnik with one count of rape of a child under age 14, one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy.
On January 8, 2010, Stegnik pled guilty, pursuant to plea negotiations, to one count of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child under age 14, in violation of K.S.A. 21–3511(a), one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age, in violation of K.S.A. 21–3504(a)(1), and one count of criminal sodomy of a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age, in violation of K.S.A. 21–3505(a)(2). After confirming that Stegnik understood his rights, the charges against him, and the consequences of his pleas, the district court accepted Stegnik's pleas as “knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
On February 2, 2010, prior to sentencing, Stegnik filed a pro se motion to dismiss his counsel and withdraw his guilty pleas. Stegnik alleged that his counsel, Timothy Frieden, was ineffective because Frieden coerced him to plead guilty “by way of threats and promises.” Accordning to Stegnik, Frieden discussed his case with his parents, without his permission, in an effort “to pressure [him] into taking a plea,” and despite his wishes, Frieden failed to prepare a defense and move forward with trial. Stegnik further alleged that Frieden failed to properly advise him of the ramifications of his pleas, i.e., his convictions would, for the rest of his life, adversely affect his employability “in a long list of occupations”; and should he have children in the future, he would not be allowed to pick them up from school.
On February 26, 2010, the district court held a hearing to consider Stegnik's motion to dismiss Frieden. At the hearing, Stegnik clarified the arguments he raised in his motion. First, Stegnik explained that Frieden engaged in “constant coercion” by repeatedly emphasizing his potential sentence: “[Frieden] came to me ... saying if you don't take this plea you won't be on the grid at all, basically, and giving me the emotional fear of life in prison.” Second, Stegnik indicated that although he gave Frieden permission to speak with his parents, he thought Frieden's contacts with his family would be limited to specific issues, and he did not expect Frieden to discuss sentencing matters. According to Stegnik, Frieden's discussions with his family extended beyond the topics he deemed acceptable because his father, for instance, would visit him at the jail with “tears in his eyes, saying, if you don't take this plea, I'm going to spend the rest of my life seeing you in prison and I don't want to see that.” Stegnik claimed this caused him to feel “emotionally pressured” into pleading guilty because he did not “want [his] parents feeling, saying, why didn't you take that plea, ... [he] just didn't want to hurt [them].” Finally, Stegnik alleged that he and Frieden had a “conflict of interest” because Frieden thought he was guilty.
At the conclusion of the hearing, District Judge John J. Kisner, Jr., denied Stegnik's request for new trial counsel because Stegnik failed to show “justifiable dissatisfaction” with Frieden necessitating the appointment of substitute counsel. Judge Kisner explained:
Four days later, on March 2, 2010, the district court conducted a separate hearing on Stegnik's motion to withdraw his pleas. At the hearing, Stegnik told District Judge Clark V. Owens II—the judge who accepted Stegnik's pleas—he wished to withdraw his pleas and proceed to trial, Stegnik argued that his pleas were a byproduct of emotional distress and he had “more of a fighting chance” at countering the State's evidence and obtaining an acquittal. Stegnik explained that he was “constantly being told to take the plea,” and due to Frieden's actions, his parents were distraught. Although Stegnik acknowledged that when he entered his pleas he told Judge Owens that he understood the plea agreement, the potential sentences he faced, and the rights he waived by pleading guilty, Stegnik said he did not actually understand any of this information. According to Stegnick, this was because his father had a “panic attack” in the courtroom moments before he entered his pleas and he was concerned about his parents' welfare. Judge Owens denied Stegnik's motion, finding that he had failed to show good cause to set aside the pleas.
Three days later, Stegnik filed a motion to dismiss all of the charges against him. He asserted that the severe and unconstitutional nature of the potential sentences associated with the original charges against him (life imprisonment with a minimum sentence of 25 years) “influenced [his] ability to make any reasoned decision on how to proceed regarding plea or trial.” Stegnik also raised the issue that his sentences were unconstitutional because the lifetime postrelease supervision term, mandated by K.S.A.2008 Supp. 22–3717(d)(1)(G), violated the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.
Immediately prior to sentencing on March 9, 2010, the district court held a hearing on Stegnik's motion to dismiss. The district court denied Stegnik's motion, stating that the legislature had deemed it appropriate to require sex offenders to serve lifetime postrelease supervision terms due to the nature of the offenses and public safety concerns.
At sentencing, the district court denied Stegnik's motion for a durational departure, and sentenced him to a controlling term of 61 months' imprisonment with lifetime postrelease supervision. Stegnik filed a timely appeal.
For his first issue on appeal, Stegnick contends “[b]y not appointing Mr. Stegnik conflict-free counsel at a hearing where the State is represented, the district court failed to hold a meaningful hearing on Mr. Stegnik's motion” to withdraw pleas.
Appellate courts review this issue for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 312, 318, 263 P.3d 153 (2011). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion:
“if [the] judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.” State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied132 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial