State v. Steinhauer, 37078

Decision Date20 November 1968
Docket NumberNo. 37078,37078
Citation216 So.2d 214
PartiesThe STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Jerry Lee STEINHAUER, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Herbert M. Klein, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.

THORNAL, Justice.

By petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of a district court of appeal allegedly in conflict with decisions of this Court and another district court. Fla.Const. Art. V, § 4, F.S.A.; Steinhauer v. State, 206 So.2d 25 (3d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1968).

We must decide whether In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), applies retroactively to a waiver of jurisdiction hearing in a Florida juvenile court.

Respondent, Jerry Lee Steinhauer, was a juvenile, age sixteen, when arrested. Pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 39.02 (1965), F.S.A. he was promptly taken before a juvenile court for a hearing. He was bound over to the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County following a voluntary waiver of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. During the hearing on waiver, respondent was not represented by counsel. There is no showing that he was advised of a right to counsel.

On October 18, 1966, respondent was adjudged guilty in the Criminal Court of Record upon two, two-count informations which charged him with breaking and entering felonies. He was sentenced to consecutive five year terms upon each information.

On January 11, 1967, respondent filed a petition for relief pursuant to former Criminal Procedure Rule Number I, now Cr.P.R. 1.850, 33 F.S.A. This is Florida's procedure for post-conviction relief. On February 2, 1967, the respondent amended this petition. In his amended petition he raised two points contesting the validity of his conviction and sentence. His first contention was that he was coerced into waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. His second was that he was not advised of his right to counsel, nor did he have counsel, at the hearing in the juvenile court when he waived that court's jurisdiction. On February 10, 1967, the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County denied the post-conviction application. Respondent appealed this denial to the Third District Court of Appeal.

The District Court stated that it dealt solely with the following issue:

'The critical question presented upon this appeal is whether a 16--year-old boy is entitled to counsel in the Juvenile Court at a hearing where he waives the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.' Steinhauer v. State, 206 So.2d 25, 26 (3d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1968).

Relying on In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), and

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the District Court on December 12, 1967, reversed the trial court. It held that a juvenile has a right to the assistance of counsel in a juvenile court at a hearing when he elects to waive the jurisdiction of that court. It held this to be a right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The District Court also felt that Gault and Kent apply Retroactively in favor of respondent by analogy to the application of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963), and under Johnson v. New Jersey, 284 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), and Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). This view was reaffirmed on rehearing.

On petition for certiorari the State claims that Steinhauer v. State, supra, is in direct conflict with decisions of other district courts and this Court. We have granted certiorari and heard oral argument because we feel that the instant decision does directly conflict with Ex parte Kitts, 109 Fla. 202, 147 So. 573 (1933), and Sult v. Weber, 210 So.2d 739 (4th Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1968). It likewise conflicts with obiter dictum in In re T.W.P., 192 So.2d 482 (Fla.1966). See Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla.1960).

The conflict derives from the following statements in Steinhauer, supra:

'We interpret what was said in Gault and Kent, when read together, to mean that the basic requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require assistance of counsel whether it results in a transfer order or a commitment order. The purpose for creating juvenile courts was not to deprive a juvenile of his rights but to ameliorate the harshness of the Criminal law.' Id. 206 So.2d at 27.

'Therefore, we feel that the ruling in Gault must apply to cases both prospectively and Retroactively.' Id. 206 So.2d at 27--28. (Emphasis added)

The District Court thus held that Florida Juvenile Courts are analogous to criminal courts in certain fundamental aspects. It held that juveniles when appearing before juvenile courts, whether for transfer or commitment, have certain fundamental, organic rights characteristic of criminal proceedings. Illustrative is the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages in juvenile court proceedings. In Kitts, though not factually on point because the issue was whether a juvenile has the right to trial by jury in a juvenile court, we held:

'Juvenile Courts and judges have No criminal jurisdiction, nor have they any jurisdiction to try and adjudge any person, whether a minor or not, guilty of the violation of a city or town ordinance.' Id. 147 So. at 575. (emphasis added)

The conflict of law is direct though the cases are factually dissimilar. In Steinhauer by asserting the right to have counsel in juvenile courts, the District Court followed Gault, which had applied this Sixth Amendment right to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Sixth Amendment reads in part: 'In all criminal prosecutions, * * * the accused shall * * * have assistance of counsel for his defense.' Thus, under the Sixth Amendment, the right to have the assistance of counsel vests in an individual only in 'criminal prosecutions.' Since under the Steinhauer rule juveniles appearing in juvenile courts must have counsel, then obviously under that rule it would follow that juvenile courts in Florida do exercise a measure of criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the direct conflict between Steinhauer and Kitts becomes apparent.

In T.W.P., this Court by obiter dictum stated:

'Furthermore, the Juvenile proceedings herein are not criminal proceedings and no stigma attached to Appellant growing out of such proceedings which would justify reaching back of the release and vitiating the adjudication in the juvenile court.' Id. 192 So.2d at 482. (Emphasis added)

T.W.P. was never adjudicated on its merits because the juvenile had been released from custody and the issue of lack of counsel at the juvenile court hearing had become moot. Nevertheless, this Court simply re-enforced its earlier opinion in Kitts by holding that 'juvenile proceedings herein are not criminal proceedings.' The District Court in the present case says that juvenile courts are criminal proceedings when it comes to the need for counsel.

Since the case at bar was filed in this Court on February 1, 1968, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has decided a case that is directly in conflict with Steinhauer. Sult v. Weber, 210 So.2d 739 (4th Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1968). The only factual difference is that instead of dealing with a waiver hearing in a juvenile court, Sult deals with the right to counsel in a juvenile court delinquency hearing. The Fourth District Court held Gault is definitely Not retroactive. The Court stated:

'Following the reasoning given for applying prospective limitations in the above-cited cases, we venture to hold that application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, is not applicable in collateral attack on Pre-Gault judgments, and the judgment appealed from is reversed.' 210 So.2d at 749.

Steinhauer is therefore in direct conflict with two prior decisions of this Court and, also, a decision of another district court of appeal subsequently entered. We take jurisdiction to resolve the conflict.

Several aspects of the instant matter are of significance. They should be retained in mind as we proceed to a decision. They are:

(a) The current attack is collateral. It is not a proceeding for direct review.

(b) A Florida juvenile court waiver proceeding does not require a determination of delinquency or incarceration as an incident to waiver. It involves no decision on the merits.

(c) No attack on the waiver was made after the cause was transferred to the criminal court and was pending trial there with the assistance of counsel.

An accurate perspective of the problem is also illumined by certain dates.

The waiver hearing in the juvenile court was held on August 23, 1966. Informations charging the crimes were filed August 30, 1966, and September 7, 1966. Respondent pleaded not guilty. He was tried and convicted by the criminal court on October 18, 1966. The decision in Kent was announced on March 21, 1966. The decision in Gault was announced May 15, 1967. The application for post-conviction relief in the instant case was denied on February 10, 1967.

Kent v. United States, supra, was decided entirely on the basis of the District of Columbia Code. While it involved certain aspects of a waiver hearing under the Code, it did not demand, nor produce, far reaching constitutional considerations. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly circumscribed its rule of decision by refusing 'to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties' applicable to adults charged with serious offenses must be applied to juvenile court proceedings. The Court specifically announced that the 'Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of' the Court of Appeal 'provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no further.' 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct. at 1055. Kent, supra,...

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