State v. Steinmetz

• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 32,732.,32,732.
• Citation: 327 P.3d 1145
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Bryan James STEINMETZ, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

327 P.3d 1145

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Bryan James STEINMETZ, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 32,732.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

April 17, 2014.

Certiorari Denied, June 17, 2014, No. 34,712.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

L. Helen Bennett, P.C., L. Helen Bennett, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} On April 30, 2009, Defendant Bryan James Steinmetz was indicted on counts of criminal sexual penetration of a child, criminal sexual contact of a minor, kidnapping, bribery, and child abuse relating to allegations that he sexually abused his daughter during the period of November 2006 through November 2008 when she was six to seven years old. On January 4, 2013, following a hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss for a violation of his right to a speedy trial, the court entered an order of dismissal of the case on speedy trial grounds. The State appeals from the order of dismissal. We conclude Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, and we reverse the district court's order of dismissal.

BACKGROUND

{2} Necessary and relevant factual and procedural details are provided throughout the discussion.

Standard of Review

{3} Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a person who is accused of a crime has a fundamental right to a speedy trial. State v. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. At the heart of this right is “preventing prejudice to the accused.” Id. ¶ 12. In effect, the right is intended “to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration [,] ... to minimize anxiety ... of the accused[,] and ... to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” State v. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 34, 283 P.3d 272 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{4} Determining whether a defendant's speedy trial right has been violated requires a review of the particular circumstances of each case, including consideration of the conduct of the prosecution, that of the defendant, and “the harm to the defendant from the delay.” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. Our analysis in this regard is guided by considering four factors: “(1) the length of delay[;] (2) the reasons for the delay[;] (3) the defendant's assertion of his right[;] and (4) the actual prejudice to the defendant that, on balance, determines whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On appeal from an order of dismissal for a violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial, the appellate courts review the speedy trial factors de novo. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272.

The Length of the Delay

{5} “The length of delay serves two purposes under the speedy trial analysis.” Id. ¶ 20. On the one hand, it triggers an analysis of the speedy trial factors; and on the other hand it is, itself, a speedy trial factor to be weighed in the balance. Id. The speedy trial analysis in the present case was triggered by the passage of approximately forty-three months from the date that Defendant was indicted to the date of the evidentiary hearing on his motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. The district court found, and the parties do not disagree, that the case was of intermediate complexity; we will defer to the court's determination in this regard. See State v. Plouse, 2003–NMCA–048, ¶ 42, 133 N.M. 495, 64 P.3d 522 (“We give due deference to the district court's findings as to the level of complexity.”); see also Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 2, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (updating the “guidelines for determining the length of delay necessary to trigger the speedy trial inquiry”). Thus, the delay in this case exceeded the speedy trial analysis triggering time of fifteen months by approximately twenty-eight months. See Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 2, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (stating that the length of delay necessary to trigger a speedy trial inquiry is fifteen months for intermediate cases).

{6} In terms of the weight given to the length of the delay, “the greater the delay[,] the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [prosecution].” Id. ¶ 24. In the present case, based on the passage of an additional twenty-eight months beyond the triggering date, the district court found that the length of the delay weighed heavily against the State, but the State contends that the court erred in this finding. Although we agree with the court's determination that the length of the delay weighs against the prosecution, we disagree with its determination that it does so heavily. See id. (recognizing that a delay beyond the date of presumptive prejudice weighs against the prosecution, but its weight correlates to its length). In State v. Montoya, this Court held that a delay of six months beyond the triggering date in an intermediate case weighed only slightly against the prosecution. 2011–NMCA–074, ¶ 17, 150 N.M. 415, 259 P.3d 820. In contrast, in Garza, our Supreme Court recognized that a delay of five or more years weighed heavily in the defendant's favor. 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. Here, the delay of twenty-eight months beyond the date of presumptive prejudice, being significantly longer than the six-month delay in Montoya, but significantly shorter than the five to six years discussed in Garza, weighs moderately against the State and in Defendant's favor. See Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (recognizing that a delay of three years and nine months “was too short to weigh heavily in the defendant's favor”).

The Reasons for the Delay

{7} “Closely related to [the] length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.” Id. ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A deliberate or bad faith attempt to delay the trial with the goal of hindering the defense will weigh heavily against the prosecution, whereas delay caused by a valid reason, such as a missing witness or time spent opposing the defendant's pretrial motions, is both inevitable and wholly justifiable. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. In the middle of this spectrum is “negligent or administrative delay,” which is delay caused, for example, by overcrowded courts, the reassignment of judges, or governmental negligence. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29. Negligent or administrative delay is weighed against the prosecution because “the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances ... rest[s] with [the] government rather than with the defendant [.]” Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The degree of weight we assign against the [prosecution] for negligent delay is closely related to the length of [the] delay”; the longer the delay, or the greater the threat to the fairness to the defendant, the less tolerant we are of the delay. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 26, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{8} In analyzing the reasons for the delay in this case, the district court examined the period from April 30, 2009, the date of Defendant's indictment, to November 19, 2012, the date on which the fourth in a series of four assistant district attorneys entered his appearance on behalf of the State. The district court divided the delay into ten periods of time and ultimately concluded that twenty-five months of the delay weighed against the State, thirteen months weighed neutrally, and three months weighed against Defendant. The State argues that Defendant was responsible for thirty-six months of the delay and that the court erred in ruling otherwise. We review the reasons for the delay in this case using the district court's ten time periods as a framework.

1. April 30, 2009, to June 21, 2009

{9} The court's first time frame was the approximate two months between Defendant's indictment on April 30, 2009, until the State's entry of appearance on June 21, 2009. Without explaining its reasoning for doing so, the court concluded that this time frame weighed against the State. Although one possible explanation for the court's weighing assignment is that it viewed the State as somehow dilatory in entering its appearance, we note that Defendant's counsel did not enter his appearance until July 9, 2009, approximately two weeks after the State's entry. Because counsel for Defendant entered his appearance after the State, we conclude that the State's ostensibly late entry did not cause a delay in the progress of the case. Rather, we view this series of events—the indictment, followed by the State's and then defense counsel's entries of appearance—to indicate that from April 30, 2009, to July 9, 2009, the case was moving along with customary promptness, to be weighed neutrally. See State v. Moreno, 2010–NMCA–044, ¶ 13, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782 (stating that when a case proceeds “with customary promptness[, the] delay cannot be held against either party”).

2. July 10, 2009, to January 12, 2010

{10} Although the district court did not delineate the exact date on which its second time frame began, we have concluded that the first time frame may reasonably be viewed as having ended on July 9, 2009, when Defendant's first counsel entered his appearance. Thus, we view the second time frame as extending from July 10, 2009, to January 12, 2010, when Defendant's second counsel entered his appearance. Although the district court characterized this approximate six-month time frame as “negligent delay” and weighed it against the State, the court's factual findings are inconsistent with its conclusion.

{11} The court found that between July 2009 and January 12, 2010, “Defendant's counsel failed to attend at least three [pretrial] conferences, failed to return Defendant's calls, and did not appear for a scheduled meeting with Defendant.” The court also found that Defendant's counsel was permitted to withdraw his representation on ...