State v. Stenback

Citation2 P.2d 1050,78 Utah 350
Decision Date21 September 1931
Docket Number5000
CourtSupreme Court of Utah
PartiesSTATE v. STENBACK

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; O. W McConkie, Judge.

Werner Stenback was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

REVERSED and remanded for a new trial.

Vere L McCarthy, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Geo. P Parker, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Miner, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

ELIAS HANSEN, J. STRAUP and EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., concur. CHERRY, C. J., FOLLAND, J., dissenting.

OPINION

ELIAS HANSEN, J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be executed. He appeals. The evidence shows that he is a native of Finland. He came to the United States in 1914, and to Salt Lake City, Utah, in December, 1927. Soon after he arrived in Salt Lake City he purchased a pool hall and restaurant which he conducted until August, 1928. In January, 1928, he became acquainted with Minnie Mantyla, a widow. In August, 1928, the defendant sold his pool hall and restaurant and went to Murray, where he lived with Minnie Mantyla and four of her children on her farm. The defendant and Mrs. Mantyla were never married, but they lived together as husband and wife from August, 1928, until May 18, 1929, when she was killed. During the time the defendant resided with Mrs. Mantyla at Murray, he worked on her farm. About April 1, 1929, Mrs. Mantyla rented the Evans apartment house, which is located on State street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Soon after the Evans apartment was rented, Mrs. Mantyla and the defendant established their residence in a part thereof. The remainder of the apartment house was sublet to others. At about 10 o'clock at night on May 18, 1929, the defendant and Mrs. Mantyla were at home in their rooms in the Evans apartment house. At about that time two of the tenants who occupied rooms on one of the upper floors called at the rooms occupied by Mrs. Mantyla and the defendant for a key. Apparently at that time the defendant and Mrs. Mantyla were feeling kindly toward each other. The tenants secured their key and went to their rooms. In about ten minutes after they went to their rooms they heard the report of several shots and the screams of a woman. Thereupon they ran down to the rooms occupied by the defendant and Mrs. Mantyla. They knocked on the door, and in a short time the defendant unlocked and opened the door. He was bleeding profusely from his face and head. When he opened the door he said, "Just a minute, just a minute," and then closed the door again. The tenants ran back to their rooms and called the police department of Salt Lake City, Utah. When the police officers arrived, Mrs. Mantyla was dead. Her body was lying on the floor with six bullet wounds in it. The defendant was lying on the body of the deceased with his face against hers. He was bleeding profusely from his head and face and was apparently unconscious. A doctor who later examined the body of the deceased thus described her wounds:

"There were three bullet wounds in the right upper arm. In describing them, one of them looked like a wound that had just been skirted by some passing object. There was one in the left upper arm. There were two bullet wounds in the left side of the chest, one on the line of the arm-pit between the second and third ribs, and one on the line of the arm-pit between the fifth and sixth ribs. There were contusions and lacerations over the left side of the body about the hips and the buttocks. * * * I believe the two wounds on the chest were responsible for the death, probably a perforation of the lungs.

When the defendant was later treated at the emergency hospital, it was found, as testified to by the doctor who gave him first aid, that:

"The man was suffering a great deal from loss of blood and he presented an extensive laceration of the right side of his mouth and the right side of his jaw and a good deal of swelling under the left eye. * * * He had a laceration which tore out the angle of his mouth on the right side, allowing his lower lip to drop. There was a swelling of the eye as though something had been pushed back of the eye. The defendant had no powder marks on his face."

The police officers found at the scene of the tragedy a revolver with six empty cartridges in it lying on the floor. They also found, on a table, a bottle containing a small quantity of whisky. The pistol belonged to the defendant and was usually kept in a bureau drawer in which the defendant and the deceased kept their clothes.

The defendant was called as a witness in his own behalf, and testified that on the date of the homicide he and Mrs. Mantyla had been drinking intoxicating liquors and that he was drunk. There is considerable other testimony coming from disinterested witnesses which tends to show that the defendant had been drinking intoxicating liquors on the day of the homicide. The defendant further testified that when he sold his pool hall and restaurant he gave Mrs. Mantyla $ 600 to keep until they could purchase a rooming house; that he had not been paid anything for his work on the farm; that when Mrs. Mantyla leased the Evans apartments he asked her to take the lease jointly in their names, but she refused to do so; that on the night in question the deceased stated that she was going on a trip to Idaho with an Irishman by the name of Kelly; that he told her that she could not go away with the other man unless she paid the money which she owed to the defendant; that thereupon Mrs. Mantyla "became mad and said that she was not going to pay anything for it and went to the bureau drawer and pulled this gun and said 'This is the way I am going to pay.' I was very much scared when I saw her coming with this gun and I went to grab her. Then there was a shot fired. * * * I heard one shot, and after that everything was black. * * * I don't remember what happened after that."

A few days after the homicide a book was found in the kitchen cabinet in the rooms theretofore occupied by the deceased and the defendant. The book contained some writing in the Finnish language, which translated into English reads as follows:

"W Stenbaka

"I have decided that I will do a good deed end Minnie Mantyla and myself because she is such a great harlatan woman I am not crazy but will say farewell to all of you states W. Stenbaka I am doing this deed so you will see that I can suffer all I have suffered very much take notice of W. Stenbak."

Two handwriting expert witnesses were called by the state who, after comparing the writing in the book with the admitted writings of the defendant, expressed it as their opinion that both were written by the same person. The defendant denied that the writing in the book was his.

We have thus set out the substance of the evidence offered at the trial so that the questions of law applicable to such evidence may be more readily discussed and understood.

The defendant relies on two assignments of error for a reversal of the judgment. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that:

"It is a general principle of law that intoxication is no excuse for crime, but this general principle has this important qualification or modification, so far as it relates to murder in the first degree. A particular or specific intent is absolutely essential to the commission of this crime, and if the mind of the person doing the killing is unable, because of intoxication, at the time of the killing to form this particular or specific intent, there can be no murder in the first degree, unless the person doing the killing became voluntarily intoxicated for the purpose of killing while intoxicated."

"You are instructed that on the question of the intoxication of the defendant at the time of the alleged killing, if you find from the evidence he was intoxicated, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such intoxication did not incapacitate him from forming a deliberate purpose to kill the deceased; and if you have any reasonable doubt on this question, you must give the prisoner the benefit of such doubt, and find him not guilty of murder in the first degree."

The trial court refused both of the foregoing requested instructions, but gave the following instruction:

"No act committed by a person while intoxicated is less criminal by reason of his having been in such intoxicated condition, but if you find that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged act, then you may take that fact into consideration in determining as to the intent with which the act was committed. If defendant was capable of conceiving a design, he is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have intended the natural consequences of his acts."

While we do not regard the requested instructions which the trial court refused to give as models, the defendant was entitled to have the substance of those instructions given to the jury. The instruction given by the trial court on the effect of intoxication does not measure up to the requirements of a proper instruction where, as here, intoxication is interposed as a defense to or in mitigation of a charge of murder in the first degree. Our Penal Code, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, provides:

Section 7910: "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act."

Section 8025: "Every murder perpetrated by poison lying...

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