State v. Stephenson (In re Stephenson)
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2018AP2104,2018AP2104 |
| Citation | 2020 WI 92,951 N.W.2d 819,394 Wis.2d 703 |
| Parties | IN RE the COMMITMENT OF Jamie Lane STEPHENSON: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Jefren E. Olsen assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen.
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Donald V. Latorraca.
¶1 Jamie Lane Stephenson seeks review of the court of appeals decision1 affirming the circuit court's denial2 of his Chapter 980 petition for discharge from his commitment as a sexually violent person. Stephenson raises three issues. First, he contends that Chapter 980 requires the State to present expert testimony in order to prove he is dangerous because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will re-offend in a sexually violent manner. Because the State failed to do so, Stephenson asserts there is insufficient evidence to continue his Chapter 980 commitment. Second, Stephenson asks this court to overrule the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review this court adopted in Curiel.3 Third, he claims that even if expert testimony is not required, and even if we do not overrule Curiel, the evidence was nevertheless insufficient to support the circuit court's decision denying his petition for discharge.
¶2 We hold the State is not required to present expert testimony to prove the required dangerousness element in Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (2017-18).4 We further reject Stephenson's request to overrule Curiel and, instead, reaffirm Curiel’s holding that the appropriate standard of review to use in Chapter 980 cases is the sufficiency-of-the—evidence test set forth in our criminal law. Finally, we hold the evidence of record satisfies the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
¶3 Stephenson has a lengthy history of committing sexual assaults. In 2000, when he was 15 years old, the State charged Stephenson with three counts of fourth-degree sexual assault. One of these charges resulted in a delinquency adjudication. In 2001, Stephenson sexually assaulted a high school classmate. In that case, Stephenson led the student to a secluded area of the high school, forcefully pushed her up against a wall, pulled down her pants, and began engaging in forced intercourse. Stephenson was subsequently adjudicated delinquent for second-degree sexual assault of a child.
¶4 In 2004, Stephenson engaged in sexual intercourse with two 15-year-old girls. The State charged Stephenson with two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child, and he later pled guilty to two counts of fourth-degree sexual assault of a child. The circuit court placed him on two years of probation. Also in 2004, Stephenson engaged in sexual intercourse with a 12-year-old girl in Minnesota when he was 19 years old. The State of Minnesota charged Stephenson with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Stephenson was ultimately convicted of this charge and placed on 25 years of probation.
¶5 In 2007, Stephenson corresponded with a 14-year-old girl over the internet and lied to her about his age. When he eventually met her face-to-face, Stephenson pinned her down and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. That same year, Stephenson restrained a 16-year-old girl and forcibly engaged in sexual intercourse with her while her parents were away. The girl was eventually able to escape.
¶6 For these incidents in 2007, the State charged Stephenson with two counts of sexual assault of a child. Stephenson subsequently pled guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child and, in 2009, was sentenced to two years of initial confinement followed by four years of extended supervision. In 2011, as Stephenson's release date neared, the State filed a petition to qualify Stephenson as a "sexually violent person," pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980. The circuit court committed Stephenson to a secure mental health facility.
¶7 In 2017, Stephenson petitioned the circuit court to discharge him from commitment. The State opposed Stephenson's release. The circuit court considered his petition and conducted a discharge trial. In order to continue Stephenson's commitment on the basis that he remained a "sexually violent person," the State was required to prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense [hereinafter the "first element"],5 (2) that he has a mental disorder that predisposes him to acts of sexual violence [hereinafter the "second element"],6 and (3) that he is dangerous to others because the mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence [hereinafter the "third element"]. Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).
¶8 At the discharge trial, there was no dispute over the first element: Stephenson had been convicted of a host of sexually violent offenses. In order to establish the second element, the State introduced testimony from an expert witness, Donn Kolbeck, a psychologist employed by the Department of Health Services (DHS) who had previously evaluated Stephenson. Kolbeck testified that he diagnosed Stephenson with two qualifying mental disorders: (1) Other Specified Personality Disorder, with antisocial and borderline features, and (2) Alcohol Abuse Disorder.
¶9 Kolbeck testified that Stephenson's personality disorder meant that he possesses an "enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates ... markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture leading to impairments[ ] in cognitions, emotions, interpersonal functioning, and impulse control." Kolbeck further stated that Stephenson exhibits "a long history of deceitfulness, conning and manipulation in the context of sexually violent behaviors, impulsivity, irritability, consistent irresponsibility, and a lack of remorse." According to Kolbeck, Stephenson's personality disorder "has a direct causal connection to [his] sexually violent behaviors in the community."
¶10 With regard to the other qualifying mental disorder, Kolbeck testified that, while Stephenson's symptoms were in remission given his controlled environment, Stephenson's "use of alcohol ... was a condition that predisposed him to engage in acts of sexual violence." He further testified that Stephenson's alcohol consumption grew heavily over time, progressing to "frequent intoxication" during his life. According to Kolbeck, Stephenson also admitted that he had "never committed a crime sober" and that he was still "capable of social drinking" in the community.
¶11 Additionally, Kolbeck testified regarding Stephenson's numerous rule violations while committed.
Noting that Stephenson's anti-social traits were "still active," Kolbeck explained that Stephenson repeatedly covered his room window with a towel, despite contrary instructions from staff. When confronted with this violation, Stephenson lied, claiming this behavior had been allowed by other unit staff members. Additionally, while in confinement, Stephenson had been cited repeatedly for trying to obtain property that he was not allowed to have. In one case, Stephenson violated the rules by ordering women's lingerie—an item expressly prohibited under the facility's policies.
¶12 Kolbeck also stated that Stephenson produced a concerning result on a non-suppressed penile plethysmograph test, during which Stephenson became aroused by stimuli "depicting teenager coercive interactions" as well as by graphic depictions of "victims crying or in some form of suffering" related to sexual deviancy. Kolbeck testified that Stephenson tested highly on measures of psychopathy, as quantified by the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL-R). While most individuals in the "prison population" score "roughly 23" on the PCL-R, Stephenson scored a "29," which is "consistent with a high degree of psychopathy." Kolbeck opined that these indicators suggest that Stephenson manifests characteristics of shallow affect, grandiosity, and manipulation.
¶13 Next, Kolbeck addressed the third element: whether Stephenson's mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence. In opining on this issue, Kolbeck employed two actuarial risk instruments to measure Stephenson's risk of future dangerousness: the Static-99R and the Violence Risk Scale—Sex Offense Version (VRS-SO). Based on these assessment tools, Kolbeck concluded that Stephenson had a 41 percent probability of re-offending. Importantly, Kolbeck defined "re-offense" as the probability of Stephenson being arrested or charged with a sexual crime, not his actual likelihood of committing future acts of sexual violence. Stephenson's score on this instrument (41 percent) was lower than the "more likely than not" standard required for the third element. As a result, Kolbeck concluded that, under this measure, Stephenson did not satisfy the third element.
¶14 Following Kolbeck's testimony, Stephenson introduced his own expert witness, Courtney Endres, a psychologist whose evaluation of Stephenson supported his discharge petition. With respect to the second element, Endres testified that Stephenson "no longer meets the criteria for a mental disorder as defined under Wisconsin Chapter 980." As to the third element, Endres opined that Stephenson's "risk falls below the threshold" and...
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