State v. Stephenson, No. E2003-01091-CCA-R3-DD (TN 3/9/2005), E2003-01091-CCA-R3-DD.

Decision Date09 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. E2003-01091-CCA-R3-DD.,E2003-01091-CCA-R3-DD.
PartiesSTATE OF TENNESSEE v. JONATHAN WESLEY STEPHENSON.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County; No. 5012 & 5040; Ben W. Hooper, II, Judge.

Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.

Carl R. Ogle, Jr., Jefferson City, Tennessee, John E. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, and Tim S. Moore, Newport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jonathan Wesley Stephenson.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Angela M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney General; Al Schmutzer, Jr., District Attorney General; and James B. Dunn, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

David H. Welles, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David G. Hayes and Norma McGee Ogle, JJ., joined.

OPINION

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE.

The Defendant, Jonathan Wesley Stephenson, appeals as of right his sentence of death. In 1990, he was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder in the death of his wife. His conviction for murder was based on his role in the killing under the criminal responsibility statute. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for the murder and the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years in prison for the conspiracy. On direct appeal, our supreme court affirmed both convictions, but remanded for resentencing because of an error which nullified the jury's verdict. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W. 2d 530, 534 (Tenn. 1994). On remand, by agreement of the parties, the Defendant was sentenced to life without parole for the murder and to sixty years for the conspiracy. In 1998, the Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Johnson County in which he challenged his life sentence. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition. See Jonathan Stephenson v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No. 03C01-9807-CR-00255, 1999 WL 318835 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 19, 1999), app. granted (Tenn. Sept. 20, 1999). On further review, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the Defendant's life sentence for the murder conviction was illegal because life without parole was not a statutorily authorized punishment at the time of the offense. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. See Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W. 3d 910, 912 (Tenn. 2000). After his life sentence was declared void, resentencing proceedings began in the Circuit Court for Cocke County. At the conclusion of the proof, the jury found as the sole aggravating circumstance that the "defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration." Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-204(i)(4). The jury further found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstance and imposed the death penalty. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUES

In this appeal, the Defendant challenges his death sentence and presents for this Court's review sixteen issues:

I. Whether the combination of the Defendant's sentence of confinement for conspiracy to commit premeditated murder, plus his sentence of death, which is premised upon the sole aggravating circumstance of murder for remuneration or promise of remuneration, unconstitutionally subjects the Defendant to multiple punishments for the same conduct.

II. Whether the grand jury's failure to find or charge the existence of aggravating circumstances in the indictment renders the death sentence invalid under Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny.

III. Whether the trial court erroneously declined to consider the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement.

IV. Whether the trial court's admission of former testimony of witnesses who were not shown to be unavailable violates the right of confrontation.

V. Whether the trial court erroneously allowed into evidence the rifle which was alleged to have been used to kill the victim.

VI. Whether the trial court erroneously declined the defense motion for a mistrial upon Agent Davenport's mention of the Defendant's having stated that he was willing to take a polygraph test.

VII. Whether the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about a ring which the Defendant gave to his former girlfriend.

VIII. Whether the trial court erroneously permitted the State to inquire as to whether the Defendant had shown remorse for the death of his wife and to argue the absence of remorse to the jury.

IX. Whether the trial court erroneously permitted the State to appeal to vengeance by arguing that, while the Defendant's family asked the jury not to impose the death sentence, the victim's family did not get that opportunity.

X. Whether the prosecutor during closing argument improperly argued that the jury should consider which codefendant pulled the trigger only if the trial court told the jury that that is important.

XI. Whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to victim impact evidence when no victim impact evidence had been adduced before the jury.

XII. Whether the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury that a Defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for parole until service of at least twenty-five full calendar years.

XIII. Whether the trial court's permitting a juror to break sequestration prejudiced the Defendant.

XIV. Whether the cumulative effect of errors violates constitutional due process guaranties as to the Defendant's sentence of death.

XV. Whether the Defendant's sentence of death is disproportionate, especially in light of the life sentence received by his co-defendant.

XVI. Whether the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction following the invalidation of the Defendant's illegal sentence.

After review, this court finds no error of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the jury's imposition of the death sentence.

Re-sentencing Hearing

Resentencing proceedings began on October 1, 2002, in the Circuit Court for Cocke County. Chief Detective Robert Caldwell of the Cocke County Sheriff's Department testified that at approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 4, 1989, he was called to investigate a shooting death. He found the victim, Lisa Stephenson, sitting in the driver's seat of her car with a large hole in her forehead. She had been shot to death through the windshield. Detective Caldwell's investigation led him later that night to the home of Ralph Thompson in Morristown, Tennessee, where a high-powered rifle was recovered. The rifle smelled as if it had been recently cleaned. Although bullet fragments were later recovered from the victim, it was not possible to establish whether they were fired from that rifle. Detective Caldwell testified that the Defendant, Jonathan Stephenson, lived over fifteen miles from the murder scene and had no criminal record. An autopsy revealed that the victim had been shot in the forehead at close range and her hands indicated that she was in a defensive position when she was killed.

The testimony of Glen Franklin Brewer, given at the Defendant's 1990 trial, was read into evidence. Brewer stated that in 1989 he and the Defendant both worked as truck drivers for JIT Express in Morristown. A few weeks after he became acquainted with the Defendant, the Defendant began talking about wanting to kill someone "practically every time we got together." Brewer did not know who the intended victim was, only that the Defendant wanted Brewer to kill the Defendant's friend's wife. The Defendant offered Brewer various forms of payment in exchange for the killing including cash, insurance proceeds, and a boat and motor. The Defendant told Brewer that the victim lived out in the country and offered various ways she could be shot and killed. Brewer recalled that one night, the Defendant brought a handgun to work and told Brewer he had the money with him. Brewer refused to become involved in any such killing. A few weeks after the last discussion he had with the Defendant about killing the victim, Brewer returned from a road trip and learned through a newspaper article about Lisa Stephenson's murder.

The prior trial testimony of Michael Litz was also read into evidence. Litz testified that he met the Defendant through a friend named Ralph Thompson. In the fall of 1989, during a discussion among Litz, Thompson, and the Defendant, the Defendant offered Litz $5,000 to kill his wife. The Defendant suggested that Litz go to his mobile home and shoot his wife with a rifle as she sat on the couch. The Defendant stated that his wife intended to divorce him and "take everything he'd ever worked for" and said this was the reason he wanted her killed. Litz stated they never discussed killing the Defendant's wife again. Litz recalled next seeing the Defendant on December 3, 1989, the day of the murder. Litz and Thompson went to the Defendant's house to cut firewood and then to Thompson's house to watch movies. The Defendant arrived that evening and reminded Thompson about a job interview. Thompson changed clothes and left with the Defendant. Thompson later returned alone. On cross-examination, Litz testified that Thompson had a key to a fishing boat owned by the Defendant and a key to the Defendant's truck. Litz stated that he and Thompson had permission to take the truck and boat and go fishing whenever they liked. Litz acknowledged that Thompson owned a hunting rifle.

Julie Webb testified that in 1989 she was single and living in La Follette, Tennessee. She met the Defendant that year at Rumors bar in Knoxville and the two began dating. The Defendant told Webb that he had a son and had been married, but that his wife, Lisa, had been killed in a car accident five years earlier. The Defendant...

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