State v. Steven Child B.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2015
• Docket Number: 34,122.
• Citation: 352 P.3d 1181,2015 NMSC 020
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. STEVEN B., Child–Respondent. State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Ernie Begaye, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

352 P.3d 1181

2015 NMSC 020

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner

v.STEVEN B., Child–Respondent.

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner

v.Ernie Begaye, Defendant–Respondent.

34,122.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 25, 2015.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, B. Douglas Wood, III, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent Steven B.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E. Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent Ernie Begaye.

Damon P. Martinez, U.S. Attorney, District of New Mexico, Jonathon M. Gerson, Assistant U.S. Attorney Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae United States.

The Navajo Nation Department of Justice Harrison Tsosie, Attorney General, Paul W. Spruhan, Assistant Attorney General, Window Rock, AZ, for Amicus Curiae The Navajo Nation.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} In this consolidated appeal, Respondents Steven B. and Ernie Begaye (Respondents), are both enrolled members of the Navajo Nation who stand accused of offenses committed on Parcel Three of Fort Wingate (Parcel Three). The question presented is whether Parcel Three is a dependent Indian community—and therefore Indian country—under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2012) and Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998). If so, then the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Respondents. See State v. Quintana, 2008–NMSC–012, ¶ 4, 143 N.M. 535, 178 P.3d 820 (“In general, ‘a state does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by an Indian in Indian country.’ ” (quoting State v. Frank, 2002–NMSC–026, ¶ 12, 132 N.M. 544, 52 P.3d 404 )). If not, then we must reverse the district court and permit the State to proceed against Respondents.

{2} We are not the first court to consider the Indian country status of Parcel Three. More than a decade-and-a-half ago, the Court of Appeals in State v. Dick held that Parcel Three is a dependent Indian community and ordered the dismissal of a DWI prosecution due to a lack of state jurisdiction. See 1999–NMCA–062, ¶ 28, 127 N.M. 382, 981 P.2d 796, cert. granted, 127 N.M. 391, 981 P.2d 1209 (1999), cert. quashed, 129 N.M. 208, 4 P.3d 36 (2000). Four years later, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico reached the opposite conclusion in United States v. M.C., holding that Parcel Three is not a dependent Indian community and dismissing an indictment for second-degree murder due to a lack of federal jurisdiction. See 311 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1282, 1297 (D.N.M.2004).

{3} Faced with these contradictory rulings, the district court determined that Dick was controlling and dismissed the proceedings against Respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State now urges this Court to overrule Dick and to reverse. We review the controlling case law, the history, and the present circumstances of Parcel Three, and conclude that Dick was wrongly decided and must be overruled. Parcel Three is not a dependent Indian community, and the district court, therefore, has jurisdiction over Respondents. The district court and the Court of Appeals having concluded otherwise, we reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{4} The facts leading to these consolidated appeals are not in dispute. Respondents are enrolled members of the Navajo Nation who were charged with offenses which, if proven, were committed on Parcel Three. Respondent Steven B., a child, is the subject of a petition alleging that he committed the delinquent act of battery against a school official at Wingate High School, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30–3–9(E) (1989) and 32A–2–3(A) (2009). Respondent Begaye was charged in an unrelated proceeding with 11 counts of criminal sexual penetration of a child under 13 years of age, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–9–11(D)(1) (2009), and with 14 counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor on a child under 13 years of age, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–9–13(B)(1) (2003). The criminal sexual penetration and criminal sexual contact allegedly occurred in the staff housing area of the Wingate school campus. The alleged victims in both proceedings were non-Indians.

{5} Respondents moved to dismiss the proceedings for lack of state jurisdiction, arguing that Parcel Three is a dependent Indian community and therefore Indian country as held in Dick. The State acknowledged that Dick was controlling, but argued that the courts should revisit the status of Parcel Three in light of the federal district court's contrary holding in M.C. The parties entered into stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the State's concession that the district court was bound by stare decisis to follow Dick, and after an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss.

{6} The State appealed both rulings, arguing that Dick was wrongly decided and that it should be overruled. The Court of Appeals considered the federal district court's reasoning in M.C. and declined to overrule Dick. See State v. Steven B., 2013–NMCA–078, ¶¶ 14–15, 306 P.3d 509. As a result, the Court affirmed the dismissals of the proceedings against Respondents. See id. ¶ 16; State v. Begaye, No. 32,136, mem. op., ¶ 4, 2013 WL 4516457 (N.M.Ct.App. Apr. 9, 2013) (non-precedential) (“Steven B. controls this appeal.”). We granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated the proceedings to settle for our state courts the question of Parcel Three's status as a dependent Indian community.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{7} “Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction ‘are questions of law which are subject to de novo review.’ ” State v. Chavarria,

2009–NMSC–020, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 251, 208 P.3d 896 (quoting State v. Montoya, 2008–NMSC–043, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 458, 188 P.3d 1209 ). This Court defers to a district court's factual determinations “if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Frank, 2002–NMSC–026, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 544, 52 P.3d 404 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the State does not contest the facts found by the district court, we review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the law to the facts, viewing the facts in the manner most favorable to Respondents as the prevailing parties. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The issue before us is the type of “use” for which lands must be set aside by the federal government to support a finding of a dependent Indian community

{8} Though the ultimate question in this appeal is whether Parcel Three is a dependent Indian community, the parties and the district court below have narrowed the issue significantly. To frame the precise question before us, we pause to review some basic principles and to summarize the disagreement between Dick and M.C.

{9} We first explained in Blatchford v. Gonzales that a dependent Indian community is one of three categories of land that Congress has defined as Indian country for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. See 1983–NMSC–060, ¶¶ 7, 8, 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976), which defines Indian country as Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments). The phrase dependent Indian community originated in federal common law and was adopted as part of the statutory definition of Indian country in 1948 when Congress enacted § 1151. See Blatchford, 1983–NMSC–060, ¶ 9, 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (noting that the dependent Indian community language in § 1151(b) stemmed from United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 107 (1913), and United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410 (1938) ).

{10} To determine if a particular tract of land is a dependent Indian community, we apply the two-prong test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Venetie: “for the land in question to be a dependent Indian community, it must satisfy two requirements: (1) it ‘must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land[,]’ and (2) it ‘must be under federal superintendence.’ ” Quintana, 2008–NMSC–012, ¶ 4, 143 N.M. 535, 178 P.3d 820 (alteration in original) (quoting Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527, 118 S.Ct. 948 ). If the land at issue fails to meet either prong, it is not a dependent Indian community. See Quintana, 2008–NMSC–012, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 535, 178 P.3d 820 (declining to consider whether the land in question was under federal superintendence because the Court had already concluded that it failed to meet the set-aside prong).

{11} The district court below, with the State's concession, found that Parcel Three is administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and therefore meets Venetie 's federal superintendence prong. That conclusion is not challenged on appeal.¹ Thus, to determine whether Parcel Three is a dependent Indian community, we must answer only whether Parcel Three satisfies the first prong of the Venetie test, whether it was “set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land.” Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527, 118 S.Ct. 948.

{12} But our inquiry is narrower still. In our most recent opinion to address the set-aside requirement, we explained that Venetie requires “some explicit action taken by Congress or the Executive to create Indian country.” Quintana, 2008–NMSC–012, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 535, 178 P.3d 820. Our cases have shown that failing the first part of this requirement—the need for “some explicit action taken by Congress or the Executive”—can be dispositive such that a tract is not a dependent Indian community. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 6 (holding that State Road 16, which separates the Santo Domingo and Cochiti Pueblos and is located on land owned by the federal government and administered by the U.S. Forest Service, is not a dependent Indian community because “there is no evidence of any explicit congressional or executive action recognizing State Road 16 as Indian country”); Frank, 2002–NMSC–026, ¶¶ 4, 11, 23, 132...