State v. Stevens
Docket Number | ED 111230 |
Decision Date | 20 February 2024 |
Citation | 684 S.W.3d 379 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Damathan L. STEVENS, Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Honorable Scott A. Lipke, Judge
For Appellant: Christian Lehmberg, 1000 W. Nifong Blvd., Bldg. 7, Ste. 100, Columbia, MO 65203.
For Respondent: Abigail M. Meharg, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.
Damathan L. Stevens ("Stevens") appeals from the trial court’s judgment following jury convictions for resisting arrest, assault in the fourth degree, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. In his sole point on appeal, Stevens argues the trial court plainly erred in admitting evidence that, at the time of the arrest, Stevens had been charged in a neighboring jurisdiction with second-degree kidnapping and third-degree assault. Because Stevens has failed to meet his burden of facially establishing substantial grounds for believing manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted from the admission of this evidence, we decline to exercise our discretion to review for plain error under Rule 30.20.1 Point One is denied, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
On July 25, 2022, Cape Girardeau Police Officer M.T. was in his patrol vehicle when he received information from nearby Scott City Police Department about a stolen 2002 silver Hyundai Santa Fe ("the vehicle"). Twenty minutes later, Officer M.T. observed Stevens driving the vehicle. Without engaging his patrol lights, Officer M.T. followed Stevens into a parking lot. As Stevens exited the vehicle, Officer M.T. ordered him to stop. Stevens complied. Officer M.T. advised Stevens that the vehicle had been reported stolen, but Stevens maintained that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend and he had permission to drive it. Another police officer, Officer D.S., arrived.
Through his dispatch radio, Officer M.T. engaged with the Cape Girardeau Police Department. Dispatch, in turn, communicated with Scott City’s police force to determine how Officer M.T. should proceed with Stevens and the vehicle. Stevens was within earshot of the radio and overheard as dispatch instructed Officer M.T. to arrest Stevens and tow the vehicle. Stevens then began to run from Officers M.T. and D.S., ignoring their orders to stop. Both officers deployed their Tasers, at least one of which made contact. Stevens fell to the ground. The officers approached and attempted to apply handcuffs, but Stevens resisted. A third officer, Officer C.S., arrived.
A physical altercation between Stevens and the officers ensued. During the melee, Stevens "flail[ed] his arms around," resisting the officers, and made a shoving motion that knocked Officer D.S. to the ground. Officer C.S. was also pushed and fell into a parked vehicle. Stevens again evaded the officers and continued to run through the parking lot toward a highway. Officer M.T. followed Stevens by vehicle. Officer C.S. pursued him by foot and deployed his Taser, which made contact with Stevens and caused him to fall. As Stevens attempted to stand, Officer C.S. successfully activated his Taser a final time. The officers then secured Stevens with handcuffs, placed him under arrest, and conducted a search incident to arrest. In the search, the officers recovered a glass pipe with a bubble on the end, commonly used to smoke methamphetamine.
During the incident, neither Officer M.T. nor Officer C.S. activated their body cameras. Although Officer D.S.’s body camera was activated, it was knocked off as he tried to handcuff Stevens and captured only part of the incident. Surveillance footage recorded the interaction within the parking lot, but Stevens went out of frame when he ran toward the highway.2
The case proceeded to trial. At trial, both Officer D.S.’s body camera footage and the surveillance footage were played for the jury. Additionally, the three responding officers testified. During re-di- rect examination of Officer D.S., the State engaged in the following exchange:
State: At this time, I’m going to hand you what’s been marked as State’s Exhibit 4. Can you tell me what that is?
Officer D.S.: This is a warrant from Scott County Sheriff’s officers, Scott County District.
State: And who is that warrant for?
Officer D.S.: [Stevens].
State: Can you tell me what the charges are for that?
Officer D.S.: Kidnapping second degree, stealing a motor vehicle[,] and assault third degree.
The State then elicited testimony that the stolen motor vehicle referenced in the Scott County warrant was the same vehicle Stevens was driving when Officer M.T. stopped Stevens and acted to arrest him for committing the felony of stealing a motor vehicle. Re-cross and further redirect of Officer D.S. followed. Officer C.S. then testified. After Officer C.S.’s testimony, the State sought to admit the warrant into evidence. The trial court asked Stevens if he objected—to which he responded, "No, Your Honor"—and then admitted the exhibit. The second-degree kidnapping and third-degree assault charges were not referenced again. Stevens rested without presenting any evidence.
The jury acquitted Stevens of a third-degree assault charge and found him guilty of resisting arrest, fourth-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Stevens to five years in prison. This appeal follows.
In Stevens’s sole point on appeal, he argues that the trial court plainly erred in admitting evidence that Stevens was facing charges for second-degree kidnapping and third-degree assault in Scott County. Stevens reasons that the testimony constituted inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts and was presumptively prejudicial. Stevens appears to argue that, because of this presumption, manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice necessarily resulted.
[1] Stevens acknowledges that this point was not preserved for appeal and asks that we use our discretion to review for plain error. "Generally, this Court does not review unpreserved claims of error." State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020). Rule 30.20 creates an exception by granting "appellate courts discretion to review ‘plain errors affecting substantial rights … when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.’ " Id. at 526 (quoting Rule 30.20).
[2–4] Our review under Rule 30.20 is a two-step process. State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022). "The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.’ " Id. (quoting Grado v. State, 559 S.W.3d 888, 899-900 (Mo. banc 2018)). "In the absence of such a determination, an appellate court should decline to review for plain error." State v. Gonzalez, 671 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). As recent Supreme Court of Missouri cases emphasize, it would "ignore[ ] Rule 30.20’s exclusivity [to] jump[ ] into a merits analysis without finding manifest injustice" established on the face of the appellant’s claim. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 528. Then, only if the appellant meets this threshold burden, do we proceed to the second step and determine whether the claimed error actually resulted in manifest injustice or mis- carriage of justice. Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731 (quoting Grado, 559 S.W.3d at 899-900).
I. Admission of Evidence of Pending Kidnapping and Assault Charges
[5] Based on the arguments submitted by both parties, we must, as a preliminary matter, clarify the scope of Stevens’s point on appeal. Officer D.S. testified about three charges pending against Stevens in Scott County: kidnapping, assault, and tampering with a motor vehicle. Stevens expressly limits the scope of his appeal to challenging the admission of evidence related to kidnapping and assault; he does not challenge the admissibility of evidence related to tampering with a motor vehicle. In fact, Stevens concedes that evidence of the tampering charge was relevant to establishing why Officer M.T. initially stopped Stevens. Additionally, Stevens does not challenge the admission of the warrant itself into the evidentiary record. Rather, he challenges the admissibility of Officer D.S.’s testimony about the charges.3 We find this clarification necessary because the State dedicates considerable argument to suggesting that admitting evidence of the tampering charge was relevant and admitting the exhibit was proper. Neither of these evidentiary issues are challenged by Stevens, and we need not consider them in our analysis.
A. Stevens Failed to Satisfy His Burden of Facially Establishing Substantial Grounds for Believing Manifest Injustice or Miscarriage of Justice Resulted
[6–10] Plain errors are "evident, obvious, and clear." State v. Robinson, 541 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Not every allegation of plain error, however, is entitled to plain error review. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526. "To obtain a new trial on direct appeal based on a claim of plain error, the appellant must show ‘the error was outcome determinative.’ " Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731 (quoting State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019)). When, as here, the alleged error involves erroneously admitted evidence, an appellant establishes outcome-determinative error by showing that the "erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all of the evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion but for the erroneously admitted evidence." State v. Black, 524 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017) (quoting State v. Barriner, 34 S.W.3d 139, 150 (Mo. banc 2000)). "In the absence of an error...
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