State v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 18 February 2022
• Docket Number: 20-1393
• Citation: 970 N.W.2d 598
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Yale STEVENS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

970 N.W.2d 598

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Yale STEVENS, Appellant.

No. 20-1393

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted December 15, 2021

Filed February 18, 2022

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, Melinda J. Nye (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, and Sonia M. Elossais (until withdrawal), law student, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

OXLEY, Justice.

Yale Stevens was convicted of possessing methamphetamine following his arrest when his brother was pulled over for a traffic violation. Stevens contends that the district court should have suppressed evidence of the methamphetamine found in his coat pocket during the traffic stop, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to search him after a canine indicated drugs were present in the car where he had been a backseat passenger. A drug dog's positive alert outside the driver's door of a vehicle does not alone create probable cause to search the vehicle's passengers, and the officers here lacked probable cause particularized to Stevens needed to search his person without a warrant. We reverse the denial of his motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.

I.

On our de novo review, we find the facts are as follows. Sergeant Brian Clausen followed an Audi he observed leaving a suspected drug house on February 26, 2020, between 12:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. While following the vehicle, he noticed a middle brake light was out and called a uniformed police officer to perform a traffic stop. Officer Thompson received the call and pulled over the Audi. Officer Thompson also requested assistance from K-9 officer Michael Simons based on Sergeant Clausen's report that the vehicle left a suspected drug house.

There were two people in the car. Yale Stevens, the defendant, was in the rear passenger-side seat, and his brother Kyle Stevens was driving. Officer Thompson explained the purpose for the stop and requested identification from both men. While Officer Thompson waited for his computer system to provide the status of Kyle's driver's license, Sergeant Clausen ordered Yale to exit the vehicle so the drug dog, Aura, could sniff the outside of the car. With Yale's consent, Clausen patted him down for weapons and felt only cigarettes, car keys, and what Yale identified as ChapStick. Meanwhile, Officer Thompson learned that Kyle did not have a valid license and returned to the car. He ordered Kyle out of the vehicle and ultimately arrested him.

Once Yale and Kyle were away from the car, Officer Simons walked Aura around the vehicle. Aura is a "passive" drug dog, which means she indicates the presence of a controlled substance by sitting. Officer Simons, who had been Aura's handler for over a year, explained that "there's no in between with this dog," she "either sits or doesn't sit." "[I]t's real plain" and "obvious"—her "tail stops wagging" and she "sits and stares at where the odor is coming from."

Aura jumped up on the driver's door where the window was open and sat after sniffing inside. Officer Simons then opened the driver's door to allow her in the car. Aura entered and exited the car twice. While inside the car, Aura was most interested in the passenger's side in both the front and back seat, but as Officer Simons testified, it is difficult for a passive dog to alert by sitting when inside of a vehicle. After exiting the vehicle the second time, Aura sat outside the driver's side of the empty car. Officer Simons testified he was concerned with the passenger side based on Aura's actions inside the vehicle, so he told Sergeant Clausen to "get in his pockets," meaning to search Yale.

Sergeant Clausen asked Yale if he knew why the dog would alert on the car, and Yale responded he did not. Clausen then asked if Yale had anything illegal on him, and Yale looked at him without responding. Clausen told Yale he was going to search his person. Yale put both his hands in his coat pockets, and Clausen told him to take them out. Clausen again asked Yale if he had anything illegal, and Yale mumbled something unintelligible and reached toward his right coat pocket. Clausen stopped him and reached inside Yale's pocket himself, pulling out a bag containing a crystal-like substance that later field-tested positive for 0.51g of methamphetamine. Officer Thompson subsequently found a similar user quantity of drugs in Kyle's pocket during a search incident to his arrest for driving without a license. Yale told the officers he and his brother had each purchased $30 worth of methamphetamine but refused to say more. Officer Simons later searched the car by hand and did not find any drugs.

After his arrest, Yale Stevens filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his pocket, arguing that the canine's alert on the vehicle did not provide probable cause to search his person. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied his motion to suppress. The court concluded the totality of the circumstances established probable cause because the car was leaving a known drug house, the canine signaled on the passenger side of the vehicle, and Stevens mumbled when questioned.

The district court proceeded to a trial on the minutes of testimony, attached reports, and the dashcam video recording from the stop. The court found Stevens guilty of possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2020). Stevens appealed his conviction, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.¹ We retained the appeal.

II.

We review claims challenging the denial of a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Dewitt , 811 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 2012).

When presented with such claims, we make an "independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record." State v. Scheffert , 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Tague , 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004) ). "We give deference to the district court's factual findings, but they do not bind us." Id.

A.

Stevens argues that Sergeant Clausen's search of his person violated his constitutional rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." We decide today's case under the federal constitution. Although Stevens cited both the Iowa and federal constitutions below, he did not argue for more protection or adoption of a different standard under the Iowa Constitution. See State v. Effler , 769 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Iowa 2009) (Appel, J., specially concurring) ("[B]ecause of our prudential concern that the issue may not be fully illuminated without a developed record and briefing, we generally decline to consider an independent state constitutional standard based upon a mere citation to the applicable state constitutional provision."). Further, because we find there was a Fourth Amendment violation, it is unnecessary for us to separately decide this case under the Iowa Constitution.

We have said that warrantless searches of a person by a police officer are per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, unless the search falls under one of the "few carefully drawn exceptions": "consent, plain view, probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and those based on the emergency aid exception." State v. Lewis , 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004) ; see also Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Both parties address the warrantless search here under the automobile exception, which requires probable cause and exigent circumstances. We reject this analysis because the automobile exception does not authorize an officer to conduct a warrantless search of a person.

The automobile exception allows officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if the officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. See State v. Storm , 898 N.W.2d 140, 145–46 (Iowa 2017). The "exception rests on twin rationales: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle, and (2) the lower expectation of privacy in vehicles compared to homes and other structures." Id. at 145. Generally, a positive alert from a reliable drug dog establishes probable cause to search a vehicle, including containers capable of concealing contraband. State v. Bergmann , 633 N.W.2d 328, 338 (Iowa 2001) ("Several cases have concluded that a reliable drug dog alert alone is enough to establish probable cause to search."). Stevens relies on cases holding that a dog alert on a vehicle does not provide probable cause to search a container that was not in the vehicle at the time the dog alerted, see State v. Lelm , 962 N.W.2d 419, 423 (N.D. 2021) (holding that probable cause established by canine's indication on a vehicle limited search for potential illegal contraband to containers within the vehicle at the time the sniff was conducted), reasoning that if probable cause is lacking to search a container not in the vehicle, it is also lacking to search a person who was outside the vehicle at the time of the drug sniff.

In State v. Rincon , also filed today, we held that officers properly searched a passenger's backpack that had been removed from a vehicle after the officers observed open containers of alcohol inside the vehicle.

970 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Iowa 2022). Probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception for evidence of other open containers, including a search of any containers in the vehicle that could hold an open container of alcohol, had been established while the backpack was inside the vehicle, and we held that the passenger could not frustrate law enforcement's lawful search by removing the backpack from the vehicle. Id. at 279 (distinguishing State v. Lelm on the basis that the passenger's backpack in that case was...