State v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 05 April 2023
• Docket Number: 22-746
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WILLIE J. STEVENS, SR.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

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STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WILLIE J. STEVENS, SR.

No. 22-746

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit

April 5, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 20686-18 HONORABLE DERRICK D. KEE, DISTRICT JUDGE

Jeff Landry Attorney General Tasha Stockwell Assistant Attorney General COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: State of Louisiana

Annette Fuller Roach Roach &Roach, APLC COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Willie J. Stevens, Sr.

Wilford D. Carter Attorney at Law COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Willie J. Stevens, Sr.

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Van H. Kyzar, and Guy E Bradberry, Judges.

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE

FACTS

On November 29, 2018, the defendant, Willie J. Stevens, Sr., was charged by bill of indictment with first degree rape, in violation of La.R.S. 14:42. On December 7, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to quash based on the state's failure to timely commence trial. The trial court granted the motion to quash following a contradictory hearing held on January 13, 2022. The state now appeals the trial court's ruling. For the following reasons, the trial court's ruling granting the motion to quash is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. The present appeal was filed by the state seeking review of the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to quash. This court has found that an error patent review is required in such cases. State v Nguyen, 14-639 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 562; State v. Jones, 13-395 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 130 So.3d 1; State v. Brignac, 10-276 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 49 So.3d 960; State v. Gutweiler, 06-561 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So.2d 160, judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 062596 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 469. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

In its sole assignment of error, the state asserts the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash. The state contends the dispositive question before this court is "whether court closures caused by Hurricane Laura qualify as 'cause[s] beyond the control of the state' under La. Code Crim. P. art. 579(A)(2) and thus interrupt the two-year period for bringing non-capital felony cases to trial." Relying on this court's recent decision in State v. Simmons, 22-208 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22), 350 So.3d 599, writ denied, (La. 2/7/23), __So.3d__, the state argues it does. In contrast, the defendant argues this court should not follow Simmons for numerous reasons, and alternatively, if this court finds the time limitation was interrupted by Hurricane Laura as this court found in Simmons, then La.Code Crim.P. art. 579 is unconstitutional.

Before addressing the merits of the arguments, we set forth the applicable law regarding a motion to quash. The standard of reviewing a motion to quash is as follows:

Because the complementary role of trial courts and appellate courts demands that deference be given to a trial court's discretionary decision, an appellate court is allowed to reverse a trial court judgment on a motion to quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court's discretion. State v. Love, 00-3347, pp. 9-10 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1206. However, the trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. State v. Hamdan, 12-1986, p. 6 (La. 3/19/13), 112 So.3d 812, 816; State v. Smith, 99-0606, p. 3 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504. This case presents both a question of law as to the proper interpretation of the meaning of the La. C.Cr.P. art. 576 phrase "based on the same facts" and a question as to the propriety of the trial court's application of that provision to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

State v. Gray, 16-687, pp. 3-4 (La. 3/15/17), 218 So.3d 40, 43.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 578 provides, in pertinent part, "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no trial shall be commenced nor any bail obligation be enforceable: . . . [i]n other felony cases after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution[.]" Once a defendant shows the state has failed to bring him to trial within the time limitation, the state "bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that either an interruption or a suspension tolled the prescriptive period." State v. Schmidt, 21-491, p. 3 (La. 1/28/22), 333 So.3d 411, 413 (citing State v. Morris, 99-3235 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So.2d 205 (per curiam)). In State v. Rome, 93-1221 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1284, the supreme court summarized the difference between interruptions and suspensions as follows:

An interruption of prescription occurs when the state is unable, through no fault of its own, to try a defendant within the period specified by statute, in this case two years. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 579(A)(2) provides in pertinent part that the two-year period of limitation will be interrupted if the defendant "cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the control of the state." Once the cause of interruption disappears, the two-year time limit begins anew. See La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 579(B). In contrast, the prescriptive period is merely suspended, until the trial court rules on the filing of preliminary pleas. The relevant period is simply not counted, and the running of the time limit resumes when the motions are ruled on. Note, however, that "in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence the trial." La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 580.

Rome, 630 So.2d at 1287 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).

Since prosecution was instituted against the defendant on November 29, 2018, the state had until November 29, 2020, to commence trial unless the prescriptive period was interrupted or suspended. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 578(A)(2).^[1] The defendant had not proceeded to trial at the time his motion to quash was filed on December 7, 2021. Therefore, his motion to quash was facially meritorious.

At the motion to quash hearing held on January 13, 2022, the state argued the prescriptive period had not yet lapsed for two reasons. First, the state argued that the defense's failure to object to the state's motions to continue the February 18, 2020 and the November 8, 2021 trial dates qualified as joint motions to continue. The state contended the unopposed motions to continue sufficiently suspended the time limitation under La.Code Crim.P. art. 580, but the trial court found the state's unopposed motions did not constitute a suspension.

Second, the state asserted the prescriptive period was interrupted by Hurricane Laura, which caused the prescriptive period to run anew. The state discussed numerous fourth circuit cases which held that extended court closures due to Hurricane Katrina constituted "cause[s] beyond the control of the state" and interrupted the time limitation under La.Code Crim.P. art. 579(A)(2). The trial court rejected the state's interruption argument, because it determined that granting the state an additional two-year prescriptive period was not "equitable, fair, or constitutionally allowable." The trial court then granted the defendant's motion to quash:

THE COURT:

I find that there was no cause beyond the control of the State at the point that the time period began to run anew .... I take no joy in interrupting -- in granting this motion. Quite honestly, this is -- this is a very serious case. I'm sure the victim -- the alleged victim, complaining witness want[s her] day in court. But I think that the constitution of the State is designed to protect not only the rights of victims, but firmly, the rights of the defendant --....

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and his rights were violated. And I think the Motion to Quash is not only the right mechanism, but I think it's the only mechanism under which you can attack this matter. And I think it was appropriately filed. I find that was appropriate, and I grant the Motion to Quash.

The following relevant events occurred between the institution of prosecution and the filing of the motion to quash:

- November 29, 2018: Bill of indictment filed charging the defendant with first degree rape.

- December 4, 2018: Motion for Discovery and Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by the defendant (trial court order signed December 4, 2018).

- December 10, 2018: The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and elected to be tried by jury. Pretrial conference fixed for March 4, 2019. Discovery tendered by the state.

- December 18, 2018: Answer to Motion for Discovery and Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by the state.

- June 13, 2019: Trial set for February 18 2020.

- January 8, 2020: Second Motion for Discovery and Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by the defendant (trial court ordered signed January 8, 2020).

- January 9, 2020: Answer to Second Motion for Discovery and Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by the state.

- February 11, 2020: On the state's unopposed motion, trial date continued to September 21, 2020 (trial court granted motion on February 12, 2020).

- March 16, 2020: Louisiana Supreme Court ordered all jury trials scheduled to commence between March 16, 2020, and March 27, 2020, to be continued to a date no earlier than April 13, 2020. (Order #2020-4 and #2020-5).

- March 16, 2020: Governor's Emergency Proclamation suspending all legal deadlines, including liberative prescription and peremptive periods applicable to legal proceedings, until at least Monday, April 13, 2020. (Proclamation # 30 JBE 2020).

- March 20, 2020:

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