State v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 12 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | DA 17-0334 |
| Citation | 2019 MT 36,434 P.3d 904,394 Mont. 278 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jeremiah James STEVENS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Kathryn Brautigam, Clinical Law Student, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana
¶1 Jeremiah James Stevens (Stevens) appeals from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
¶3 On June 26, 2016, at approximately six a.m., Deputy Sheriff Brandon Holzer (Deputy Holzer) was preparing to transfer a prisoner from the courthouse in Libby, Montana, to a separate facility. Deputy Holzer was outside of the prisoner transport bay door at the north end of the courthouse, when he noticed a person hiding in the bushes across the street from the courthouse. According to Deputy Holzer, the person hiding in the bushes, later identified as Stevens, was "bobbing up and down." Concerned by Stevens' behavior, Deputy Holzer delayed the prisoner transport and called for backup.
¶4 Trooper Trewick arrived to assist Deputy Holzer. The officers approached Stevens on foot with their weapons drawn at their sides. Deputy Holzer ordered Stevens to stand up and show his hands—Stevens cooperated. Deputy Holzer then asked Stevens to turn around, Stevens complied, and Deputy Holzer placed Stevens in handcuffs. Deputy Holzer testified that Stevens appeared "very nervous."
¶5 Deputy Holzer asked Stevens what he was doing in the bushes, to which Stevens responded that he had an open container of alcohol and was attempting to conceal it from Deputy Holzer. Deputy Holzer asked Stevens if he had any weapons on him. Stevens answered that he did not have any weapons, but he was in possession of methamphetamine. Deputy Holzer proceeded to search Stevens and found a container of a white powdery substance, a Fentanyl patch, and a clear plastic container holding a white crystal rock. A field test of the powder and the rock revealed the presence of methamphetamine. Deputy Holzer then placed Stevens under arrest for criminal possession of dangerous drugs.
¶6 Stevens was charged by information with one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation § 45-9-102(4), MCA (2015), and one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation § 45-9-102(6), MCA (2015). Stevens filed a motion to suppress his statements and the drugs on the basis that he was initially detained without reasonable suspicion and arrested without probable cause in violation of the United States and Montana Constitutions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to suppress. Stevens entered into a plea agreement with the State, in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and the State agreed to dismiss the other count. On February 27, 2017, Stevens pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, in violation of § 45-9-102(6), MCA (2015). On April 10, 2017, Stevens was committed to the Department of Corrections for five years, with two years suspended. Stevens appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
¶7 In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence or statements, we determine whether the court’s underlying factual findings are clearly erroneous and whether the court correctly interpreted and applied the governing law. State v. Morrisey , 2009 MT 201, ¶ 14, 351 Mont. 144, 214 P.3d 708. A trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous if not supported by substantial evidence, if the court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court’s review of the record leaves us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Clayton , 2002 MT 67, ¶ 8, 309 Mont. 215, 45 P.3d 30.
¶8 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution similarly prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. Const. amend. IV (); Mont. Const. art. II, § 11 (). The fundamental purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is to protect the privacy and security of individuals. Clayton , ¶ 11. When the legality of a search or seizure has been called into question, the central inquiry is the reasonableness, in light of all circumstances, of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security. Clayton , ¶ 12 ; Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
¶9 1. Whether the District Court erred in its determination that the officers' initial investigation was supported by particularized suspicion.
¶10 Except under certain recognized exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures of persons are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. City of Missoula v. Kroschel , 2018 MT 142, ¶ 10, 391 Mont. 457, 419 P.3d 1208 ; Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the temporary investigative stop, or the Terry stop, established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and subsequently codified in Montana at §§ 46-5-401 and -403, MCA. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1885. Section 46-5-401(1), MCA, provides:
In order to obtain or verify an account of the person’s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person ... has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.
¶11 Further, an officer who has lawfully stopped a person may request the person’s name, address, and an explanation of the person’s actions, frisk the person, and take other reasonably necessary steps for protection if the officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer. Section 46-5-401(1), (2)(a)-(b), MCA. A stop authorized by § 46-5-401, MCA, may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Section 46-5-403, MCA.
¶12 The United States Supreme Court has stated that "in determining whether the [investigatory] seizure and search were ‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry , 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. An officer may only initiate a Terry stop if he or she has particularized suspicion that wrongdoing exists. Section 46-5-401(1), MCA. Particularized suspicion is objective data from which an experienced police officer can make certain inferences and a resulting suspicion that the individual is or has been engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Wilson , 2018 MT 268, ¶ 28, 393 Mont. 238, 430 P.3d 77. Relevant considerations include the quantity, substance, quality, and degree of reliability of information known to the officer. Wilson , ¶ 28. The question of whether particularized suspicion exists is a "factually driven inquiry dependent on the totality of the circumstances giving rise to the investigative stop." Clayton , ¶ 19. This standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even correct, that a person is engaged in criminal activity. Wilson , ¶ 28. Yet, particularized suspicion requires more than mere generalized suspicion or an undeveloped hunch of criminal activity. Wilson , ¶ 28.
¶13 Unquestionably, Stevens was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment when he was approached by the officers. Katz , 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511 (). The issues raised by Stevens are whether the officers' initial investigation was supported by particularized suspicion and whether the use of handcuffs elevated the Terry stop into an unconstitutional arrest.
¶14 Stevens argues that his "mere presence" on the street adjacent to the courthouse did not give Deputy Holzer particularized suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. Stevens' argument, however, misconstrues several key facts. Specifically, he minimizes the fact that "bobbing up and down" in the bushes across from a courthouse at six a.m. may be construed as strange, even suspicious, behavior. Further, Deputy Holzer’s concern that Stevens might be attempting to interfere with the prisoner transport was reasonable considering Stevens was trying to conceal himself from Deputy Holzer. At the evidentiary hearing, Deputy Holzer testified that he considered the prisoner transport bay door a "high risk area" and that interference with a prisoner transport "is a factor at all times." Stevens argues that it was unreasonable for Deputy Holzer to suspect Stevens of attempting to interfere with the transport considering Deputy Holzer had never personally encountered such an interference. This argument is not compelling. An officer does not have to...
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