State v. Stevens

Decision Date03 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 9982,9982
Citation26 Conn.App. 805,603 A.2d 1203
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Frances I. STEVENS.

William W. Fisher, Jr., Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., and Peter McShane, deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, NORCOTT and LANDAU, JJ.

NORCOTT, Judge.

This case requires us to consider the narrow issue of whether a Connecticut police officer, after having made a lawful arrest in Connecticut for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, may thereafter gather evidence in a neighboring state when the arrestee has been transported there for medical care.

The defendant, Frances I. Stevens, appeals from a judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60d, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed (1) to find that her arrest was illegal and (2) to suppress evidence resulting from two sobriety tests and two blood tests, thereby denying her federal and state constitutional rights to due process. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On January 31, 1990, the defendant, a Rhode Island resident, was driving her car accompanied by a dinner companion, Rose Buck, in the Pawcatuck section of Stonington at about 11 p.m. on a poorly lighted, narrow hilly road. The defendant had been drinking wine at a restaurant earlier that evening with Buck and another friend. Behind the defendant's car, Keith Beebe, an off duty Stonington police officer, was driving with a friend, Amos Steadman. The defendant's car rounded a curve on the two lane road and Beebe lost sight of it. As he reached the other end of the curve, he saw that the defendant's car had gone off the road and crashed into a tree. The car's front end was heavily damaged.

While Steadman went to summon help, Beebe tried unsuccessfully to open the car doors as Buck screamed in pain. While talking with the defendant, Beebe noticed that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, her speech slurred. He smelled alcohol on her breath, and she told him she had been drinking wine that evening. At about 11:07 p.m., two on duty Stonington police officers, Randy Holt and Louis Diamanti, arrived. They also spoke with the defendant, smelled alcohol on her breath, noticed her glassy eyes and concluded, as did Beebe, that she was under the influence of alcohol. The defendant also told Diamanti that she had been drinking wine that evening.

At about 11:15 p.m., an ambulance came to take the women to the Westerly Hospital in Westerly, Rhode Island, the closest medical facility. 1 Buck had suffered serious chest and rib injuries, and internal bleeding. She underwent surgery for removal of her spleen and remained in intensive care for three weeks thereafter. The defendant, after being fitted with a neck brace, was removed from the car and placed in an ambulance. Before the ambulance left, however, Diamanti entered the vehicle and conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus test 2 to determine if the defendant was intoxicated. Because the results, along with his prior observations, led him to conclude that she was intoxicated, he then placed her under arrest at about 11:30 p.m. as she lay on a stretcher in the ambulance, waiting to leave for the hospital. 3

Diamanti then rode to the hospital in the ambulance with the defendant. In the emergency room, a doctor examined her and told Diamanti she was suffering from chest bruises. At 12:07 a.m. on February 1, 1990, after the examination was completed, Diamanti gave the defendant Miranda 4 warnings. She was coherent and sitting upright in a bed at this time. Diamanti then asked if he could perform two more sobriety tests, and the defendant agreed. 5 He also read her Connecticut's implied consent law 6 and offered her the chance to contact an attorney, which she chose not to do. When he requested that she submit to two blood tests, she voluntarily consented. At 1 a.m. and again at 1:30 a.m., blood was taken by the defendant's attending doctor, a physician licensed by the state of Connecticut. Diamanti then issued the defendant a summons. After the blood was sealed and placed in a kit Diamanti had brought from Stonington, he took it back to Connecticut for laboratory analysis. The first sample showed a blood alcohol level of .13; the second disclosed a .12 level. At trial, Sanders F. Hawkins, the state's chief toxicologist, estimated that at the time of the collision, the defendant's blood alcohol level was between .14 and .17.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to find that her arrest was illegal because Diamanti had no authority to act as a police officer in Rhode Island. We disagree.

The defendant relies on, inter alia, State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 85-86, 510 A.2d 172 (1986), and State v. Carroll, 131 Conn. 224, 230, 38 A.2d 798 (1944), for the proposition that General Statutes § 54-1f(a) and (b) do not permit Connecticut law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests beyond the state's borders. Because Diamanti placed the defendant under arrest in Connecticut and not in Rhode Island, such reliance is misplaced. Except for a single statement in her brief that she was issued a summons in Rhode Island, the defendant makes no claim that she was placed under arrest in Rhode Island. Moreover, she does not provide us with citation of authority, nor does our independent research disclose any, for the proposition that an arrest occurs where a summons is issued.

It is the generally accepted rule that the validity of an arrest is determined by the law of the state where the arrest was made. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589, 68 S.Ct. 222, 226, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948); Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir.1970). The validity of an arrest hinges on the existence of probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 178, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). In Connecticut, probable cause is required before an arrest may be made for operating under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Gonzalez, 210 Conn. 446, 460, 556 A.2d 137 (1989) (written report, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b[c], must set forth grounds for police officer's belief that probable cause existed to arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence); Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 511, 529 A.2d 177 (1987) (license suspension hearing limited to determination of whether probable cause existed to arrest for operating under the influence).

"Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts 'as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe' that criminal activity has occurred." State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 548, 594 A.2d 917 (1991), quoting Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 218, 230, 30 Am.Dec. 611 (1837). It is a flexible common sense standard that does not require the police officer's belief to be either correct or more likely true than false. Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 175, 474 A.2d 795 (1984). Probable cause for an arrest is based on the objective facts available to the officer at the time of arrest, not on the officer's subjective state of mind. State v. Kaplan, 20 Conn.App. 183, 186-87, 565 A.2d 11 (1989); see Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 208 n. 3, 530 A.2d 603 (1987).

" 'There must be facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has trustworthy information sufficient to justify the belief of a reasonable person that an offense has been or is being committed.' " State v. Kaplan, supra, 20 Conn.App. at 187, 565 A.2d 11, quoting State v. Copeland, supra, 205 Conn. at 213, 530 A.2d 603; Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979).

On the basis of the facts and circumstances as they appeared to Diamanti at 11:30 p.m. that night, the trial court properly found that probable cause existed to believe that the defendant had been operating under the influence of alcohol. Diamanti saw her heavily damaged car and spoke with her moments after the crash. He saw that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and he noticed her slurred speech and smelled alcohol on her breath. Further, the defendant told Diamanti that she had been drinking wine that evening, and had failed a sobriety test he conducted at the scene. Diamanti also had trustworthy information from Holt and Beebe, the off duty officer, who told him that they also had spoken with and observed the defendant moments before, and believed her to be under the influence of alcohol. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly found that Diamanti had lawfully arrested the defendant at the accident scene pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227a.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly refused to suppress the results of sobriety tests Diamanti performed at the hospital, as well as the results of laboratory tests on her blood, which was drawn at the hospital, thereby denying her right to due process.

In explaining why we believe that Diamanti's gathering of evidence in Rhode Island was valid, we begin by examining his status when he acted in this case. As a general rule, police officers acting outside their jurisdictions do not act in their official capacity, nor do they have official power to arrest. People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360, 365-66 (Colo.1986); State v. Hodgson, 57 Del. 383, 385, 200 A.2d...

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12 cases
  • State v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • February 23, 1993
  • State v. Toth
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • February 24, 1993
    ... ... There must be facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has trustworthy information sufficient to justify the belief of a reasonable person that an offense has been or is being committed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevens, 26 Conn.App. 805, 810-11, 603 A.2d 1203, cert. granted, 221 Conn. 926, 608 A.2d 691 (1992) ...         When an affidavit in support of a search warrant is based on information supplied by confidential informants, the test to be applied is whether the "totality of the circumstances" ... ...
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    ...geographical jurisdiction (see, People v. Lahr, 147 Ill.2d 379, 168 Ill.Dec. 139, 589 N.E.2d 539 [Sup.Ct.Ill.1992]; State v. Stevens, 26 Conn.App. 805, 603 A.2d 1203, affd. 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 [App.Ct.Conn.1992]; 6A CJS Arrest § 53; 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 69). Similarly, an arrest war......
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