State v. Stevenson
| Decision Date | 08 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 56528,56528 |
| Citation | 323 So.2d 762 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond STEVENSON. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
John R. Joyce, Wright, Joyce & Jefferson, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Raymond Stevenson was charged with the crime of armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. Following a trial by jury defendant was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. He appeals urging four assignments of error. We affirm.
The armed robbery was committed at the Seven-Eleven Food Store on Shannon Drive, Monroe, Ouachita Parish, Louisiana. On the evening of February 12, 1975, the defendant and two companions drove to the store location where defendant and one of his confederates entered the store armed with guns, demanded and received from the attendant the store's receipts, and escaped the scene. The three men were ultimately arrested and the prosecution of this defendant ensued, resulting in his conviction and sentence.
These assignments complain of the trial court's ruling the oral confession given by defendant was free, voluntary and, hence, admissible. Defendant states three bases for this error. Each basis is made the subject of a separate assignment even though all three refer to the same allegedly erroneous ruling and the attendant consequences.
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in ruling the confession admissible because he initially declined to give a statement and only confessed after he had been confronted by one of his companions and the companion's brother. It is contended this ruling was erroneous in light of the State's failure to affirmatively show the confession was not a result of threats against defendant or of his fear of great bodily harm. La.R.S. 15:451. Defendant's second and third arguments relate to the failure of the interrogating officers to obtain his signature on a waiver of rights form and their failure to use electronic recording equipment to record his confession. Defendant contends that since the forms were readily available and the equipment was at its disposal, the State's failure to utilize them renders the ruling admitting the confession error.
The record reveals that when the interrogating officers first approached the defendant at approximately 6:00 P.M. on the evening of his arrest, he declined to give any statement. Later in the evening, however, one of the defendant's arrested companions and the co-arrestee's brother requested and were granted permission to speak to defendant, after which they reported to the officers that defendant wished to speak to them. After again apprising the defendant of his Miranda rights, the interrogating officers requested a statement from the defendant; in response he confessed his participation in the crime. No written waiver of rights was sought from defendant but an oral waiver was obtained. There is some conflict in the testimony regarding whether the officers offered to tape the confession, but it is clearly established that one of the interrogating officers took notes within the defendant's view during the taking of the confession.
The interrogating officers and defendant's companion testified on behalf of the State at the hearing outside the jury's presence to establish the free and voluntary nature of the confession prior to its admission into evidence. Both officers testified they had not threatened nor coerced the defendant in any way. They likewise testified that during the time defendant spoke privately with his companion and the man's brother, the officers occasionally viewed them through a window to assure that the discussion was calm. The record reveals that no physical coercion was observed and that no loud threats were heard. The officers acknowledged softly spoken threats would have escaped their notice, but there is no testimony to establish any such threats were made.
The defendant presented no witnesses who attacked the State's showing of the free and voluntary nature of the confession during the admissibility hearing out of the presence of the jury. The...
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State v. Myles
... ... However, this court has indicated that a written waiver of rights is not a prerequisite to the introduction of a confession or other statement made while the defendant was detained. State v. Haynes, 339 So.2d 328 (La.1976); State v. Stevenson, 323 So.2d 762 (La.1975). Moreover, in State v. Taylor, 336 So.2d 855 (La.1976), we held that a waiver was implicit when the defendant was read his rights, stated that he understood them and then made a statement. See North Carolina v. Butler, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) ... ...
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State v. McZeal
...identifications. The weight to be given a witness' testimony is an issue which must be determined by the finder of fact. State v. Stevenson, 323 So.2d 762 (La.1975). Accordingly, this assignment of error is without Because Assignment of Error No. 8 is related to the above assignment of erro......
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State v. Haynes, 58129
... ... The defendant offers no evidence that he was in fact taking medication or unable to knowingly or intelligently waive his rights ... Initially, we note that there is no requirement that the waiver of an accused's Miranda rights be in writing. State v. Stevenson, La., 323 So.2d 762 (1975); State v. Lewis, La., 315 So.2d 626 (1975). Prior to the admission of a confession or inculpatory statement, the State must affirmatively establish that the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona have been met. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v ... ...
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State v. Trudell
... ... 1 Dr. Hill testified at trial for the defendant in a similar manner, but that testimony, not introduced by either the state or defendant at the predicate, was not before the trial judge and forms no part of our decision. State v. Tucker, 332 So.2d 797 (La.1976); State v. Stevenson, 323 So.2d 762 (La.1975). It can be noted, however, that the psychiatrist's testimony in no way contradicted the sanity commission findings which were already a part of the record and properly used as a basis of the decision on admissibility ... 2 Dr. Kirkpatrick's third report follows, in full: ... ...