State v. Stevenson

• Decision Date: 15 June 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 16824).
• Citation: 849 A.2d 626,269 Conn. 563
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JIMMY STEVENSON.

269 Conn. 563

849 A.2d 626

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.JIMMY STEVENSON.

(SC 16824).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 24, 2003.

Officially released June 15, 2004.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and Vertefeuille, Js.

Toni M. Smith-Rosario, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Antonia Carabillo, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant(state).

Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, for the appellee(defendant).

Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The issue in this certified appeal¹ is whether certain questions posed by the assistant state's attorney to the defendant during cross-examination and certain remarks made by the assistant state's attorney in final argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial.We conclude that the defendant was not deprived of his right to a fair trial.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court to the contrary.

The state charged the defendant, Jimmy Stevenson, with burglary in the second degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8²and53a-102,³ conspiracy to commit burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48⁴and53a-102, larceny in the fifth degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8and53a-125a, conspiracy to commit larceny in the fifth degree in violation of §§ 53a-48and53a-125a,⁵ burglary in the third degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8and53a-103,⁶ conspiracy to commit burglary in the third degree in violation of §§ 53a-48and53a-103, larceny in the second degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8and53a-123,⁷ and conspiracy to commit second degree larceny in violation of §§ 53a-48and53a-123.After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on all counts.The trial court rendered judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury's verdict.The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court.That court concluded that the assistant state's attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, which deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial.State v. Stevenson,70 Conn. App. 29, 31, 797 A.2d 1(2002).Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial.Id., 55.This certified appeal followed.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.On the night of October 22, 1998, Marilyn Mejia returned home from church to find that the back door to the first floor apartment that she shared with her husband and three children at 475 Myrtle Street in New Britain was open, and that her apartment had been burglarized.Mejia telephoned the police, and Officer Anthony Cintron arrived within one hour.Cintron investigated the apartment for signs of forced entry, and finding none, inventoried the missing property.After Cintron left, Mejia and her husband discovered that additional property was missing, and that a glass window had two holes sliced into it.Neither Mejia nor her husband, however, notified the police of the additional missing property or alerted the police to the holes that had been sliced into the window.

The following afternoon, on October 23, 1998, Dorotka Wilczynska returned home from shopping to find that the rear door to the first floor apartment that she shared with her husband and her brotherat 200 Smith Street in New Britain was open.Wilczynska also saw that the lock was broken and that her apartment had been burglarized.Wilczynska telephoned the police, and Officer Philip Caseria arrived to investigate.Caseria noted damage consistent with a forced entry and inventoried the property that Wilczynska identified to him as missing.After Caseria left, Wilczynska and her husband discovered additional missing property and contacted the police to add it to the inventory.After the defendant became a suspect in the burglaries, neither Mejia nor Wilczynska recognized the defendant's name or acknowledged lending him keys or otherwise giving him access to their apartments.

On November 11, 1998, two detectives from the New Britain police department, William Durkin and Stanley Masternak, questioned the defendant, who was under arrest and in custody on another charge, regarding the burglaries at Mejia's and Wilczynska's apartments.The defendant waived his Miranda⁸ rights, and told the detectives that he and another individual had committed a number of burglaries in the Broad Street area of New Britain.The defendant then accompanied the detectives on a drive through the Broad Street neighborhood in an unmarked police vehicle, pointing out numerous homes and businesses that he and his accomplice had burglarized.Among these locations were the first floor apartments at 475 Myrtle Street and 200 Smith Street.Regarding the burglary at 475 Myrtle Street, the defendant told Durkin and Masternak that he and his accomplice had entered through a side window.The defendant also told the detectives that he and his accomplice had stolen several property items from 475 Myrtle Street, which the detectives later discovered were not included in Cintron's inventory.

After the defendant pointed out the burglary locations, the defendant and the detectives returned to the police department where Durkin prepared a written statement, which the defendant read and then signed.The defendant was later arrested on the basis of that statement.Thereafter, the defendant moved to suppress his confession, and the trial court denied his motion.He was tried to a jury, and the state introduced his confession into evidence.The defendant denied that he had confessed to the detectives that he had committed burglary, and testified that he supported his significant drug habit by borrowing money from his friends, including his girlfriend, who was a waitress at a fast-food diner.The defendant further testified that he had been intoxicated and sleep deprived when he was questioned by the detectives, that the detectives had not read him his rights, and that they had tricked him into signing a fraudulent confession.The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts charged.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that the assistant state's attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, thus depriving him of his right to a fair trial.The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant, reversed the judgment of conviction, and ordered a new trial.State v. Stevenson,supra, 70 Conn. App. 55.⁹Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that certain cross-examination questions posed by the assistant state's attorney to the defendant during trial, as well as during the assistant state's attorney's voir dire of the defendant and the defendant's hearing on his motion to suppress, compelled the defendant to characterize opposing witnesses as liars in violation of this court's holding in State v. Singh,259 Conn. 693, 700, 793 A.2d 226(2002).State v. Stevenson,supra, 34.The Appellate Court further concluded that the assistant state's attorney, during final argument, improperly expressed her personal opinion as to the credibility of witnesses and referred to facts outside the record.Id., 38-43.After performing a due process analysis, the Appellate Court concluded that the cumulative effect of the assistant state's attorney's conduct so infected the proceedings as to deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.Id., 44.

On appeal to this court, the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that some of the assistant state's attorney's cross-examination questions and remarks made during final argument constituted misconduct, and that, in determining whether the conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial, the Appellate Court incorrectly applied the factors for assessing harm.Specifically, the state claims that the Appellate Court: (1) failed to consider the effect of the defendant's defense; (2) improperly considered certain cross-examination questions asked outside the presence of the jury in assessing the severity and frequency of the misconduct; (3) failed to consider the ameliorative effects of the trial court's instructions to the jury; and (4) failed to consider the strength of the state's case against the defendant.We agree with the state's claims.

Before addressing the certified question before us, namely, whether the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the assistant state's attorney's conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial, "we first review the principles that govern our resolution of claims of prosecutorial misconduct.The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor. . . .The issue is whether the prosecutor's conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.. . .In determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of prosecutorial misconduct we must view the prosecutor's comments in the context of the entire trial."(Internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Rizzo,266 Conn. 171, 245-46, 833 A.2d 363(2003).

"It is not the prosecutor's conduct alone that guides our inquiry, but, rather, the fairness of the trial as a whole. . . .We are mindful throughout this inquiry, however, of the unique responsibilities of the prosecutor in our judicial system.A prosecutor is not only an officer of the court, like every other attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people of the State, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent. . . .By reason of his or her office, the prosecutor usually exercises great influence upon jurors.The prosecutor's conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty are at stake should be...