State v. Stewart, 22502

• Decision Date: 10 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 22502,22502
• Citation: 341 S.E.2d 789,288 S.C. 232
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Richard STEWART, Appellant. . Heard

Page 789

341 S.E.2d 789

288 S.C. 232

The STATE, Respondent, v. Richard STEWART, Appellant.

No. 22502.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Feb. 10, 1986.

Decided March 14, 1986.

David I. Bruck, Columbia; Anderson County Public Defender Robert A. Gamble, Anderson; and South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Amie L. Clifford, Columbia; and Sol. George M. Ducworth, Anderson, for respondent.

HARWELL, Justice:

Appellant was convicted of murder by a jury on March 12, 1983, and was sentenced to death upon the jury's recommendation on March 14, 1983. On appeal to this Court, the conviction was affirmed, the death sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. On January 25, 1985, the resentencing jury returned a recommendation of death. The appellant was sentenced accordingly that same day. This case consolidates the appellant's direct appeal and our mandatory review of the death sentence. We reverse and remand for resentencing.

During the retrial of the sentencing phase, the court ruled outside the jury's presence that the guilt or innocence of the appellant would not be retried since the guilt portion of the prior trial had been affirmed on appeal. The court noted that the sentencing proceedings would deal only with matters in aggravation or mitigation of the sentence. The court ruled that the appellant would not be allowed to introduce evidence or present arguments to the resentencing jury which were intended solely to show or suggest that he was not guilty. The appellant was free, however, to introduce any evidence of mitigation, even if it related to the guilt phase of the previous trial.

The resentencing proceeding was conducted pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(E)(2) (1976) which provides that "[T]he new [resentencing] jury ... shall hear evidence in extenuation, mitigation or aggravation of the punishment in addition to any evidence admitted in the defendant's first trial relating to guilt for the particular crime for which the defendant has been found guilty." (emphasis added). Appellant submits that by refusing to permit the resentencing jury to consider the appellant's guilt phase evidence as well as the state's, the trial judge violated both this statutory provision and the Eighth Amendment requirements of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).

Appellant asserted an alibi defense during the guilt phase of his first trial. The primary evidence linking appellant to the murder was a written confession given to the police by the appellant. At trial, however, the defense repudiated this confession and presented alibi witnesses who accounted for all but approximately forty-five minutes of appellant's whereabouts on the day of the murder. The court's ruling that the appellant could not introduce evidence "which was solely intended to show or suggest that appellant was not guilty of the offense of murder" effectively precluded appellant from reintroducing the alibi evidence which he presented at the first trial.

In compliance with this pretrial court ruling, appellant did not attempt to introduce evidence at the resentencing trial which tended to show that he was innocent of the murder, and defense counsel made no jury argument to that effect. The state reintroduced for the sentencing jury's consideration most of the evidence admitted to prove appellant's guilt at the first trial.

We are called upon to consider for the first time what the scope of a resentencing hearing should be when the guilt phase has already been upheld on appeal. This requires an interpretation of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(E)(2) (1976). We agree with appellant that the evidence tending to establish appellant's alibi was admissible under this statute as "any evidence admitted in the defendant's first trial relating to guilt for the particular crime for which the defendant has been found guilty." The appellant's alibi evidence "related to" his guilt of the crime for which he stood convicted. The appellant, therefore, had the right to decide whether or not to admit this evidence. In a resentencing hearing, each side has the right to put into evidence anything that it properly put into evidence during the guilt or sentencing phase of the previous trial.

This construction of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(E)(2) (1976) is consistent with the constitutional requirement of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) that the sentencing authority in a capital case not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any of the circumstances to the offense that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death. When the choice is between life...