State v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 11 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 44865,44865
• Citation: 238 La. 1036,117 So.2d 583
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Simon STEWART.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 583

117 So.2d 583

238 La. 1036

STATE of Louisiana v. Simon STEWART.

No. 44865.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 11, 1960.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1960.

Sam J. D'Amico, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. St. Clair Favrot, Dist. Atty., Thomas B. Pugh, Alex W. Wall, Asst. Dist. Attys., Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee.

HAWTHORNE, Justice.

Simon Stewart, charged with murder, was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. From this conviction and sentence he has appealed.

Defendant pleaded present insanity and also insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. All of the bills of exception that we shall discuss or specifically mention have to do with one or the other of these pleas.

During the examination of prospective jurors on their voir dire several bills were taken and perfected by counsel for the accused. One of these bills shows that an error was committed which entitles the accused to a new trial.

During the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, counsel for the State and for the accused engaged in argument as to the law relative to the degree of proof in cases where the accused pleads insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. Counsel for the State took the position that proving something by a preponderance of evidence requires 'a greater proof than * * * proving something beyond a reasonable doubt', and so stated to prospective jurors. Counsel for the accused in examining a group of five prospective jurors asked a question giving his view of the law governing such cases, and the State objected to this question. The trial judge sustained the objection and in doing so made a comment on the law which he deemed appropriate to the case. In the course of this comment he said:

'* * * I will say this, that we discussed this morning about the question of reasonable doubt, that to prove the insanity beyond a reasonable doubt or lack or reasonable doubt--my idea is that the defense is required to prove insanity not only by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt of insanity, not reasonable doubt of sanity. * * *'

The record discloses that when this comment was made, five jurors had already been accepted and sworn to try the case, and that four of the five then being examined on their voir dire were accepted and actually served.

In his per curiam the judge cites and relies on the case of State v. De Rance, 34 La.Ann. 186, to support his statement that the defendant must show insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The leading case dealing with the degree of proof by which an accused must establish his insanity is State v. Scott, 49 La.Ann. 253, 21 So. 271, 272, 36 L.R.A. 721, decided after State v. De Rance, supra, on which the trial judge relied. In the Scott case the trial judge instructed the jury:

'When insanity is set up as a defense for crime, it must be proved as a substantive fact by the party alleging it, on whom lies the burden of proof. The degree of proof must be by a preponderance of evidence. * * * The burden is upon the state to overcome the presumption of innocence, while the burden is upon the defendant to overcome the presumption of sanity when insanity is set up as a defense, and Both presumptions should be overcome beyond reasonable doubt.' (Italics ours.)

The accused in that case excepted to this charge as ambiguous and contradictory and not a correct exposition of the law, arguing that the charge placed before the jury two different rules of proof for the establishment of insanity as a defense--one, that the preponderance of testimony sufficed, and the other, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required.

After setting out the charge and the objection, this court observed that the trial judge's charge followed that sustained in State v. De Rance, 34 La.Ann. 186. It is obvious that in Scott this court repudiated the De Rance case because in Scott we found the judge's charge on the degree of proof required to establish the insanity of the accused to be reversible error and granted the accused a new trial.

In the Scott case this court pointed out that the charge in the trial court implied that though there might be a preponderance of testimony before the jury to show that the accused was insane at the time of the act, yet they might convict. The court then stated that it would be difficult to maintain such a charge under the authority of text books and the decisions of other courts, and refused to do so, saying:

'We think it will suffice if the jury are told, in effect, that the burden of proof is on the accused to establish by clear and convincing proof the insanity he urges as a defense; that the presumption of sanity is to be taken into consideration, and exercise its full influence along with all the testimony before them, whether produced by the accused or by the state; and if, on the consideration of the whole testimony, giving due weight to the presumption of sanity, they are satisfied the accused was not of sane mind when the act charged was committed, they are to acquit, but, if not thus satisfied, they are to hold the accused sane, and responsible.' (49 La.Ann. 253, 21 So. 274.)

In State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 987ff., 37 So. 890, 900, this court approved the Scott decision in these words:

'Of the three rules on this subject, to wit: (1) The defendant must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act charged against him; (2) he must satisfy the jury of such insanity by a preponderance of the whole evidence in the case; (3) if, upon the whole evidence, there be reasonable doubt as to whether he was sane or insane, he should be acquitted--The second is supported by the weight of authority in England and in this country. * * * In Louisiana that rule was applied in State v. Burns, 25 La.Ann. 302, and State v. Coleman, 27 La.Ann. 691, and affirmed in State v. Scott, 49 La.Ann. 253, 21 So. 271, (36 L.R.A. 721). * * * In the case last mentioned, Mr. Justice Miller, as the organ of this court, in effect, overruled a former decision, rendered in the case of State v. De Rance, 34 La.Ann. 186, 44 Am.Rep. 426, where it had been held that the onus is on the accused to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the insanity relied on by him, and returned to the jurisprudence as established by the decisions in State v. Burns and State v. Coleman, supra; the rule thus readopted having been subsequently mentioned in terms of approval in State v. Paine, 49 La.Ann. (1092), 1094, 22 So. 316; * * *.' (Italics ours.)

In State v. Surrency, 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240, 244, this court said:

'When insanity is an issue, the state and the accused are placed in the following relative positions:

'The state must make such proof of guilt as would satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, as in the case of an admittedly sane individual. When this is done, then the accused assumes the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. In deciding the case, there stands on the side of the state the proof of guilt plus the positive legal presumption of sanity, which presumption, if the case is otherwise made out beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. On the side of the defense stands the negative of that presumption (of sanity) which he must combat and overcome by proof sufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence in favor of...