State v. Stewart, No. 101179.

• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Writing for the Court: KETCHUM
• Citation: 719 S.E.2d 876,228 W.Va. 406
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Rhonda Kay STEWART, Defendant Below, Petitioner.
• Decision Date: 28 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 101179.

228 W.Va. 406
719 S.E.2d 876

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent
v.
Rhonda Kay STEWART, Defendant Below, Petitioner.

No. 101179.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Oct. 18, 2011.Decided Nov. 28, 2011.

[719 S.E.2d 879]

Syllabus by the Court

1. “Where it is determined that the defendant's actions were not reasonably made in self-defense, evidence that the decedent had abused or threatened the life of the defendant is nonetheless relevant and may negate or tend to negate a necessary element of the offense(s) charged, such as malice or intent.” Syllabus Point 4, State v. Harden, 223 W.Va. 796, 679 S.E.2d 628 (2009).

2. “Expert testimony can be utilized to explain the psychological basis for the battered woman's syndrome and to offer an opinion that the defendant meets the requisite profile of the syndrome.” Syllabus Point 5, State v. Steele, 178 W.Va. 330, 359 S.E.2d 558 (1987).

3. In cases involving Battered Woman's Syndrome, evidence that a victim had abused the defendant may be considered by the jury when determining the factual existence of one or more of the essential elements of the crime charged, such as premeditation, malice or intent. It is generally the function of the jury to weigh the evidence of abuse and to determine whether such evidence is too remote or lacking in credibility to have affected the defendant's reasoning, beliefs, perceptions, or behavior at the time of the alleged offense.

Gregory L. Ayers, Esq., Deputy Public Defender, Charleston, WV, for the Petitioner.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Thomas W. Rodd, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.

Kevin Baker, Esq., Baker & Brown, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women.KETCHUM, J.:

Rhonda Kay Stewart (“defendant”) appeals her conviction in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County for the first degree murder of her husband. The trial court observed at sentencing that the defendant was “ abused throughout her life ... by the man she killed.” However, at trial, the circuit court prohibited the defendant from presenting evidence that she had been battered and abused by her husband during their thirty-eight-year marriage. The trial judge did not allow eyewitnesses to testify about this abuse, and did not allow an expert witness to testify as to how this abuse may have affected the defendant's state of mind and reasoning as it related to premeditation, malice or intent.

If the jury had been allowed to hear the abuse evidence, it could have reasonably found that the abuse affected the defendant's reasoning, and that she did not act with premeditation or malice, two required elements of first degree murder. The defendant does not rely on this evidence to excuse her from responsibility; instead, the evidence was to mitigate the offense. To receive a fair trial, the defendant, whom the trial judge observed was “ abused throughout her life ... by the man she killed,” was entitled to present evidence that her crime was not first degree murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter. This has been our law for decades.

Based on well-established West Virginia precedent, the defendant was entitled to present evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome and evidence of abuse through eyewitnesses and expert witnesses. See, e.g., Syllabus Point 4, State v. Harden, 223 W.Va. 796, 679 S.E.2d 628 (2009) (in cases not involving self-defense, evidence of abuse is “relevant and may negate or tend to negate a necessary element of the offense(s) charged, such as malice or intent.”); Syllabus Point 5, State v. Steele, 178 W.Va. 330, 359 S.E.2d 558 (1987) (“[e]xpert testimony can be utilized to explain the psychological basis for the battered woman's syndrome and to offer an opinion that the defendant meets the requisite profile of the syndrome.”).

The defendant did not get a fair trial. We reverse the defendant's conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.

I. Background

The defendant, with one of her daughters, went to the Medical Intensive Care Unit

[719 S.E.2d 880]

(“MICU”) at Charleston Area Medical Center to visit her husband, who had only hours earlier been taken off of a ventilator. At the time, the defendant was fifty-four years old and had been married for thirty-eight years (the defendant met her husband when she was fourteen years old and married him when she was sixteen years old). However, while still married, the defendant and decedent were estranged, with the defendant staying in the marital home located on an island in a river, and the decedent staying in a camping trailer on the river bank.

Shortly after arriving in her husband's hospital room, the husband ordered the defendant and their daughter to leave. When a nurse asked the husband if he knew who was there, he responded by saying that he did and it was “Rhonda Kay Boyd,” the defendant's maiden name. After being ordered to leave, the defendant and her daughter separated, and the defendant returned to her home.

After arriving home, the defendant claims that she decided to return to the hospital and commit suicide in the presence of her husband even though she “knew ... that without [her] there, the girls, the girls would have to be hurt,” but that she “wouldn't feel the pain.” When later asked why she did not just take her life then if that was her intent, the defendant explained that she “wanted [her husband] to know, [she] wanted him to know that [she] wouldn't bother him anymore.” Asked why it was important for her husband to know, the defendant explained that “[b]ecause—because it was—it had lasted so long.” After deciding to take her own life, the defendant wrote a note to her daughters, retrieved a pistol, and returned to the hospital. When asked what she was thinking, the defendant testified that “I wanted to stop the pain. I wanted to stop the pain. I wanted to stop the pain.”

Arriving in her husband's hospital room, the defendant found him sleeping. It was when she went to wake him that her pistol discharged:

I stepped into the bed. And I reached across him. And I nudged him. And he opened his eyes, and I was going to do this. I was going to do this, and he pulled my elbow down and pulled it down. And my—it was so fast. It was so fast. It was so fast. It was so fast. It was—there was blood. There was blood. There was blood. And I was—I needed to get help. I needed to get—I turned, I walked. I was walking. I knew [an ICU nurse] was there. I knew ... she could help. I knew she could.

After the shooting, the defendant said that she remembered walking and that she “needed to get help. I was walking and I couldn't walk anymore. I couldn't move my legs. I needed to get help. My legs wouldn't go anymore.”

Eyewitness testimony to the event included that of the health unit coordinator for the MICU unit. This witness testified that when the decedent's “monitor was ringing off,” she looked up and saw the defendant “standing there with a gun to [his] head.” Other hospital staff testified to seeing the defendant enter the MICU unit and that nothing appeared out of the ordinary until they heard the gunshot.

Following the shooting, the defendant walked from her husband's hospital room, handed the pistol to a doctor, went to a corner, lay on the floor and curled into a fetal position, crying. Police then arrived and the defendant was taken to the police station for questioning. A video of that questioning shows the defendant to have been extremely distraught, at times sobbing uncontrollably. When a detective asked why she went and got the pistol, the defendant stated: “Oh God ... can't take any more pain.” The defendant related that the decedent had been abusive and cruel towards her and their two daughters.

The defendant was arrested and subsequently indicted for first degree murder. In preparation for trial, the defense retained Dr. David Clayman, a clinical and forensic psychologist versed in Battered Woman's Syndrome, to evaluate the defendant and offer an opinion as to how the defendant's history of abuse may have affected her mental condition at the time of the shooting. Dr.

[719 S.E.2d 881]

Clayman's report stated,¹ in part, that:

If the information gathered is credible, she has a long history as a victim of verbal, emotional, physical, and sexual spousal abuse. These factors will justify consideration of the degree to which her status as a battered woman might be contributory to her mental state that led up to the shooting.²

Dr. Clayman's report was also described during the pretrial hearing as having concluded that the defendant “fits the mold of a battered spouse,” “meets the definition of a ‘battered spouse,’ ” “was suicidal just prior to [killing] her husband.” The report also was described as concluding that the decedent's behavior “fits some of the characteristics of an individual who is comitting [sic] ongoing abuse.”

The prosecution's theory of the case was that the defendant's actions reflected the intentional, malicious, and premeditated killing of a helpless man. Prior to trial the prosecution filed four motions in limine. These motions sought to exclude any testimony that the defendant had been abused by the decedent, and that she met the requisite profile of Battered Woman's Syndrome.

On the morning that the defendant's trial was to begin, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecution's motions. During the hearing, the trial court asked the prosecution to explain “the law on that in terms of the [battered woman's] syndrome and the causal connection between the actions of—the alleged actions of the defendant and the decedent, and the use of it as a defense?” In reply, the prosecution reiterated its arguments that while “battered spouse syndrome ... goes to negate criminal intent,” it has “historically been used in ... the context of self-defense.” In the defendant's case, self-defense could not...