State v. Stidam

• Decision Date: 21 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15CA1014.,15CA1014.
• Citation: 74 N.E.3d 787,2016 Ohio 7906
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Aaron STIDAM, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

74 N.E.3d 787

2016 Ohio 7906

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Aaron STIDAM, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15CA1014.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Adams County.

Nov. 21, 2016.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for appellant.

David Kelley, Adams County Prosecutor and Michele L. Harris, Assistant Adams County Prosecutor, West Union, OH, for appellee.

HOOVER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Aaron Stidam ("Stidam") appeals from the Adams County Common Pleas Court the portion of his sentence classifying him as a Tier III sex offender. At the age of 22, Stidam was indicted on two counts of rape. The indictment alleged that Stidam committed these offenses when he was a juvenile. Through plea negotiations with the State of Ohio ("State"), Stidam pleaded guilty to two amended counts of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Stidam to an aggregate total of five years in prison. Also, the trial court designated him a Tier III sex offender.

{¶ 2} Here on appeal, Stidam asserts that his automatic classification as a Tier III sex offender for offenses he committed as a juvenile violates his due process rights and the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Stidam relies on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in In re C.P. 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that automatic, lifetime sex offender registration for juvenile offenders tried within the juvenile system violated constitutional protections against cruel and usual punishment, as well as constitutional rights to due process. Id. at syllabus. Stidam contends that based upon the reasoning of In re C.P., he should not be subject to automatic lifetime sex offender registration requirements for offenses he committed as a juvenile just because he was apprehended for those offenses after the age of 21.

{¶ 3} In evaluating Stidam's claims, we determine that the facts here are distinguishable from those of In re C.P. At no time was Stidam tried for his crimes in the juvenile system. Accordingly, the reasoning and analysis presented in the Court's decision in In re C.P. is not applicable under the facts here. Therefore, for those reasons and the reasons discussed below, we overrule Stidam's sole assignment of error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Facts and Procedural Posture

{¶ 4} In October 2014, the Adams County Grand Jury indicted Stidam on two counts of rape, first degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). At the time of the indictment, Stidam was 22 years old. The indictment alleged that the criminal activity took place "[o]n or about and between April 1, 2008 and April 20, 2009[.]" Therefore, Stidam was either 15 or 16 years old at the time when the offenses occurred. The indictment stated that at the time of the offenses the victim was a minor under the age of 10.

{¶ 5} Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, in September 2015, Stidam pleaded guilty to two amended counts of sexual battery, second degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1). At the change of plea hearing, Stidam admitted on the record that between April 2008 and April 2009, on two occasions, he coerced his eight or nine year old cousin to put his penis in her mouth. The trial court accepted Stidam's guilty pleas and found him guilty of the offenses. Following his guilty pleas, Stidam filed a motion requesting that the trial court (1) declare the adult sex offender classification statutes unconstitutional; and (2) decline to classify him under those statutes. In the motion, Stidam argued that the adult sex offender classifications as applied to him, an adult indicted for crimes he committed as a juvenile,violated his right to due process and constituted cruel and usual punishment. The State filed a response to Stidam's motion.

{¶ 6} The trial court never filed a separate entry overruling Stidam's motion. Instead, during the sentencing hearing on October 2, 2015, the trial court indicated that it declined Stidam's motion. The trial court stated:

I do find though, however, the arguments made to be very compelling of this exception that we have in this case as I see it, but otherwise the court sees that it is a tier 3 sex offender registrant and at this time I'm not adopting either individually to constitutionally challenge the constitutionality or to challenge the jurisdiction of an unconstitutional statue [sic]. I'm not going to at this time in this case adopt that invitation. While inviting, certainly inviting as I read the memorandum, at this time, the court will decline on that.

The trial court sentenced Stidam to an aggregate five-year prison term. Because of Stidam's violation of R.C. 2907.03, the trial court classified him as a Tier III sex offender.

{¶ 7} Stidam now asserts this timely appeal challenging his classification as a Tier III sex offender.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 8} Stidam assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:

The trial court erred by requiring Aaron Stidam to register for life as a Tier III Sex Offender for an offense he committed as a child. Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Ohio Constitution ; R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a) and 2950.07(B)(1) ; Sentencing Entry (Oct. 2, 2015); T.p. 15 (Oct. 2, 2015).

III. Law and Analysis

{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Stidam contends that, as applied to him—an adult indicted for offenses he committed as a juvenile—his Tier III sex offender classification violates the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment and the due process protections contained in the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. Stidam primarily relies on the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that "[t]o the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system, R.C. 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the [United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution] and the Due Process Clause [contained in the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution]* * *[.]" Id. at syllabus. Stidam claims that based on In re C.P., mandatory lifetime registration requirements for offenses committed as a juvenile also violate his right to due process and the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.

{¶ 10} Specifically, Stidam contends that based on the factors examined by the Court in In re C.P. we should declare his Tier III sex offender classification unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) a child is just as culpable for a sex offense if he is apprehended immediately or seven years later; (2) lifetime registration for a childhood offense is equally severe regardless of when the child is apprehended; (3) the modern juvenile system is almost as punitive as the adult system; (4) lifetime registration inhibits rehabilitation regardless of when a person is charged for a childhood offense; (5) lifetime registration serves the goal of accountability equally poorly regardless of when a child is charged; (6) lifetime registration is a poor deterrent for a child regardless of when charges are filed; and (7) the need for retribution is the same regardless of when a child is charged.

{¶ 11} The State contends that Stidam's classification as a Tier III sex offender should be upheld because (1) he is not a juvenile offender because R.C. 2151.23(I) exempted him from the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the common pleas court; (2) lifetime sex offender registration neither constitutes cruel and unusual punishment nor violates Stidam's rights to due process and fundamental fairness; and (3) lifetime registration is mandatory pursuant to R.C. 2950.01 et seq.

A. Ohio's Sex Offender Registration

{¶ 12} In 2007, the General Assembly enacted the Adam Walsh Act, which "repealed Megan's Law, effective January 1, 2008, and replaced it with new standards for sex-offender classification and registration pursuant to the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code." Bundy v. State, 143 Ohio St.3d 237, 2015-Ohio-2138, 36 N.E.3d 158, ¶ 5. The implementation of the Adam Walsh Act transformed the nature of the sex offender registration statutes from remedial to punitive. State v. Metcalf, 2016-Ohio-4923, 68 N.E.3d 371, ¶ 19, citing State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 21. "Because the AWA is punitive, and thus imposes a punishment, the possibility exists that a sexual offender may be deprived of a protected liberty interest by virtue of his classification." Metcalf at ¶ 19. This scheme, which the General Assembly codified in R.C. Chapter 2950, divides sex offenders into Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III sex or child-victim offenders. R.C. 2950.01(E) through (G). The sex offender's classification is automatically determined by the offense for which a person is convicted and the judge has no discretion to modify the classification. State v. Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, ¶ 11. The duration of the offender's obligation to update his or her personal information for the registry, as well as the frequency of that duty, depends upon his or her tier classification.

{¶ 13} For Tier III sex offenders, the act requires registration and verification of the offender's address every 90 days for the remainder of their lifetime. R.C. 2950.06(B)(3). Here, Stidam was convicted of two counts of sexual battery, second degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1). Pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a), the trial court classified Stidam as a Tier III sex offender. R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a) states, " ‘Tier III sex...