State v. Still
| Decision Date | 28 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 45792 |
| Citation | 458 P.3d 220,166 Idaho 351 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jesse Ray STILL, Defendant-Appellant. |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Kimberly A. Coster argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Ted S. Tollefson argued.
Jesse Ray Still appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Still argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Still was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The charges arose after two police officers, Officer Clark and Officer Kingery, stopped Still's vehicle for a traffic violation. Officer Clark was the driver of the patrol car and Officer Kingery was the passenger. Officer Clark approached the driver's side of the vehicle and made contact with Still. Officer Clark informed Still that he was stopped for speeding and an expired license. Officer Clark asked Still for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Still handed Officer Clark his driver's license and began searching through his vehicle to retrieve the remaining items. As Still was searching for the items, Officer Clark called a drug-dog officer (Officer Inman) using his on-body radio. Officer Clark stated: "SP39, you and your partner want to head my way, if you are available?" Thereafter, Still provided Officer Clark with the remaining documents. Officer Clark questioned Still about the vehicle's registration and asked Still if there were any weapons or drugs in the vehicle. Still denied possessing either.
Next, Officer Clark and Officer Kingery returned to the patrol vehicle to run Still's license and registration. After reaching the patrol vehicle, Officer Clark sat down in the driver's seat, picked up the in-car radio, and called Officer Inman for a second time. Officer Clark stated, "SP 39?, [this is] SP 30," "Are you and your partner available?" The district court found that The second call to Officer Inman took approximately ten seconds. Thereafter, Officer Clark placed Still's driver's license on the in-car computer and began processing and obtaining information. Officer Clark completed a citation for speeding and began filling out a warning for Still's expired registration. At that time, Officer Inman arrived at the scene and deployed his drug dog. The dog alerted on the vehicle and a subsequent search revealed the presence of a firearm and methamphetamine. Consequently, the State charged Still with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and unlawful possession of methamphetamine.
Still filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle. The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing and in his brief in support of the motion, Still argued that pursuant to Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) and State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 389 P.3d 150 (2016), the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged when Officer Clark radioed to Officer Inman a second time. In response, the State argued that the Idaho Supreme Court did not intend for Linze to apply to the facts of this case and Officer Clark did not abandon or deviate from the purpose of his stop.
Subsequently, Still agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea to felon in possession of a firearm, Idaho Code § 18-3316(1), reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. In exchange for Still's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge. The district court sentenced Still to a term of four years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction. Still timely appeals.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
Still argues that his traffic stop was unlawfully extended in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Clark radioed to Officer Inman a second time.1
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." As the text indicates, the " " State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 264, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ).
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ; Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ; State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999).
In the context of traffic stops, authority for the seizure ends when the tasks related to the infraction are, or reasonably should have been, completed. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). Such tasks include ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop such as checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). An officer may also require the occupants to exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). Although a drug-dog sniff cannot fairly be characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission, it is well-established that a drug-dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop is constitutionally permissible if it is executed in a reasonable manner and does not itself infringe upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10, 125 S.Ct. 834. Conversely, a drug-dog sniff conducted after an otherwise-completed traffic stop is unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion for the sniff. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
Still asserts that the United States Supreme Court holding in Rodriguez and the Idaho Supreme Court holding in Linze dictate that, although the radio call was for a period of only ten seconds, it constituted an abandonment of the traffic mission because it was unrelated to the purpose of the stop and "added time" to Still's detention making it an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In response, the State argues that the district court did not err because the officers did not abandon the purpose of the traffic stop. We agree with the State.
It is important to examine the context in which Rodriguez and Linze were decided. Prior to Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that a "dog sniff...
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