State v. Stilling
| Decision Date | 15 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 870094,870094 |
| Citation | 770 P.2d 137 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Steven Michael STILLING, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
James C. Bradshaw, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Earl F. Dorius, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Defendant Steven Michael Stilling appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) and for being a habitual criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978). The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent sentences of five years to life at the Utah state prison. We affirm the convictions but vacate the sentences and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
In March 1984, a Salt Lake County, Utah food store was robbed. A witness to the robbery identified defendant in a photo lineup as the robber.
In April 1984, defendant was arrested in Oregon on fugitive warrants issued out of Weber County, Utah (based on charges unrelated to the Salt Lake robbery). Weber County lodged a detainer with Oregon prison officials against defendant and later requested temporary custody of him. Oregon prison officials approved Weber County's request, and on August 17, 1984, defendant was transported to the Weber County jail.
Sometime prior to July 23, 1984, Salt Lake County also lodged detainers with Oregon prison officials against defendant. Before Salt Lake County requested temporary custody of defendant, it learned that he was in temporary custody of Weber County. Rather than seeking temporary custody of defendant through Oregon officials, Salt Lake County filed arrest warrants against defendant on September 19, 1984, directly with Weber County.
On January 29, 1985--133 days after the arrest warrants were filed with Weber County and 164 days after defendant's arrival in Utah--defendant received a preliminary hearing on the Salt Lake County charges. On February 8, 1985, he was arraigned in Third District Court, and trial was set for March 4, 1985.
Defendant pleaded guilty to the Weber County charges on February 10, 1985, and was sentenced to the Utah state prison. He was then moved from the Weber County to the Salt Lake County jail to stand trial on the Salt Lake County charges.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the Salt Lake County charges on the grounds that Salt Lake County neither (1) requested temporary custody of him from Oregon prison officials, as is required by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), 1 nor (2) brought him to trial within 120 days, as is also required by the IAD. The trial court agreed with defendant's first theory and ordered him returned to Oregon "on the ground that the defendant could not be tried in Salt Lake County, since the Salt Lake County officials have never sought nor received authority of the Oregon officials to dispose of the charges."
In May 1985, defendant was paroled from the Oregon state prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his sentence on the Weber County convictions. Trial on the Salt Lake County charges was reset, and defendant renewed his motion to dismiss on the ground that Salt Lake County failed to bring him to trial within the IAD's 120-day requirement.
The trial court found that Salt Lake County officials never sought temporary custody of defendant under IAD article IV(a) and concluded that since Salt Lake County never sought custody, the IAD statutory time period was never triggered. Defendant's motion was denied.
Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal in this Court, which was denied. A jury found him guilty of aggravated robbery, and the trial judge found him guilty of being a habitual criminal. He was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of five years to life in the Utah state prison.
Defendant claims that Salt Lake County's charges should have been dismissed because he was not brought to trial within the 120-day period required by IAD article IV. We must decide whether Salt Lake County's lodging a detainer against defendant while he was incarcerated in a state that is party to the IAD and then serving him with arrest warrants while he was in temporary custody of Weber County either activated the IAD's statutory time limit or violated the IAD's purpose.
A detainer is a notice to prison authorities that a prisoner in their custody faces charges pending in another state. Lodging a detainer is an informal process; it neither requires the state lodging a detainer ("the receiving state") to pursue custody 2 nor requires the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated ("the sending state") to do any act or effect any transfer of the prisoner. 3 Lodging a detainer itself, however, may limit a prisoner's privileges and activities. 4 When groundless detainers are lodged, a sending state might restrict a prisoner's privileges to the same extent as when valid detainers are filed. 5
The IAD benefits prisoners by providing them with a uniform procedure to obtain an expeditious and orderly disposition of charges upon which outstanding detainers are based. 6 The IAD benefits party states by establishing a system of cooperative measures that allow the disposition of charges pending in one state against a prisoner incarcerated in another. 7 In order to enjoy IAD benefits, a party state is required to follow IAD procedures. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, "Once the [state] lodges a detainer against a prisoner with state prison officials, the Agreement by its express terms becomes applicable and the [state] must comply with its provisions." 8
After a detainer is lodged, the IAD time limit is triggered by a request from either the prisoner 9 or the receiving state. 10 When a prisoner is informed of a pending detainer, he or she may request final disposition of the underlying charges. 11 If a prisoner so requests, the receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of receipt of the request. 12 In contrast, the IAD time limit is triggered by a receiving state after it files a detainer and requests temporary custody of the prisoner 13 and the prisoner arrives in the receiving state. 14 The governor of the sending state is given 30 days in which to disapprove the receiving state's request. 15 If no negative action is taken by the sending state's governor, a prisoner may be transferred to the receiving state, which has 120 days after the prisoner's arrival to bring him or her to trial.
In the case before us, defendant did not request disposition of the charges underlying the Salt Lake County detainer. Thus the 180-day limit does not apply. While Salt Lake County lodged a detainer against defendant and thereby bound itself to comply with IAD requirements, it did not request temporary custody of defendant from Oregon prison officials. Since Salt Lake County never requested temporary custody of defendant from Oregon officials, it never triggered the 120-day IAD time limit.
Defendant argues that the Salt Lake County detainer lodged with Oregon prison officials activated the IAD clock. This is incorrect. That detainer simply bound Salt Lake County to comply with IAD requirements. It did not bind Salt Lake County to request temporary custody of defendant and thereby activate IAD time constraints. 16 While defendant correctly states that IAD article IV(c) "provides that trial shall be commenced within 120 days of [a prisoner's] arrival in the receiving state where temporary custody is obtained pursuant to Article IV," Salt Lake County did not obtain custody of defendant pursuant to IAD article IV.
Defendant relies on United States v. Mauro, 17 claiming that Salt Lake County constructively requested temporary custody of defendant when it filed arrest warrants against defendant with Weber County. In Mauro, the United States lodged a detainer against a state prisoner and then sought custody of the prisoner by filing a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendam with state prison officials rather than by requesting temporary custody. The Court held that the United States' writ was tantamount to a written request for temporary custody that triggered the IAD clock. 18 We do not find Salt Lake County's arrest warrants to effectuate the same purpose as the United States' writ.
In Mauro, the United States filed its writ with state prison officials, while in this case, Salt Lake County filed its arrest warrants with a sister county. Oregon officials never received a request from Salt Lake County--actual or constructive--for temporary custody of defendant. A ruling that filing warrants with a sister county constitutes a request for temporary custody would allow officials within the receiving state to circumvent a sending state's right to deny the request. Officials within a receiving state could obtain physical custody of a prisoner from a sister county by arrest warrants or other means, avoid IAD procedure, ignore any protest of a sending state's governor, and still fulfill IAD requirements, as long as they brought the prisoner to trial within 120 days. We do not believe the Mauro Court intended this circumvention of IAD procedure. In any event, it is a result we will not allow. Salt Lake County's failure to bring defendant to trial within 120 days after filing arrest warrants with Weber County is not a violation of IAD requirements since, at least in this case, warrants filed with a sister county do not constitute a request for temporary custody that activates the IAD 120-day clock.
Likewise, we find no violation of the IAD purpose. The IAD is designed to encourage the speedy disposition of the outstanding charges upon which a detainer is based in order to limit the restriction and disruption to a prisoner that a detainer may cause. However, lodging a detainer itself does not violate this purpose even though lodging a detainer may possibly disrupt a prisoner and restrict his or her opportunities. In this case, defen...
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State v. Hintze
...in favor of the defendant, the defendant must make a "persuasive allegation that prejudice resulted from the delay." State v. Stilling , 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989). As explained by the Supreme Court, the mere "possibility of prejudice" is generally insufficient. United States v. Loud Haw......
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State v. Hintze
...... "prejudice to the defendant." Barker , 407. U.S. at 530. . . ¶96. For this factor to weigh in favor of the defendant, the. defendant must make a "persuasive allegation that. prejudice resulted from the delay." State v. Stilling , 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989). As explained by. the Supreme Court, the mere "possibility of. prejudice" is generally insufficient. . 39 . . United States v. Loud Hawk , 474 U.S. 302, 315. (1986); accord Jackson v. Ray , 390 F.3d 1254, 1264. (10th Cir. 2004). In State v. Mejia , 2007 ......
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State v. Hintze
...... "prejudice to the defendant." Barker , 407. U.S. at 530. . . ¶96. For this factor to weigh in favor of the defendant, the. defendant must make a "persuasive allegation that. prejudice resulted from the delay." State v. Stilling , 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989). As explained by. the Supreme Court, the mere "possibility of. prejudice" is generally insufficient. . 40 . . United States v. Loud Hawk , 474 U.S. 302, 315. (1986); accord Jackson v. Ray , 390 F.3d 1254, 1264. (10th Cir. 2004). In State v. Mejia , 2007 ......
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