State v. Stokes
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2017AP1303-CR |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
| Parties | State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Maurice Deangelo Stokes, Defendant-Appellant. |
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County No. 2011CF1652: RICHARD J. SANKOVITZ and JEFFREY A WAGNER, Judges.
Before Donald, P.J., Dugan and White, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis.Stat. Rule 809.23(3).
¶1 Maurice Deangelo Stokes appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime and with use of a dangerous weapon, and orders of the postconviction court denying Stokes's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence trial court error in admitting other-acts evidence and instructing the jury, and an erroneous exercise of discretion by the trial court at the time of sentencing related to imposition of a DNA surcharge.[1] For the reasons set forth below we affirm.
¶2 Terry James Baker was shot and killed on October 29, 2005. Stokes was subsequently charged for his role in Baker's death and convicted of first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime and with use of a dangerous weapon.[2]
¶3 At Stokes's jury trial, two eyewitnesses to Baker's death, James Turner and Michael Henderson, [3] testified and identified Stokes as one of two individuals who were chasing Baker down the street and into an alley, and shooting at Baker on October 29, 2005. In addition to describing the shooting, Turner further testified that he approached Baker as Baker was lying on the ground after the shots were fired and tried to talk to him. Turner testified that Baker did not respond, and he knew at that point that Baker was dead. Turner also testified that in the days prior to the shooting, Stokes and his co-actor, Cyrus Brooks, had approached Turner and warned him that he "better stop hanging round" Baker because "[h]e a dead man." Henderson also described that after he saw Baker being chased down the street and heard the shots fired, he went into his house to look out the back window that faced the alley "[t]o see what was going on." Henderson testified that he saw people in the yard and Baker was lying down.
¶4 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine and sought to admit evidence of an altercation that occurred on October 23, 2005, in which Stokes, Brooks, and a third individual were seen shooting at Baker. The trial court granted the State's motion and allowed admission of this evidence for purposes of showing motive. Thus, pursuant to the trial court's ruling, Xavien Bates testified at trial about the prior altercation, stating that he was with Baker on October 23, 2005, when three individuals started shooting at him and Baker. Bates indicated that he knew the three individuals to be Stokes, Brooks, and an individual he identified as Randell. The State also presented testimony from police officers about this altercation and played surveillance video from a nearby business, showing Baker and Bates running.[4]
¶5 In his defense at trial, Stokes's mother and sister testified and indicated that Stokes was not the shooter. Stokes's mother described witnessing a young man, who was not Stokes, crouching near a dumpster and firing shots. She further testified that shortly after the shooting, several people broke into her house, causing significant damage to her front door and front porch area. She also testified that Stokes lived with her, but he was not home at the time of the shooting, and he did not come home in the days after the shooting. However, she testified that Bates was arrested at her house. Stokes's sister testified that she went to her mother's house on the day of the shooting to see what the commotion was at her mother's house, and ended up in an altercation with a member of Baker's family. She testified that she believed that it was Baker's family and friends at her mother's house that day who were causing damage to her mother's house, and that after the police diffused the situation, she told the police that her brother was at her house playing video games at the time of the shooting.
¶6 The jury found Stokes guilty and the court sentenced him to life in prison with eligibility for release to extended supervision after serving twenty-three years of his sentence.
¶7 Stokes has since filed three postconviction motions, all of which were denied without a hearing. In the first motion filed on October 13, 2014, Stokes alleged that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the prior shooting that occurred on October 23, 2005, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting testimony from a detective about a third shooting incident. Stokes filed his second postconviction motion on November 18, 2016, in which he argued that the jury was erroneously instructed regarding the October 23rd incident, he had newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial, and the trial court considered improper factors at the time of sentencing. Stokes filed his third postconviction motion on November 26, 2019, in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and he had newly discovered evidence. Stokes now appeals.
¶8 A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing following a postconviction motion. "A hearing on a postconviction motion is required only when the movant states sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief." See State v. Allen 2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 Wis.2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. "[I]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief," a trial court may deny a postconviction motion without a hearing. See id., ¶9. Whether a motion alleges sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing presents a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Bentley, 201 Wis.2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).
¶9 "Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel." State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis.2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. A defendant must show two elements to establish that his or her counsel's assistance was constitutionally ineffective: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defense. Id.
¶10 "To demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' considering all the circumstances." State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶22, 324 Wis.2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citation omitted). Prejudice occurs when counsel's error is of such magnitude that there is a "reasonable probability" that but for the error the outcome would have been different. State v. Erickson, 227 Wis.2d 758, 769, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999). Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (citations omitted).
¶11 "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of fact and law." State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, ¶13, 382 Wis.2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95. "We will not reverse the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. "We independently review, as a matter of law, whether those facts demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel." Id.
A. Failure to Investigate and Call Witnesses
¶12 Stokes argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Kathleen Trammell, Devon Johnson, and Farice Campbell as witnesses.[5] We disagree, and we conclude that Stokes has failed to demonstrate prejudice and, therefore, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard fails. See State v. Floyd, 2016 WI.App. 64, ¶22, 371 Wis.2d 404, 885 N.W.2d 156 ("If the defendant fails to prove either prong, we need not address whether the other prong was satisfied.").
¶13 Stokes's argument as to each of the three witnesses is that each told the police that he or she saw only one male running away from the scene of the shooting. Stokes maintains that Trammell would have testified that she saw one individual fleeing into her backyard by jumping over the fence. He contends that Johnson and Campbell both similarly witnessed the individual who was fleeing the scene of the crime, while possessing a firearm. Further, he states that Johnson and Campbell viewed an in-person lineup in which Stokes was a participant and could not identify Stokes as the person running away with a firearm.[6]
¶14 Stokes argues that all three witnesses only saw one individual running from the scene of the shooting with a firearm. He then argues that all three of these witnesses are important witnesses. As to Trammell, he states that she could have assisted him at trial because she "was a neutral eyewitness." Stokes further states that trial counsel was aware of Trammell, he should have reached out to her, and he had no strategic reason for not calling her as a witness. As to Johnson and Campbell, Stokes states that "[t]here is no question that these witnesses were vital to the defense" and there can be no strategic reason for failing to call them as witnesses at trial.
¶15 Addressing the...
To continue reading
Request your trial