State v. Stokoe
| Citation | 730 P.2d 415,43 St.Rep. 2336,224 Mont. 461 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-259,86-259 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sandra Mills Stewart STOKOE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
Nye and Meyer, Billings, for defendant and appellant.
March Racicot, County Prosecutor, Helena, for plaintiff and respondent.
Sandra Stokoe appeals a Yellowstone County District Court jury verdict convicting her of the criminal sale of dangerous drugs to Lee Jonas.
Two issues are raised on appeal:
(1) Whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction for sale of dangerous drugs?
(2) Whether a purchaser is an accomplice to a seller of dangerous drugs thereby requiring independent corroboration of the purchaser's testimony to sustain the seller's conviction?
We affirm.
On November 2, 1984, undercover agent Geary of the Montana Criminal Investigation Bureau was contacted in Billings, Montana, by Lee Jonas who offered to sell him an ounce of cocaine. Two other agents and two Yellowstone County Sheriff deputies in separate vehicles began surveillance of Jonas' residence at 3:55 p.m. on November 5, 1984, or approximately sixteen minutes before agent Geary arrived wearing an electronic transmitting device pursuant to court order. During the operation, the surveillants heard several references to "Sandy" [Stokoe] and "Sandy's place." Jonas' girlfriend met agent Geary at the house and said that Jonas would be back in a few minutes. Jonas arrived at 4:23 p.m. and displayed a sample of the cocaine for Geary. Jonas said the sample had come "from Sandy's" and that he had to go back to Sandy's house to get the ounce of cocaine. At 4:32 p.m. the surveillants watched Jonas and his girlfriend exit their residence and drive to Stokoe's residence. Agent Geary followed in his car and parked in front of Stokoe's house, remaining in the car. Jonas and his girlfriend testified that Stokoe let both of them into her house. They observed that Stokoe's five year old daughter was the only other person present. Jonas added that Stokoe, his aunt, had expected him. Jonas went to a back bedroom of the house, weighed out the cocaine on a scale, and put it into a baggie. Approximately four minutes after arriving, (4:59 p.m.) Jonas' girlfriend came out of the house and entered agent Geary's vehicle demanding that he pay her $2,400, drive to nearby Trails End Park to avoid curious neighbors and wait for Jonas to arrive with the cocaine. Geary paid the girlfriend $2,400 at this time. Before the girlfriend left the house, the surveillant party could see Jonas, the girlfriend, and an unknown female adult having a discussion. A surveillant agent followed Geary and Jonas' girlfriend to the park where they were met by Jonas seven minutes later. Geary entered Jonas' vehicle upon Jonas' hand signal to do so. Jonas handed over the ounce of cocaine and Geary paid him $50 more. Jonas told Geary that he [Geary] was supposed to get $100 back from the girlfriend. Geary walked back to his car where the girlfriend gave Geary $100. At this point the girlfriend walked back to Jonas' vehicle. Jonas and the girlfriend then drove back to the Stokoe house under surveillance and were let into the house by Stokoe. The surveillance was then terminated. As for the payment arrangement, Jonas testified as follows:
As to the source of the cocaine, Jonas further testified:
Jonas pleaded guilty to the sale of cocaine to agent Geary and a marijuana sale to Geary on September 28, 1984. In exchange for a statement, the State recommended a three year probationary sentence which was approved by the District Court. The Montana State Crime Lab positively identified the substance as cocaine.
The test for the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of conviction is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction, viewed in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Lamb (1982), 198 Mont. 323, 646 P.2d 516. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Kutnyak (Mont.1984), 685 P.2d 901, 910-911, 41 St.Rep. 1277, 1289.
Section 45-9-101(1), MCA, states as follows:
A person commits the offense of criminal sale of dangerous drugs if he sells, barters, exchanges, gives away, or offers to sell, barter, exchange, or give away or manufactures, prepares, cultivates, compounds, or processes any dangerous drug as defined in 50-32-101.
The compiler's comment to Sec. 45-9-101, MCA, reveals the broad reach of the statute. "Although this section is entitled 'Criminal Sale of Dangerous Drugs', it includes all types of transfers and activities preparatory to actual sale ..." In State v. Davis (Mont.1980), 620 P.2d 1209, 1215, 37 St.Rep. 1958, 1964, we said:
[T]he Montana legislature did not intend that a sale should be complete merely upon the exchange of money. Delivery appears to be an integral part of the sale of drugs, particularly when we consider that the statutes are aimed primarily at stopping the transfer and distribution of dangerous drugs. (Emphasis added.)
We find that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. Stokoe knowingly and intentionally transferred possession of an ounce of cocaine to Jonas for $2,250 and therefore her actions met the test set forth in Davis. Stokoe's involvement in the crime of selling cocaine was abundantly clear. She gave a sample of the cocaine to Jonas for inspection purposes and possessed a scale to measure out particular quantities of cocaine for subsequent distribution. As the Davis case indicates, Sec. 45-9-101, MCA, was enacted to stop the transfer and distribution of dangerous drugs such as cocaine. We see no reason to overturn the jury's decision.
On the issue of whether a purchaser is an accomplice to a seller of dangerous drugs thereby requiring independent corroboration of the purchaser's testimony to sustain the seller's conviction, we refer to Sec. 45-2-302, MCA:
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