State v. Stoll

Decision Date05 February 2021
Docket NumberNo. 117,081,117,081
Citation480 P.3d 158
CourtKansas Supreme Court
Parties STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Amy STOLL, Appellant.

Jennifer C. Roth, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.

Thomas R. Stanton, deputy district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

Per Curiam:

In 2015, Amy Stoll was charged with failure to register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA). Before the district court, she argued K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5203(f), which makes failure to register a strict liability crime, violated her due process rights. She also argued she should be found not guilty because she substantially complied with her registration requirements. The district court rejected Stoll's arguments and found her guilty. Stoll appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. Stoll petitioned for review, arguing the Court of Appeals made several errors in its decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, Stoll was convicted of conspiracy to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance. At sentencing, the district court erroneously ordered her to register under KORA. Stoll's crime of conviction was not added to the statutory list of drug offenses requiring registration until 2011. Nonetheless, Stoll complied with the registration requirements for about seven years. In complying with these requirements, she registered with her local sheriff four times a year in March, June, September, and December. She was also required to register within three business days of moving or changing jobs.

In June and September 2015, Stoll reported that she lived at 705 West Fifth Avenue in Hutchinson, Kansas. In early October, a deputy with the Reno County Sheriff's Office received a tip that the house at 705 West Fifth Avenue had a "For Rent" sign posted in front of it. The deputy contacted the property manager, who said no one had lived in the residence since September 30, 2015. The manager also had no record of Stoll ever living there.

On November 3, 2015, Stoll registered a new address in Nickerson, Kansas. Later that month, the State charged Stoll with failure to register as a drug offender under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-4903(a).

Before trial, Stoll filed a motion arguing that the State would need to prove she had a culpable mental state, or mens rea, when she failed to register. She maintained that finding her guilty without a culpable mental state would violate her due process rights. The district court denied her motion after concluding failure to register was a strict liability crime and the strict liability nature of the crime was constitutional.

Stoll waived her right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Stoll stipulated that (1) she had been convicted of a crime that required her to register between October 1 and 6, 2015; (2) she knew she had to register; and (3) she had reported in June 2015 and September 2015 that she lived at 705 West Fifth Avenue.

After the State presented several witnesses, Stoll testified in her own defense. According to Stoll, the tenant at 705 West Fifth Avenue had allowed her to live with him because she was having financial difficulties. He moved at the end of September 2015, but he allowed Stoll to continue living with him at his new home in Nickerson.

Stoll admitted she did not register her new address in Nickerson within three days after she moved. She explained she had a lot going on at the time. But on October 31, 2015, she realized she had not reported her new address. Because it was a Saturday, she had to wait until Monday to go to the sheriff's office to register. When she went on Monday, she was told the sheriff's office did not do registrations on that day, so she had to go back the next day to register. Stoll testified her home phone number had not changed. Also, her work address and phone number had not changed during October 2015.

In closing, defense counsel argued Stoll should be found not guilty because she had substantially complied with her registration requirements. The district court found Stoll guilty of failing to register. The court acknowledged Stoll did not appear to have intentionally done anything improper. But the court found the offense did not require a culpable mental state, and Stoll had admitted she had failed to register her new address within three days. At sentencing, the court granted a departure sentence, giving Stoll 24 months' probation instead of the presumptive prison sentence.

Stoll appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction. State v. Stoll , No. 117,081, 2018 WL 4264867 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion). We granted her petition for review.

ANALYSIS

Is substantial compliance an available defense to a charge of failure to register under KORA?

Before the Court of Appeals, Stoll argued the district court erred when it found her guilty because she had substantially complied with the registration statutes. The panel rejected her argument, holding substantial compliance was not an available defense to her charge for failing to register. Stoll now challenges that conclusion. She argues KORA is a remedial statutes, and "[s]ubstantial compliance—rather than strict compliance—is the rule for remedial statutes."

High v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , No. 103,260, 2010 WL 5490738, at *1 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion).

Whether a statutes should be liberally construed, thus allowing for substantial compliance, is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Kite's Bar and Grill, Inc., v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Alcoholic Beverage Control Div. , 50 Kan. App. 2d 493, 497, 329 P.3d 536 (2014).

Some statutory requirements may be satisfied if an individual or entity substantially complies with those requirements. "Substantial compliance is compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statutes." State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichita , 303 Kan. 650, 661-62, 367 P.3d 282 (2016). Put another way, "substantial compliance may be found where one ‘complies with the spirit and intent of the law but not with its absolute letter.’ " A & S Rental Solutions, Inc. v. Kopet , 31 Kan. App. 2d 979, 982, 76 P.3d 1057 (2003).

Generally, requirements of remedial statutes can be satisfied by substantial compliance. This is because we liberally construe a remedial statutes to accomplish the statute's intended purpose. Smith v. Marshall , 225 Kan. 70, Syl. ¶ 1, 587 P.2d 320 (1978). "Remedial statutes are those which are enacted to protect life, property, and the welfare of the public and are designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 523. We have held the Kansas Legislature intended KORA to be a remedial statutes. State v. Meredith , 306 Kan. 906, 906, 399 P.3d 859 (2017).

In its decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that substantial compliance is the general rule for remedial statutes and that we have described KORA as remedial legislation. However, it concluded substantial compliance would not suffice to meet offender registration requirements because this would not "better meet[ ] the statute's purpose." Stoll, 2018 WL 4264867, at *6. The panel noted that KORA's purpose is to protect the public from certain offenders the Legislature has concluded are likely to reoffend, citing State v. Fredrick , 292 Kan. 169, 173, 251 P.3d 48 (2011). The panel held relaxing the registration requirements would not better serve that purpose. Furthermore, there was no indication the Legislature intended the requirements to be relaxed. For these reasons, the panel rejected Stoll's argument. 2018 WL 4264867, at *6.

Stoll challenges the Court of Appeals' holding that KORA's purpose is to protect the public from certain offenders. She notes the panel relied on Fredrick , which held the legislative purpose of KORA was " ‘to protect the public from sex offenders as a class of criminals who are likely to reoffend.’ " 292 Kan. at 173, 251 P.3d 48. Because Fredrick only addressed the purpose for having sex offenders register, she claims it does not support a finding that the purpose for having drug offenders register is also to protect the public.

We see no reason to doubt the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the purpose for having drug offenders register is the same as having sex offenders register—that is, to protect the public. KORA's legislative history supports this conclusion. Testimony before the Senate and House Judiciary Committees suggests the 2007 KORA amendment requiring offenders convicted of certain drug offenses to register was enacted to protect public safety. See, e.g., Testimony of Detective Howard Shipley, Reno County Sheriff's Office, to Senate Judiciary Committee on January 16, 2007, on SB 14 ("The illegal manufacturing of methamphetamine is inherently dangerous. The components used and processes that occur during the manufacturing create a volatile situation with potentially disastrous consequences."); Testimony of Kyle G. Smith, Deputy Director of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, to House Judiciary Committee on March 14, 2007, on SB 14 ("The idea of the registry works best with crimes that show a high risk of recidivism and pose a substantial risk to the public. Certainly the manufacture of methamphetamine fits both categories and such information would be helpful to both the public and law enforcement.").

Stoll also points out that neither the State nor the Court of Appeals provided evidence that KORA, as written, effectively protects the public. But whether KORA effectively achieves its purpose does not determine what its purpose is. And to the extent Stoll is suggesting KORA punishes offenders, rather than protecting the public from them, this does not help her cause. We have repeatedly held KORA is not punitive. See, e.g., Meredith , 306 Kan. at 913-14, 399 P.3d 859 (holding defendan...

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