State v. Stovall
| Decision Date | 11 March 1986 |
| Citation | 505 A.2d 708,199 Conn. 62 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Howard STOVALL. |
Temmy Ann Pieszak, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Frederick W. Fawcett, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., and Henry J. Lyons, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and CALLAHAN, JJ.
The information against the defendant, Howard Stovall, accused him of one count of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101(a)(1), two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a), and one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(3). The underlying criminal acts which gave rise to the multicount information were perpetrated in the Art Cine Theatre in Stamford on January 20, 1981. The information charged that the defendant entered the theatre unlawfully while armed with a knife and twice sexually assaulted a female employee, before committing an armed robbery. The defendant did not dispute the fact that the crimes were committed. He contended that he was not the person who committed the crimes. Following a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty on each count and sentenced to imprisonment for an effective term of twenty-two to forty-four years.
The defendant, on appeal, presents two issues. The first concerns the admission into evidence of a third "mug shot" type of photograph of the defendant. The second alleges a violation of the trial court's sequestration order. Such facts as are pertinent to resolve the issues will be summarized therewith.
The testimony adduced at trial is substantially as follows. The victim was a cleaning woman at the Art Cine Theatre in Stamford, where she worked each night after the theatre closed. On January 20, 1981, as she removed a vacuum cleaner from a closet in the darkened theatre, the defendant grabbed her from behind, placed a knife to her side, and told her he would cut or kill her if she said anything. He then dragged her into an alcove of the building and slammed her against the wall. In the unlit alcove the struggling woman could not clearly see the face of the man pressing her against the wall. She asked the man what he wanted and explained she had no money. Thereupon the defendant demanded that she undress. The defendant then terrorized and sexually assaulted his victim. The defendant then forced her to go with him to the candy counter in the lobby of the theatre where her purse was. The lobby in the area of the candy counter was illuminated by two street lights. At the candy counter the victim had ample opportunity to view the defendant. She testified that she was able to observe his facial features, at close range, under good lighting conditions, and throughout the whole time spent at the candy counter. Before leaving, the defendant threatened to kill the victim if she notified the police. He then left the theatre by the back door with a pen knife and a couple of dollars which he had removed from the victim's purse. The victim dressed, made a telephone call to her husband, and went home.
At police headquarters the following day the victim gave the police a detailed description of her assailant by height, weight and build. Ralph Weed, a Stamford police officer, drew a composite picture which satisfied the victim. She looked through perhaps several hundred photographs kept in the identification files of the Stamford police department but she made no identification. On January 23, 1981, the police showed the victim two separate arrays consisting of sixteen photographs and again she made no identification. The defendant's picture was not among those examined on either occasion. The police investigation continued until, on September 10, 1981, the victim was asked by Sergeant Robert Toner, another Stamford police officer, to view photographs at the Stamford police station. The victim was shown sixteen mug shots arranged in groups of eight. The victim picked out the defendant's picture from each group. None of the mug shots portrayed the defendant wearing glasses. There was no objection at trial either to the victim's in-court identification or to the introduction into evidence of the mug shots involved.
The defendant's claim of error with regard to the admission into evidence of a third mug shot relates to the following circumstances. At trial, the defendant vigorously contested the reliability of the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator of the crimes with which he had been charged. The defendant cross-examined the victim extensively about her ability to describe her assailant under the lighting conditions that prevailed at the scene of the crime. The state then presented the testimony of the two police officers, Weed and Toner, who had assisted in the procedures that led the victim to identify the defendant. Weed was asked, referring to the two mug shots of the defendant previously introduced without objection during the victim's testimony, whether he could identify the defendant. He replied in the affirmative and pointed out the defendant as "[t]he gentleman ... with the glasses." The defendant was wearing glasses at trial. Neither of the photographs already in evidence showed the defendant wearing glasses. In the victim's testimony, she had not referred to the defendant as wearing glasses. The prosecutor then showed Weed a third photograph and elicited testimony that the picture depicted the defendant without glasses on September 17, 1981, eight months after the date of the crime. The defendant objected to the introduction of the third photograph as irrelevant and prejudicial. The prosecutor claimed the photograph was admissible to show that the defendant did not always wear glasses.
The trial judge properly overruled the defendant's objection to the admission of the third mug shot of the defendant. We have frequently pointed out that any use in evidence of photographs ordinarily found in police identification files will suggest to the jury that the defendant may have a criminal record and that indiscriminate use of mug shots is undesirable. State v. Pecoraro, 198 Conn. 203, 206, 502 A.2d 396 (1985). Here, however, the prosecutor did not offer the photograph indiscriminately. He quite properly refrained from introducing it during the direct examination of the victim, when he elicited the details of her identification. At that time it was of minimal significance as corroboration. The defendant, on cross-examination of the victim, however, tried to cast doubt on her identification testimony. Thus, he tried to show that she would be unable to see the defendant under the artificial lighting in the lobby she described. At this point, the trial judge could properly have found that the admission of the third photograph as corroboration was justified.
Moreover, outside the presence of the jury the trial judge suggested masking the placard shown on the third photograph. The defendant was unwilling to mask any writing and asked that the picture be exhibited without any covering. In any event, the admission of the third mug shot was minimally prejudicial, if at all, since defense counsel had previously elicited testimony from the victim, before the jury, that she had made an identification from mug shots on September 10, 1981. Also, the trial judge charged the jury to disregard and draw no inference from the date on the mug shot.
We next address the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Cassidy, 15101
...to the statements of others in the courtroom ... including the statements of counsel." (Citation omitted.) State v. Stovall, 199 Conn. 62, 67-68, 505 A.2d 708 (1986). 11 The prosecutor did not again make reference to the defendant's presence at trial during his brief rebuttal argument to th......
-
State v. Sullivan
...her testimony to conform more closely with her daughter's. We disagree. The state concedes, as it must in light of State v. Stovall, 199 Conn. 62, 505 A.2d 708 (1986), and Practice Book § 876, that the trial court erred in violating the sequestration order and allowing McGill to be present ......
-
State v. Paolella
...is to prevent a witness from fashioning his testimony to correspond to the statements of others in the courtroom"; State v. Stovall, 199 Conn. 62, 67, 505 A.2d 708 (1986); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1335, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); State v. Williams, 169 Conn. 322,......
-
State v. Robinson, 14846
...as it must, that the trial court violated the sequestration order when it allowed King to take the stand. See State v. Stovall, 199 Conn. 62, 68, 505 A.2d 708 (1986); State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn.App. 80, 84, 525 A.2d 1353 (1987). The right to have witnesses sequestered is an important right ......