State v. Strader

• Decision Date: 31 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 940244-CA,940244-CA
• Citation: 902 P.2d 638
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roger L. STRADER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 638

902 P.2d 638

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roger L. STRADER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 940244-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Aug. 31, 1995.

Robert K. Heineman and David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Kris Leonard and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Before ORME, P.J., and DAVIS, Associate P.J., and JACKSON, J.

ORME, Presiding Judge:

Defendant Roger L. Strader pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994), but retained his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App.1988). Strader claims on appeal that his prior prosecution on a different charge arising from the same criminal episode precludes his prosecution for possession of a controlled substance. We affirm.

FACTS

The facts of this case are undisputed. On the night of July 21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randall of the West Valley Police Department was preparing paperwork while sitting in his patrol car in a parking lot at 3900 West and 3390 South. At approximately 11:00 p.m., he observed a vehicle pull into an adjacent construction site. A man, later identified as Strader, exited the vehicle, entered a building on the site, returned carrying an object which he placed in the vehicle, and drove away. Officer Randall stopped the vehicle and asked Strader, who was driving, for identification.

Strader stated he had no identification, but gave his name as Stanley Kent Strader. After Officer Randall questioned him about the object in the back seat, a circular saw, Strader said he was picking it up for a friend named Tony Ochoa. Strader's female passenger left the scene to retrieve his identification from their nearby apartment. Another man, professing to be Tony Ochoa, returned with a driver's license issued to Earl Nesbitt, which contained a picture resembling Strader. However, the license had obviously been altered. The top lamination layer had been peeled back to allow insertion of Strader's picture.

Officer Randall placed Strader under arrest for giving false information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1995). After a check on the vehicle's license plates revealed that the plates belonged to another vehicle, Officer Randall impounded the vehicle. In the course of the ensuing inventory search, Officer Randall found a loaded syringe under the driver's seat and a packet of syringes in the glove compartment. A canine unit discovered another syringe under a seat cover. Subsequent tests revealed that some of the syringes contained methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another officer found the owner of the circular saw, who identified it as property stolen from him.

Strader was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on three charges: giving false identification to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor; theft, a class A misdemeanor The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office later filed charges for all three offenses. At his arraignment in Third District Court on September 27, 1993, Strader entered a plea of not guilty. Two months later, he filed a motion to dismiss all charges. The court held a hearing on the motion, at which time it dismissed the charge for false identification because the same charge had already been prosecuted in Circuit Court the previous year. The court declined to dismiss the remaining counts for theft and possession of a controlled substance. The following month, pursuant to a plea agreement, the court dismissed the theft charge and Strader changed his plea to guilty on the possession charge. However, Strader reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App.1988).

and possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. He was subsequently charged by the West Valley City prosecutor with the misdemeanor false identification offense. He entered a guilty plea to this charge, in Circuit Court, on September 3, 1992.

In its findings and conclusions issued March 9, 1994, the trial court determined that Strader's act of giving false identification to a police officer was not part of the same criminal episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995), as the other offenses of theft and possession of a controlled substance. ¹ Strader now appeals from the trial court's refusal, premised on that conclusion, to dismiss all charges.

ISSUE

Because the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of the plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled substance, based on its determination that the charge did not arise from the same criminal episode as the previously prosecuted charge of giving false identification to a police officer. ²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The "trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law," Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990), and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded no particular deference. See id.; Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App.1993).

ANALYSIS

1. Applicable Law

Our starting point is the two-prong definition of "single criminal episode" found in the Utah Criminal Code: "all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added).

If multiple offenses meet the definition of a single criminal episode, the applicable charges must "be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged ... [and] may not be separated except by order of the court and for good

                cause shown."   Utah R.Crim.P. 9.5(1)(a), (b).  Additionally, there are two statutes pertinent to joinder of offenses.  If multiple charges result from the same criminal episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials "unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice."  Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) (1995).  If a defendant has already been prosecuted for an offense, he or she cannot be prosecuted subsequently for another offense arising out of the same criminal episode, so long as the later offense "was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution."  Id. § 76-1-403(1)(a).  However, neither Rule 9.5 nor the referenced statutes apply if the offenses at issue are not part of the same criminal episode, in which case a defendant may be properly prosecuted in separate proceedings
                

2. Scope of Analysis

Strader's appeal is somewhat atypical. It is not the usual defendant who clamors for all pending charges against him to be tried together before the same jury. The conventional wisdom holds that a jury will consider a charge more fairly if untainted by hearing the details of an entire series of charges pending against the defendant. ³ In cases determining joinder issues, defendants typically contest joinder by attempting to show the offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode and, thus, that their severance and separate trial motions should have been granted.

In contesting the separate prosecution of his offenses, Strader contends the false information offense was part of the same episode as the theft and drug possession offenses. Emphasizing that he claims violation of the joinder provisions found in section 76-1-402(2), section 76-1-403(1)(a), and Rule 9.5(1) rather than a violation of the constitutional double jeopardy doctrine, Strader argues that we should take an expansive view in analyzing whether the multiple offenses indeed arise from the same criminal episode. As Strader recognizes, the opposing interpretive model is that suggested by double jeopardy cases, in which a rather restrictive interpretation is given to the key term "same offence." U.S. Const. amend. V. As is hereafter explained, neither of these approaches is wholly appropriate to Strader's claim.

An expansive interpretation of "single criminal episode" is appropriate in cases contesting joinder of multiple offenses. Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and section 76-1-403(1), while related to double jeopardy, ⁴ expand the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials beyond "the same offense" focus in double jeopardy, see State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987), to all offenses arising from a "single criminal episode." ⁵ An expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy. ⁶ See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993); State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979). Also, because appellate courts review decisions regarding joinder or severance of offenses only for an abuse of discretion, Germonto, 868 P.2d at 59; State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1987), it follows that the reviewing court would, as a practical matter, take a On the other hand, the protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same crime. U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art. I, § 12. Accordingly, review of a double jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, focusing on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the same offense without regard to whether multiple offenses were part of the same criminal episode. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (holding successive burglaries of different areas in one apartment complex did not comprise the same offense); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (holding car theft and failure to stop after traffic violation were distinct offenses not subject to double jeopardy analysis). See also State v. James, 631 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1981) (holding double jeopardy does not prevent...