State v. Straub

• Citation: 153 Idaho 882,292 P.3d 273
• Decision Date: 07 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 38139.,38139.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Daniel Ryan STRAUB, Defendant–Appellant.

153 Idaho 882

292 P.3d 273

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Daniel Ryan STRAUB, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 38139.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, June 2012 Term.

Jan. 7, 2013.

Hon. Sara B. Thomas, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori Anne Fleming, Deputy Attorney General argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This case comes before this Court on an appeal from the district court's order of restitution against Daniel Straub (Straub). Straub pleaded guilty to vehicular manslaughter, and as part of the plea, agreed to pay restitution for victims under I.C. § 18–4007 and I.C. § 19–5304. After a restitution hearing, the district court determined that Straub owed $554,506.67 to the decedent's surviving family, primarily for future medical insurance premiums and for five years of lost wages. We reverse the decision of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2009, Straub, while driving his pick-up truck, struck and killed a bicyclist, David Webster (Decedent). The Decedent was survived by his wife (Charlene), a minor child, and a son over the age of eighteen. A blood draw taken after the accident showed Straub to have a .08 BAC. In the Information, Straub was charged with a felony for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, which was a significant cause contributing to the Decedent's death in violation of I.C. § 18–4006(3)(b). In the alternative, Straub was charged with gross negligence in the commission of an unlawful act in violation of I.C. § 18–4006(3)(a).

As part of the preliminary matters, the district court denied Straub's motion to suppress the blood testing evidence. A jury trial was set for April 6, 2010, but was reset for June 22, 2010. On June 17, 2010, Straub signed a guilty plea agreement, pleading guilty to "vehicular manslaughter per gross negligence." In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that Straub receive a jail term of three to eight years, a fine to be determined by the district court, and be ordered to pay restitution for crime victims pursuant to I.C. §§ 19–5304 and 18–4007. The plea also had a provision that:

By accepting this offer the Defendant waives his right to appeal any issues regarding the conviction, including all matters involving the plea or sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all suppression issues. Excepting however the Defendant may appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds the State's sentencing recommendation of the ‘Jail/Prison terms' set forth above.

A hearing on restitution was held on August 9, 2010, and the district court issued its Memorandum Opinion Re: Restitution on August 20, 2010. In its decision, the district court ordered Straub to pay: $23,809.47 for funeral, counseling, and medical insurance premiums paid to date plus legal expenses; $530,697.20 for future medical insurance premiums and lost wages; and additional counseling costs determined pursuant to a separate order. An Order of Restitution totaling $554,506.67 was entered by the district court on August 27, 2010. At the August 23, 2010 sentencing hearing, Straub was sentenced to eight years in jail, three years fixed, and a $5,000 fine in addition to the previously determined restitution.

Straub filed an Objection to Order of Restitution on September 3, 2010. In it, Straub argued that the district court unreasonably or illegally interpreted the restitution statutes. After a hearing on the issue, the district court denied Straub's objection on September 17, 2010. Straub timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 4, 2010.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether Straub waived his right to appeal the district court's restitution order.

2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering Straub to pay restitution for the victim's lost wages.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The district court's factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990). "A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract law standards, and as a question of law, this Court exercises free review." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004) ). Additionally, "[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 929, 104 P.3d 969, 971 (2005).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Straub did not waive his right to appeal the district court's restitution order.

Although Straub's only issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion when it awarded restitution, the State argues that by signing the guilty plea Straub waived his right to appeal the issue. Straub's guilty plea contained the following term:

By accepting this offer the Defendant waives the right to appeal any issues regarding the conviction, including all matters involving the plea or sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all suppression issues. Excepting however the Defendant may appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds the State's sentencing recommendation of the ‘Jail/Prison terms' set forth above.

(Emphasis added.). A defendant may waive his right to appeal as part of a guilty plea agreement. "The prosecuting attorney and the attorney for the defendant ... may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver of the defendant's right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court...." I.C.R. 11(f)(1).

The law has long since recognized that a criminal defendant by pleading guilty waives certain constitutional rights including, the privilege against self-incrimination.

... The right to appeal is purely a statutory right and is not a right guaranteed by any provision of the federal or state constitutions. Given the fact that constitutional rights may be waived, there is no doubt that a statutory right may be waived as well.

State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006) (quoting State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456–57, 872 P.2d 719–20 (1994) ).

On appeal, Straub does not appeal the waiver itself, but rather the scope of that waiver. Straub argues in his reply brief that any waiver of rights "would not encompass his right to appeal from the district court's restitution order" since restitution proceedings are not part of a defendant's sentence. This Court has previously held that an order for restitution is separate and apart from a criminal sentence. See State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258, 281 P.3d 90, 95 (2012) ; see also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004) (An "order of restitution provided in Idaho Code § 19–5304(2) becomes, in essence, a civil judgment for the amount of such restitution."). In the instant case, Straub not only waived his right to appeal any matters involving sentencing, but also "any rulings made by the court." The phrase "any rulings" in this context would include any ruling related to restitution, which is determined by the trial court in a separate written order. See I.C. § 19–5304(2).

However, the word "made," as the past tense form of the verb "to make," refers to any rulings that the district court made prior to the agreement. Thus, the agreement neither contemplates nor has any effect on rulings that occurred after the plea agreement was reached. Since the restitution hearing and subsequent restitution order occurred after the plea agreement was signed, Straub has not waived his right to appeal the restitution order.

a. Whether the district court violated Straub's right to a jury trial as outlined in Article 1, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution.

As an additional basis for appeal, Straub argues that the damages ordered by the district court should properly be determined in civil court by a jury. In support, he cites Article 1, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution, which reads in pertinent part:

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.... A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

The constitutional right of trial by jury has been interpreted by this Court to secure that right as it existed at common law when the Idaho Constitution was adopted. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). Additionally, the right to a jury trial is not necessarily applied "to new or different rights or remedies, not in existence or in contemplation of the Constitution when adopted." Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 751, 242 P. 314, 315 (1925).

The view that criminal restitution is a civil issue to be decided by a jury fails for two reasons. First, if criminal restitution has its roots in equity, see United States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir.1994), "[i]t is generally recognized that the constitutional right to a jury trial applies only to legal claims and not equitable claims," Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008). Second, many states—Idaho included—have adopted criminal restitution statutes through legislation. Idaho Code section 19–2601, which was enacted in 1972, authorizes trial courts to impose "probation under terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and expedient." This Court has held that under I.C. § 19–2601, "the payment of court costs and restitution are ... proper and often very useful conditions of withheld judgments and probation." State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 279–80, 581 P.2d 319, 325 (1978).

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