State v. Strickland

• Decision Date: 17 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 7516SC367,7516SC367
• Citation: 27 N.C.App. 40,217 S.E.2d 758
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Stanton STRICKLAND et al.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 758

217 S.E.2d 758

27 N.C.App. 40

STATE of North Carolina v. Stanton STRICKLAND et al.

No. 7516SC367.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Sept. 17, 1975 Appeal Dismissed by Supreme Court Nov. 5, 1975.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Associate Atty. Gen. Alan S. Hirsch, Raleigh, for the State.

Moses & Diehl by Philip A. Diehl, Raeford, for defendants-appellees.

PARKER, Judge.

The State assigns as error the trial court's allowance of defendants' motion to quash the warrants upon the grounds that the statute under which they were charged is unconstitutionally vague. We find the statute constitutional and revese the order allowing the motion to quash.

The statute involved in this case is G.S. § 14--288.4, which in pertinent part reads:

'(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who:

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'(4) Refuses to vacate any building or facility of any public or private educational institution in obedience to:

'a. An order of the Chief Administrative officer of the institution, or his authorized representative;

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'(b) Any person who willfully engages in disorderly conduct is guilty of a misdemeanor . . ..'

'Public disturbance' is defined in pertinent part in G.S. § 14--288.1(8) as: 'Any annoying, disturbing, or alarming act or condition exceeding the bounds of social toleration normal for the time and place in question which occurs in a public place or which occurs in, affects persons in, or is likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.'

Defendants first contend that G.S. § 14--288.4(a)(4)a, setting our certain elements of 'disorderly conduct,' is interdependent with G.S. § 14--288.1(8), defining 'public disturbance,' and that when both provisions are read together, the average citizen is not given adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and therefore the statutes are void for vagueness. Assuming, but without deciding, that the language defining 'public disturbance,' in G.S. § 14--288.1(8) is overbroad and vague, the question is presented whether G.S. § 14--288.4(a)(4)a is thereby also rendered unconstitutionally vague. We hold that it is not.

'It is settled law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. 'A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.' (Citations omitted.) Even so, impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.' In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888 (1969).

The statute, G.S. § 14--288.4(a), initially defines 'disorderly conduct' in general terms as 'a public disturbance' and then sets forth in subsequent subsections specific examples of conduct which is prohibited as disorderly conduct. 'It is a rule of construction, that when words of general import are used, and immediately following and relating to the same subject words of a particular or restricted import are found, the latter shall operate to limit and restrict the former.' Nance v. R.R., 149 N.C. 366, 371, 63 S.E. 116, 118 (1908); Accord, In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544 (1941). In order to ascertain what actions are violative of the statute as constituting 'disorderly conduct,' one must look, not to the general definition of 'public disturbance,' but to the specific examples of prohibited conduct as set forth in the subsections of the statute itself. Such interpretation of this statute follows the admonition contained in the opinion of our Supreme Court in Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 331, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967) that '(t)o construe the statute otherwise would raise a serious question as to its constitutionality and it is well settled that a statute will not be construed so as to raise such question if a different construction, which will avoid the question of constitutionality, is reasonable.'

Again assuming Arguendo that the definition of 'public disturbance' as contained in 14--288.1(8) is unconstitutionally vague, it does not necessarily follow that the inclusion of these words in G.S. § 14--288.4(a)(4)a, renders the latter statute also unconstitutional. When a statute can be given effect as if the invalid portion had never been included, it will be given such effect if it is apparent that the legislative body, had it known of the invalidity of the one portion, would have enacted the remainder alone. Commissioners v. Boring, 175 N.C. 105, 95 S.E. 43 (1918). That such a deletion of any unconstitutional material in the statutes now before us was intended by the Legislature is made manifest in Sec. 3 of Chap. 668, 1971 Session Laws (enacted when G.S. § 14--288.4 was rewritten in 1971) which provides that '(i)f any Word, clause, sentence, paragraph, section, or other part of this act shall be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof.' (Emphasis added.) If one totally ignores the words 'public disturbance,' reference to the succeeding specific subsections in G.S. § 14--288.4(a) more than adequately gives notice as to what constitutes the 'disorderly conduct' which...