State v. Strong

Decision Date27 February 2020
Docket Number19-590
PartiesSTATE OF LOUISIANA v. ANTHONY STRONG
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HONORABLE LOWELL C. HAZEL, DISTRICT JUDGE

PHYLLIS M. KEATY JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr.

District Attorney
Catherine L. Davidson
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 7358

Alexandria, Louisiana 71306-7358

(318) 473-6650

Counsel for Appellee:

State of Louisiana

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 82389

Lafayette, Louisiana 70598-2389

(337) 991-9757

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:

Anthony Strong

Jeff Landry
Attorney General

J. Taylor Gray

Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
Criminal Division
Post Office Box 94005

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

(225) 326-6200

Counsel for Other Respondent:

Attorney General, State of Louisiana

KEATY, Judge.

Defendant, Anthony Strong, was convicted of first degree robbery and was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to forty years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He now appeals his conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 24, 2018, Defendant was charged by amended bill of information with the May 17, 2017 armed robbery of Rupert Taylor. Defendant waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. The matter was set for a jury trial to commence on May 13, 2019.1 On the morning of trial, Defendant filed a motion to declare Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system unconstitutional. The motion was denied, and trial commenced the next day. On May 15, 2019, eleven of the twelve jurors returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of first degree robbery. The trial court designated Defendant's crime as one of violence and sentenced him to serve twelve years at hard labor on June 5, 2019. Later that day, however, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information charging Defendant as a twelfth felony offender. Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence in which he argued that his twelve-year sentence was excessive. The trial court denied the motion, without a hearing, on June 18, 2019. Thereafter, Defendant timely sought and was granted an appeal of his original sentence.

On July 23, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Defendant a "fourth plus" felony offender. As a result, Defendant's original sentence was set aside, and he was ordered to serve forty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant thereafter sought and was granted an appeal of his habitual offender sentence. He is now before this court, asserting through appointed appellate counsel, that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and that Louisiana's constitutional and statutory provisions allowing a conviction with a verdict of less than all twelve jurors violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of first degree robbery.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988). A determination of the weight of evidence is a question of fact, resting solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witnesses. State v. Silman, 95-0154 (La.11/27/95), 663 So.2d 27, 35. A reviewing court may impinge on the factfinding function of the jury only to the extent necessary to assure the Jackson standard of review. State v. Bordenave, 95-2328 (La.4/26/96), 678 So.2d 19, 20. It is not the function of an appellate court to assess credibility or re-weigh the evidence. Id.

State v. Macon, 06-481, pp. 7-8 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1285-86.

First degree robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another, or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, when the offender leads the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a dangerous weapon. LSA-R.S. 14:64.1A. The first degree robbery statute has objective and subjective components. The State must prove that the offender induceda subjective belief in the victim that he was armed with a dangerous weapon and that the victim's belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The statute excludes unreasonable panic reactions by the victim, but otherwise allows the victim's subjective beliefs to determine whether the offender has committed first degree robbery. Direct testimony by the victim that he believed the defendant was armed, or circumstantial inferences arising from the victim's immediate surrender of his personal possessions in response to the defendant's threats, may support a conviction for first degree robbery. State v. Caples, 05-2517 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 147, 151, writ denied, 06-2466 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So.2d 684.

State v. Vaughn, 18-344, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So.3d 1048, 1057, writ granted in part on other grounds, judgment reversed in part, 18-1750 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So.3d 494.

At trial, Detective William Smith, with the Pineville Police Department, testified that on May 17, 2017, he received a report that Rupert Taylor had given a ride to Anthony Strong, who was an old friend of Taylor. Taylor told Detective Smith that he drove Defendant to the Popeyes Restaurant on Highway 28 East in Pineville, Louisiana. The two went inside, ate, and returned to Taylor's vehicle, whereupon Defendant produced a knife from his pocket and demanded Taylor's wallet. Taylor stated he handed his wallet to Defendant, who removed the approximate $225 in cash contained therein, threw the wallet back to him, and walked away.

Detective Smith testified that he obtained video surveillance from Popeyes. The footage was played for the jury and narrated by Detective Smith, who identified Defendant and Taylor. Upon questioning by the State's attorney, Detective Smith explained:

Q. And what does this show?
A. . . . The two of them now returning to the vehicle in the parking lot.
Q. And what does this show?
A. Uh, just interactions inside the vehicle. Okay, so this is after that interaction. Mr. Strong returns to the restaurant. He's gonna [sic] walk directly to this other door which is behind the camera. He appears to be holding a wad of cash in his hand and goes out that, that front door facing Hwy. 28. Um, if you could go back to the initial interaction inside the vehicle, uh, I can point out some observations. Shortly after, uh, returning to the vehicle, uh, you'll see the passenger's door come open. Um, it doesn't appear that Mr. Strong entered the vehicle, but stood in the doorway. You then see, at this point, you didn't see where Mr. Taylor's hands go up kind of in a defensive posture and he, and he, uh, retreats back in his seat, uh, like he was startled by something.
Q. And at that time, Pineville Police was [sic] notified.
A. I think it was about twenty or thirty minutes later. Um, [Taylor] explained to me that he called, uh, a nephew or somebody to, to kind of -- he didn't know what to do, and so he called somebody, and then they came and met him and then they, uh, they instructed him to call us. At this point, it appears that he's gonna [sic] return to the restaurant. He's -- he said he's looking for Mr. Strong. He doesn't find him and returns to his vehicle.

Detective Smith continued narrating the video, which showed Taylor back out of his parking space and drive around the parking lot of Popeyes before returning to where he had originally parked.

Detective Smith testified that he conducted several interviews with Taylor the day following the incident. He stated that, because of Taylor's demeanor and the way Taylor spoke, he believed that Taylor was scared Defendant would hurt him. Detective Smith noted that Taylor suffered from a physical disability and that during the interviews regarding the robbery, Taylor's voice trembled and he appeared to cry. According to Detective Smith, Taylor's story was consistent each time the two spoke, and it was consistent with the video footage. Detective Smith explained that he did not compile a lineup, as Taylor reported having known Defendant for a long time.

Detective Smith testified that he spoke to Defendant on the telephone once or twice, and that Defendant agreed to come and speak to him but failed to do so. Thereafter, Detective Smith put a warrant out for Defendant's arrest. AfterDefendant was located, Detective Smith advised him of his rights before interviewing him. Defendant denied the accusations against him and claimed that he and Taylor went to Popeyes "to meet somebody there to purchase a vehicle." At the conclusion of the interview, Defendant was told he was going to be placed under arrest. Defendant became very angry, and he told Detective Smith that "Mr. Taylor was going to be killed and that it would be [Detective Smith's] fault."

Taylor also testified at trial. He identified Defendant in open court and he later identified the man seen in video footage wearing a red shirt as Defendant. Taylor stated that, on the morning of May 17, 2017, he drove to the bank to withdraw $300 in cash from an ATM to pay his electric bill. Afterward, he was headed to his uncle's house when Defendant flagged him down. Taylor stated that he and Defendant had gone to school together and had not seen each other in twenty...

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