State v. Stroup
Decision Date | 19 March 1997 |
Citation | 147 Or.App. 118,935 P.2d 438 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Denise STROUP, Respondent. 95CRM0040; CA A91562. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Judith Brant, Assistant Attorney General.
Daniel Q. O'Dell, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.
Before WARREN, P.J., and EDMONDS and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
Defendant was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). ORS 813.010. 1 She moved to suppress the evidence of what occurred after her vehicle was stopped on the ground that the arresting police officer did not have probable cause to administer field sobriety tests under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 2 See State v. Nagel, 320 Or. 24, 31, 880 P.2d 451 (1994) ( ). The trial court allowed her motion, and the state appeals. We affirm.
In reviewing an order resolving a motion to suppress, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact if they are supported by the evidence in the record. We determine whether the trial court applied the proper legal principles to those findings to reach a correct legal conclusion. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). The trial court found: On January 3, 1995, at approximately 3:20 a.m., Peter Jenista, a police officer employed by the City of Grants Pass, saw a vehicle in front of him traveling west bound on J Street. Jenista observed that the vehicle's left brake and tail lights were illuminated. As the vehicle turned left, the entire left tail light went dark. Jenista continued to follow the vehicle and observed it make a U-turn, at which point he activated his patrol car's overhead lights.
In response to Jenista's signals, the vehicle pulled over to the curb, and Jenista saw defendant get out of the vehicle from the driver's side. He did not notice any instability or unusual movements on her part. Jenista then left his patrol car and walked towards defendant. When he made contact with her, Jenista told defendant that he had stopped her because her vehicle's left brake light was not functioning. He asked to see her driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Defendant explained that she did not have any of those documents, that the vehicle was borrowed and that she did not know about the problem with the tail light.
Jenista noticed a slight odor of alcohol emitting from defendant and that she had bloodshot eyes. He then conducted an Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test on defendant. Based on the odor of alcohol, her bloodshot eyes, the HGN results, and her failure to produce the requested documents, Jenista believed that he had sufficient probable cause for a DUII arrest. He continued his investigation by asking defendant a series of questions including whether she had been drinking. Defendant admitted that she had drunk a couple of beers at approximately 5 p.m. Jenista also advised defendant of the consequences of refusing to perform field sobriety tests and administered seven field sobriety tests, including a second HGN test. Ultimately, defendant was arrested and an Intoxilyzer breath test was administered.
After a pretrial hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court ruled:
The court then clarified its ruling:
3
The state argues that Jenista had probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence of intoxicants at the time that he asked her to undergo field sobriety tests. Under ORS 813.010(1)(b), a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance when the person's physical or mental facilities are adversely affected to a noticeable or perceptible degree. State v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285, 307 n. 31, 899 P.2d 663 (1995). Because requiring a person to submit to field sobriety tests constitutes a search under Article I, section 9, probable cause must exist to believe that the person is under the influence before the person can be subjected to the test. In general, probable cause for a warrantless search exists when the officer subjectively believes that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime can be procured by the seizure of the person or the thing. Also, the officer's belief must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 204, 729 P.2d 524 (1986). Here, the officer held the requisite subjective belief, and the only issue is whether his belief was objectively reasonable.
The state relies on the odor of defendant's breath, her bloodshot eyes, her inability to produce identification, her admission that she had been drinking and the HGN test results as indicia of objective probable cause. First, it argues that the trial court's findings that Jenista noticed only a "slight" odor of alcohol is not supported by the record. 4 The state points out that Jenista later characterized the odor as "moderate" after getting closer to defendant. However, as defendant points out, the officer had difficulty describing the exact...
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