State v. Strouse

Decision Date16 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. 24268.,24268.
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeffrey R. STROUSE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Jeffrey S. Barkdull and Dan B. Johnson, Spokane, Washington, for appellant. Dan B. Johnson argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

Jeffrey Strouse (Strouse) was convicted of aggravated battery. He appeals, claiming improper use of his post-Miranda silence, failure of the trial court to allow a continuance of the trial, ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to grant a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In the early afternoon of September 9, 1995, Mike Gunderson (Gunderson) was seriously injured by a shotgun blast to his right buttocks when a sawed-off shotgun held by Strouse discharged. Strouse and Gunderson had been best friends for a period of about six years, until April of 1995, when Gunderson accused Strouse of misconduct. After this time, both Gunderson and Strouse made threats to injure the other.

Matt Coleman (Coleman) was the only eye-witness to the shooting. Coleman had been living on Strouse's property near Coeur d'Alene. Gunderson was on Strouse's property, visiting with Coleman on the morning of September 9, 1995. Strouse was also coming to visit Coleman when he spotted Gunderson's car on the property. Strouse claims that he feared for his life and loaded his double-barrel, sawed-off shotgun to protect himself. Strouse asked Coleman where Gunderson had gone. Coleman said that he had run off into the bushes. Strouse saw Gunderson hiding behind Coleman's truck, and Strouse pointed the shotgun at Gunderson. There is some conflict in the testimony about what words were exchanged between Gunderson and Strouse at that point. Both agree that Gunderson began to leave Strouse's property with Strouse following close behind him with the shotgun.

Strouse's shotgun discharged, striking Gunderson in the right buttocks. Gunderson fell to the ground. Strouse ran up to Gunderson and apologized. He told Gunderson that it was an accident, and Strouse helped Gunderson onto the back of Strouse's truck, intending to take him to the hospital. However, Coleman got his car, and Strouse helped Coleman transfer Gunderson to Coleman's car. Coleman drove Gunderson to the hospital.

Strouse contacted an attorney, Lonnie Sparks, who advised Strouse to turn himself in.1 Sparks also advised Strouse not to speak to the police about the crime and that his silence could not be used against him. Strouse turned himself into the police the day after the shooting but did not speak to the police. He appeared before a magistrate on September 11, 1995, and was advised of his rights. Ken Brooks, a public defender, was appointed to represent Strouse. Brooks met with Strouse on three or four occasions for a total of 60 to 75 minutes. Strouse provided Brooks with a list of witnesses to contact, but claims that Brooks only contacted two of the requested witnesses. Strouse called his lawyer collect from jail, but all of his phone calls were refused. The lack of preparation worried Strouse, who sent his lawyer several letters and faxes from jail. Strouse moved for a continuance two days before trial on the basis that his attorney was not prepared, but the continuance was denied.

During the trial the prosecution questioned Strouse extensively about his post-Miranda silence. Defense counsel made no objection. The prosecution also used Strouse's silence in closing argument to imply that Strouse was guilty.

Strouse retained private counsel after the trial and sought a new trial under Idaho Code § 19-2406 and Idaho Criminal Rule 34. The trial court denied this motion. Strouse was sentenced to a fixed term of incarceration of two years with an indeterminate term of five years to follow.

II.

THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF STROUSE'S POST-MIRANDA SILENCE VIOLATED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT.

Strouse argues that the prosecution made improper use of his post-Miranda silence during cross-examination and closing argument in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.

The prosecutor conducted the following cross-examination:

Q The next day you turned yourself in; is that correct?
A At 1:30.
Q The next day?
A Yes.
Q And the law enforcement officers asked to talk to you at that time; is that correct?
A Yes, they did.
Q And you refused?
A Of course.
Q And you never told this version, you never told this story to anyone at any time until you testified in another hearing on or about January—January 8, I believe; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q So, this happened on September 9th. On September 10th, you declined to talk to anybody; correct?
A Correct.
Q In the rest of September, all of October, all of November, all of December, and into January, you remained quiet?
A Only to counsel.
Q Oh. So, you spoke to counsel. You spoke to Mr. Brooks?
A Yes.
Q And you spoke to Lonnie Sparks, didn't you?
A Yes.
Q In fact, you had quite a few conversations with Lonnie Sparks initially after this happened?
A I waited to get a hold of him before I turned myself in.
Q You had several conversations with Lonnie Sparks before—or immediately after this happened, didn't you?
A A few, yes.
Q But you did not, did you, Mr. Strouse, tell law enforcement where the gun was or what you had done with the gun, did you?
A No. I assumed they found it.
Q And you never did?
A No.
Q And you never told law enforcement anything about what happened to the blanket?
A They never asked, no.
Q And you never told law enforcement about why you cleaned up the tailgate on your Blazer?
A Nobody asked.
Q And you never told law enforcement why you covered up the blood, did you?
A I didn't talk to anybody.
Q And immediately after this, you drove your Blazer up to Matthew Coleman's place and hid it over there, didn't you?
A The Blazer?
Q Yes.
A No, that's not correct.
Q Where did you hide the Blazer after this happened?
A I just left it parked out in the open up on the top of the ridge, actually, about a half mile west of Matthew Coleman's trailer.
Q Did you tell law enforcement where you had put it?
A No. They found it before I turned myself in anyway.
Q Now, you knew that law enforcement would be very interested in that gun, didn't you?
A Yeah, I assume so.
Q And you knew that law enforcement was looking for it, didn't you?
A Actually, they searched a friend of mine's house, and that's when I realized they were still looking for it.
Q Yes. They were issuing search warrants—or getting search warrants issued looking for that gun, weren't they?
A Yeah.
Q And still, you told them nothing?
A That's—
Q Is that correct?
A —how I was advised, Yes.
Q And then you went and found it, but you didn't tell law enforcement you found it, did you?
A No.
Q And you took it to a gunsmith at some point?
A That day I found it.
Q You didn't tell law enforcement about that?
A No, I didn't.
Q Then you got it back from the gunsmith into your possession; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q You didn't tell law enforcement about that?
A No.
Q And you gave it to your attorney?
A Yes.
Q And your attorney had it for several weeks, and still you hadn't told law enforcement, had you?
A Then—then I was asked. I was asked on the 26th of December about it.
Q At this other hearing in January?
A No.
Q January 8th?
A No. It was December 26th. Sergeant Wiedenhoff asked me about it when I was picking up my Blazer.
Q Detective Wiedenhoff asked you about what?
A The gun.
Q Okay. Okay. Didn't—at that time, Mr. Strouse, isn't it a fact that you told Detective Wiedenhoff something to the effect of, "Huh. You guys haven't found that gun yet?"
A No.
Q You didn't say something like that?
A No.
Q Is it your testimony that you told Detective Wiedenhoff where the gun was?
A What's that again?
Q Is it your testimony that you told Detective Wiedenhoff where the gun was on December 26th?
A I told him he'd have to ask my attorney.
Q Oh. So, you refused again to talk to law enforcement?
A Normal procedure, yes.
Q Do you have any idea how that blanket got burned up in Matthew Coleman's firepit?
A You'd have to ask Mr. Coleman.
Q I'm asking you if you know.
A No, I don't.
Q You indicated that Mr. Gunderson had been threatening you repeatedly over the telephone?
A Yes.
Q But you didn't tell that to law enforcement either, did you?
A No, I didn't.
Q You indicated that you even had some of these conversations recorded; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q You didn't provide those to law enforcement?
A No, I didn't.

The prosecutor made the following final argument:

Why did he hide the gun, if this was an accident? He says he tossed it in the bush. Yeah, right. Even if he tossed it in the bush, he knew they were looking for it. He knew it could prove his innocence. Well, with all the other facts, it couldn't even do that. Why didn't he tell anybody? They were executing search warrants. They were looking for him. He turned himself in. Now, he jumps up here, and he's quick to tell you, "I'm innocent. I didn't do it. This was an accident."
If he was innocent, if this was an accident, why didn't he tell the cop that when he turned himself in? Doesn't make sense. Nothing he's told you makes sense. Not a thing that he has told you makes sense.

The State concedes that the prosecutor's statements in final argument were improper but maintains they were harmless. On the other hand, the State argues that the prosecutor's cross-examination was proper because Strouse's attorney opened the door in his opening statement and Strouse opened the door in his direct examination. Strouse's trial counsel made the following statement in his opening:

And then Jeff goes home. Jeff doesn't hide. Jeff waits to be contacted. The next day, Jeff still isn't contacted. He goes down, and he says, `Look, are you guys looking for me? Let me tell you what happened.' Then he's arrested.

Strouse...

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9 cases
  • State v. Phillips
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 9 Marzo 2007
    ...constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt. State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 713-14, 992 P.2d 158, 162-63 (1999); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314, 143 P.3d ......
  • State v. Stefani
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 21 Diciembre 2005
    ... ... Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 (1965); State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 713-14, 992 P.2d 158, ... 162-63 (1999); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 715, 551 P.2d 1344, 1351 (1976); State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577, 114 P.3d 133, ... ...
  • State v. Kerchusky
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 22 Abril 2003
    ...constitutes fundamental error. State v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 36, 773 P.2d 651, 653 (Ct.App.1989). See also State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 714, 992 P.2d 158, 163 (1999) (holding that State's elicitation of defendant's post-Miranda silence, in absence of objection by defendant, constituted......
  • State v. Burris, Docket No. 33593 (Idaho App. 9/11/2008)
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 11 Septiembre 2008
    ...held to constitute fundamental error that may be reviewed in the absence of an objection in the trial court. State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 711-14, 992 P.2d 158, 160-63 (1999)3; State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 4, 121 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677-7......
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