State v. Strouse
Decision Date | 16 December 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 24268.,24268. |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeffrey R. STROUSE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Jeffrey S. Barkdull and Dan B. Johnson, Spokane, Washington, for appellant. Dan B. Johnson argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Jeffrey Strouse (Strouse) was convicted of aggravated battery. He appeals, claiming improper use of his post-Miranda silence, failure of the trial court to allow a continuance of the trial, ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to grant a new trial.
In the early afternoon of September 9, 1995, Mike Gunderson (Gunderson) was seriously injured by a shotgun blast to his right buttocks when a sawed-off shotgun held by Strouse discharged. Strouse and Gunderson had been best friends for a period of about six years, until April of 1995, when Gunderson accused Strouse of misconduct. After this time, both Gunderson and Strouse made threats to injure the other.
Matt Coleman (Coleman) was the only eye-witness to the shooting. Coleman had been living on Strouse's property near Coeur d'Alene. Gunderson was on Strouse's property, visiting with Coleman on the morning of September 9, 1995. Strouse was also coming to visit Coleman when he spotted Gunderson's car on the property. Strouse claims that he feared for his life and loaded his double-barrel, sawed-off shotgun to protect himself. Strouse asked Coleman where Gunderson had gone. Coleman said that he had run off into the bushes. Strouse saw Gunderson hiding behind Coleman's truck, and Strouse pointed the shotgun at Gunderson. There is some conflict in the testimony about what words were exchanged between Gunderson and Strouse at that point. Both agree that Gunderson began to leave Strouse's property with Strouse following close behind him with the shotgun.
Strouse's shotgun discharged, striking Gunderson in the right buttocks. Gunderson fell to the ground. Strouse ran up to Gunderson and apologized. He told Gunderson that it was an accident, and Strouse helped Gunderson onto the back of Strouse's truck, intending to take him to the hospital. However, Coleman got his car, and Strouse helped Coleman transfer Gunderson to Coleman's car. Coleman drove Gunderson to the hospital.
Strouse contacted an attorney, Lonnie Sparks, who advised Strouse to turn himself in.1 Sparks also advised Strouse not to speak to the police about the crime and that his silence could not be used against him. Strouse turned himself into the police the day after the shooting but did not speak to the police. He appeared before a magistrate on September 11, 1995, and was advised of his rights. Ken Brooks, a public defender, was appointed to represent Strouse. Brooks met with Strouse on three or four occasions for a total of 60 to 75 minutes. Strouse provided Brooks with a list of witnesses to contact, but claims that Brooks only contacted two of the requested witnesses. Strouse called his lawyer collect from jail, but all of his phone calls were refused. The lack of preparation worried Strouse, who sent his lawyer several letters and faxes from jail. Strouse moved for a continuance two days before trial on the basis that his attorney was not prepared, but the continuance was denied.
During the trial the prosecution questioned Strouse extensively about his post-Miranda silence. Defense counsel made no objection. The prosecution also used Strouse's silence in closing argument to imply that Strouse was guilty.
Strouse retained private counsel after the trial and sought a new trial under Idaho Code § 19-2406 and Idaho Criminal Rule 34. The trial court denied this motion. Strouse was sentenced to a fixed term of incarceration of two years with an indeterminate term of five years to follow.
THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF STROUSE'S POST-MIRANDA SILENCE VIOLATED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT.
Strouse argues that the prosecution made improper use of his post-Miranda silence during cross-examination and closing argument in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
The prosecutor conducted the following cross-examination:
The prosecutor made the following final argument:
The State concedes that the prosecutor's statements in final argument were improper but maintains they were harmless. On the other hand, the State argues that the prosecutor's cross-examination was proper because Strouse's attorney opened the door in his opening statement and Strouse opened the door in his direct examination. Strouse's trial counsel made the following statement in his opening:
And then Jeff goes home. Jeff doesn't hide. Jeff waits to be contacted. The next day, Jeff still isn't contacted. He goes down, and he says, Then he's arrested.
Strouse...
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State v. Phillips
...constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt. State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 713-14, 992 P.2d 158, 162-63 (1999); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314, 143 P.3d ......
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... ... Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 (1965); State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 713-14, 992 P.2d 158, ... 162-63 (1999); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998); State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983); State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 715, 551 P.2d 1344, 1351 (1976); State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577, 114 P.3d 133, ... ...
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State v. Kerchusky
...constitutes fundamental error. State v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 36, 773 P.2d 651, 653 (Ct.App.1989). See also State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 714, 992 P.2d 158, 163 (1999) (holding that State's elicitation of defendant's post-Miranda silence, in absence of objection by defendant, constituted......
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State v. Burris, Docket No. 33593 (Idaho App. 9/11/2008)
...held to constitute fundamental error that may be reviewed in the absence of an objection in the trial court. State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 711-14, 992 P.2d 158, 160-63 (1999)3; State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 4, 121 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677-7......