State v. Strout

• Decision Date: 21 July 1933
• Citation: State v. Strout, 132 Me. 134, 167 A. 859 (Me. 1933)
• Parties: STATE v. STROUT.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

167 A. 859

STATE

v. STROUT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 21, 1933.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Androscoggin County.

Prosecution by the State against Ernest Strout on a charge of having caused his insured building to be burned with intent to defraud the insurer. Defendant's demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and he brings exception.

Exception sustained.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, and THAXTER, JJ.

Frank T. Powers and A. F. Martin, both of Lewiston, for the State.

Berman & Berman, of Lewiston, for respondent.

DUNN, Justice.

If one willfully burns his building, which is insured against loss by fire, or causes it to be burned, with intent to defraud the insurer, the act of burning, or privity thereto, constitutes a felony. R. S. c. 138, § 24.

This prosecution against the owner of an insured building is not for himself having fired the structure, but for having caused it to be burned. The indictment uses the very words of the statute, but it is not more descriptive with respect to any particular criminal act.

The defendant demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and an exception taken. Leave to plead anew was specially granted.

It is contended that the charge of causing the building to be burned is not an allegation of fact, but merely a conclusion of the pleader; that being thus restricted in its phrase, the indictment is not informative to a degree enabling the accused to prepare his defense.

An indictment describing an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient. This commonly repeated rule is ordinarily correct. State v. Doran, 99 Me. 329, 59 A. 440, 105 Am. St. Rep. 278. It, however, depends upon the manner in which the offense is defined in the statute. If the statute does not sufficiently set out the facts which make the crime, so that a person of common understanding may have adequate notice of the nature of the charge which he is called upon to meet, then a more definite statement of the facts than is contained in the statute becomes necessary. State v. Lashus, 79 Me. 541, 11 A. 604; State v. Dor an, supra. It is not enough that the indictment detail the facts from which an offense may be implied, or only so many of the essential elements as might suggest all the other elements; it must specify everything necessary to criminality.

The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Constitution of Maine contains a similar provision....