State v. Stuart
| Decision Date | 21 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001AP1345-CR.,2001AP1345-CR. |
| Citation | 695 N.W.2d 259,279 Wis.2d 659,2005 WI 47 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Paul J. STUART, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Christopher W. Rose and Rose & Rose, Kenosha, and oral argument by Christopher W. Rose.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michele A. Tjader and Tjader & Chirafisi, LLC, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
¶ 1.
The petitioner, Paul Stuart, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of conviction and order denying postconviction relief.1 Stuart was convicted in 1999 of first-degree intentional homicide for the shooting death of Gary Reagles. This is the third time that Stuart's case has come before this court.
¶ 2. Stuart now asks us to reexamine our decision in State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82. There, we rejected his claim that the preliminary hearing testimony of his brother, who implicated Stuart in the murder, was improperly admitted at trial after the brother refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. Stuart asserts that the use of such testimony violated his right to confrontation, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. ¶ 3. In light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), we agree with Stuart that the testimony in question should not have been admitted in his case.2 Such evidence violated Stuart's right to confrontation, as he did not have the opportunity to question his brother about a potential motive to testify falsely. We also conclude that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for a new trial.
¶ 4. On March 27, 1990, Gary Reagles was found dead in his apartment with a single gunshot wound to the chest. A Berretta nine-millimeter gun lay on the floor near his body. Reagles had a history of emotional problems, including prior suicide attempts. His girlfriend told police that he had been threatening suicide because of their impending breakup. Reagles used cocaine on the night of his death and had a blood alcohol content of .393%. Initially, his death was ruled a suicide.
¶ 5. In 1998, Stuart was charged with the first-degree intentional homicide of Reagles. At the preliminary hearing, his brother John Stuart (hereinafter John) implicated him in the shooting.
¶ 6. John testified that on the morning Reagles's body was found, Stuart spoke with him at his residence. Stuart indicated that during the night he partied with Reagles, drinking and getting high on cocaine. According to John, Stuart confessed to shooting Reagles because of cocaine and because Reagles was going to say something about a recent burglary perpetrated by the two brothers.
¶ 7. As questioning continued, John admitted that he and Stuart burglarized a home in Illinois a short time before Reagles's death. They stole coins, pocket-knives, and some guns. One of the guns stolen was a Berretta nine-millimeter. John indicated that Stuart had possession of that weapon following the burglary. He described Stuart to be "very confused, very distraught" and "scared" when talking about the shooting. Stuart told him that after he shot Reagles, he "fixed it to look like a suicide."
¶ 8. John testified that George Stuart (hereinafter George), another brother, came over later that day and told John and Stuart that Reagles had been found dead in his apartment. According to John, Stuart acted surprised when informed about the shooting, as if he knew nothing about it. Later, Stuart asked John to provide him with an alibi. Specifically, he asked John to say that he had been at John's home at the time of the shooting. John testified that Stuart left the state on a trip to Arizona within a week of Reagles's death.
¶ 9. On cross-examination, John acknowledged that Stuart's trip to Arizona was not unusual because their mother lived there. He said that he first told police about the information he had regarding Reagles's death when he was stopped for a routine traffic offense in 1992 or 1993.3 He indicated that he gave another statement to police in June of 1998. Defense counsel then asked about the circumstances under which John gave this statement, which drew an objection from the State. The exchange regarding that June 1998 statement was as follows:
¶ 10. After the objection, defense counsel continued his cross-examination. John admitted that he was "stoned" when Stuart told him about the shooting. He testified to smoking five or six additional marijuana cigarettes after his conversation with Stuart. John stated that he was confused during the conversation and did not believe what Stuart told him. He was also confused when George came over with the news of Reagles's death because Stuart acted like he had no prior knowledge of it.
¶ 11. Finally, John acknowledged telling police that Stuart told him that there were two shots fired. He further admitted lying for Stuart when he told officers that Stuart was at his home the day of the shooting. After hearing testimony from John and another witness, Arthur Parramoure, who testified that Stuart confessed to shooting Reagles, the court bound the defendant over for trial.4
¶ 12. On February 8, 1999, the trial began. On the third day of the trial, John took the witness stand and asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He refused to answer questions, and persisted in the refusal despite the State's offer of use immunity for his testimony and the circuit court's warning that he could be held in contempt of court. According to his attorney, John believed that he had a plea bargain in exchange for his cooperation with the police, and that the State did not keep its part of the bargain. Accordingly, although the plea bargain called upon him to testify at trial in Stuart's case, he nevertheless refused to do so.5
¶ 13. The circuit court held John in contempt of court. The State then moved to have John's preliminary hearing testimony admitted into evidence. Stuart's attorney objected, claiming that there was no effective cross-examination of John allowed at the preliminary hearing.
¶ 14. On February 11, 1999, after a motion hearing, the circuit court ruled that John's preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible. The State immediately appealed. By order dated February 16, 1999, the court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's ruling, determining that the opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional right to confrontation.
¶ 15. The State subsequently filed an emergency petition for review. This court ordered the trial stayed, pending its decision. Thus, in the middle of the trial, everything in the case stopped to await an answer from this court on the issue of the admissibility of John's preliminary hearing testimony. The parties submitted briefs and this court held oral argument on February 23, 1999. The same day, following oral argument, we issued an order reversing the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 16. After this court's ruling, the trial resumed. Based on our reversal of the court of appeals' decision, the circuit court had John's preliminary hearing testimony read into the record. Defense counsel moved the court "to take judicial notice" that there were two open Kenosha County felony cases against John at the time he was cooperating with the prosecution in its investigation of Stuart. The court refused this request, stating that "[t]he jury will be informed that John had four prior convictions, and that will be the end of what we know about John Stuart."
¶ 17. Additional witnesses were called at trial regarding purported confessions by Stuart. Michael Schultz testified that in March of 1990, he met Stuart in a bar and Stuart told him that he had to kill Reagles. Likewise, David Small testified that when he shared a jail cell with Stuart in September of 1998, Stuart told him details of the shooting. Benjamin Woody also testified that Stuart admitted killing Reagles in a conversation on October 5, 1998. Finally, Damian Simpson was present during Stuart's statements to Woody and stated that Stuart admitted killing Reagles. ¶ 18. On February 26, 1999, Stuart was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide. He filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was denied. Stuart appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to this court, identifying two specific issues:
¶ 43. It also...
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