State v. Stuart
| Decision Date | 07 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 27703.,27703. |
| Citation | 113 Conn.App. 541,967 A.2d 532 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Mark T. STUART. |
Elio C.C. Morgan, with whom was Wayne A. Francis, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).
James M. Ralls, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Kathleen A. Dwyer, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
GRUENDEL, BEACH and HENNESSY, Js.
The defendant, Mark T. Stuart, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of twenty-eight counts arising out of his involvement in a stolen car operation.1 Particularly, the convictions centered around his possession of three cars, a Lincoln Navigator (Navigator), a Cadillac Escalade (Escalade) and a Chevrolet Corvette (Corvette), which were stolen and had altered vehicle identification numbers (VINs). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the submission to the jury of certain exhibits that were not entered into evidence violated his right to an impartial jury and warranted a mistrial, (2) the conviction on more than one count of possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN with respect to a single vehicle violated his right against double jeopardy, (3) the statute prohibiting possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN, General Statutes § 14-149, is void for vagueness and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions of possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN, larceny in the first degree, conspiracy to possess a vehicle with an altered VIN and of conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree. We conclude that (1) the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial because the submission to the jury of exhibits that had not been entered into evidence as full exhibits did not constitute structural error and did not violate the defendant's right to an impartial jury, (2) the conviction on multiple counts of possession of and conspiracy to possess a vehicle with an altered VIN for a single vehicle violated double jeopardy, (3) the statute prohibiting possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN is not void for vagueness, and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of possession of stolen vehicles and possession of vehicles with altered VINs as to all three vehicles and sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to possess stolen vehicles and conspiracy to possess vehicles with altered VINs as to the Escalade and the Navigator but not as to the Corvette. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, are relevant to our consideration of the issues raised on appeal. On December 9, 2004, an airplane patrolling for the state police picked up a LoJack signal emanating from a parking lot in Glastonbury. LoJack is a motor vehicle transmitting or homing device that can be activated to emit a unique signal if a car is stolen. It allows law enforcement personnel to locate a stolen vehicle by entering the vehicle's VIN into a tracking computer that is capable of activating and locating its unique signal. The pilot alerted Glastonbury police and directed them to the parking lot. The police found the parking lot and identified an Escalade as the vehicle that was broadcasting the signal. The police also matched the make, model, year and color of the vehicle with information provided by the LoJack system. The Escalade had a "for sale" sign in the window with a telephone number on it. The telephone number was identified as belonging to the defendant. The license plates on the Escalade were registered to a different vehicle, a Chevrolet Lumina owned by Joanne Arena, the defendant's former wife.
When the police questioned the defendant about the Escalade, he stated that he did not know that it was stolen and that he had purchased it from Ozvaldo Seda the night before. The defendant then brought to the attention of the police a certificate of title to a Navigator, which he stated he had also purchased from Seda. The Navigator certificate was later found to be fraudulent. The Escalade certificate of title was found to contain irregularities, including nonmatching VINs, and was also shown to be counterfeit. After obtaining a search warrant, the police searched the defendant's driveway, which contained approximately six additional vehicles, including a Navigator and a Corvette. The police found irregularities on several of the Corvette's VINs and the Navigator's VINs, and it was later determined that these VINs had been altered. The Escalade was also found to have altered VINs. The Corvette, Navigator and Escalade were all seized by the police.
Inside the defendant's house, the police found a New Jersey certificate of title to the Corvette, which was later confirmed by New Jersey officials to be counterfeit. There were such a large number of other documents in the house relating to motor vehicles that an investigating officer testified at trial that it appeared as though some sort of an automobile business was being run out of the house. Among those papers was a note, written by the defendant, with the name "Ozzie," Seda's nickname, written on it. The note was dated December 3, 2004, which was approximately three days before the Escalade was stolen, and stated: "$21,500 for Escalade to Ozzie" and "$11,000 to Ozzie for Navigator."
At trial, a witness, Alfred Maldonado, testified that he had met the defendant through Seda. Seda had a car dealership and had purchased several vehicles from Maldonado. Maldonado testified that he had met with the defendant and Seda in Hartford where the defendant paid $10,000 for the Navigator and $20,000 for the Escalade. Maldonado testified that during this transaction, he indicated to the defendant that the vehicles were stolen. On December 14, 2004, Maldonado was arrested for an attempted transfer of another vehicle to Seda. He pleaded guilty to those charges and was sentenced to eighteen months incarceration. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the court improperly permitted exhibits that were not admitted into evidence to be submitted to the jury, and, as a result, the court should have declared a mistrial. He argues that this lapse constituted a structural defect and that its prejudicial effect violated his right to an impartial jury under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.2 In the alternative, the defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate hearing on the effect of the exhibits on the jurors. We disagree with both of the defendant's arguments and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claims. Police officers testified before the jury that when they searched the defendant's home, they seized a number of vehicular documents, including boxes and folders containing certificates of title, bills of sale and other documents relating to car sales. One officer testified that tables in the house were covered with hundreds of such documents. An officer further testified that the police seized approximately three dozen certificates of title from the house, some of which were in the defendant's name and some of which were not. Other items included a folder regarding an apparent business called "DiPietro Auto Sales" and a folder marked "Ford Windstar."
On the second day of jury deliberations, the court noted that exhibits marked fifty through fifty-four for identification only had been submitted to the jury as though they were full exhibits. These exhibits consisted of several of the items seized from the defendant's home, including a file folder containing numerous vehicle titles. Exhibit fifty was a folder labeled "Ford Windstar" and included a copy of a certificate of title to a Ford Windstar and handwriting on the inside regarding the delivery of a car; exhibit fifty-one comprised documents regarding DiPietro Auto Wholesalers, LLC; exhibit fifty-two consisted of a folder containing approximately forty-five vehicle titles or copies of vehicle titles and several other vehicular documents; exhibit fifty-three was a folder labeled "invoice boat" and contained several documents, several of which bore the names of the defendant and Seda, apparently pertaining to a boat; and exhibit fifty-four consisted of several other vehicular documents. These exhibits had not been marked as full exhibits but had been included in the group of exhibits submitted to the jury during its deliberation. Prior to the submission of exhibits to the jury, counsel for the defendant had stated that he had reviewed all of the exhibits before they were sent to the jury.
The defendant moved for a mistrial but also asked the court to defer its decision until after the jury rendered its decision. The state objected, but the court at first reserved its decision on the request for a mistrial until after the verdicts. The court instructed the jury not to consider any of the information contained in exhibits fifty through fifty-four.3 The court asked whether the jury had viewed those exhibits. The jury responded that it had, and the court reiterated its instruction to disregard the contents of those exhibits. Then, following a recess, the state renewed its request that the court rule on the mistrial prior to the verdicts. It argued that the defendant had reviewed the exhibits before they went to the jury and that he had indicated that he would not have objected to a sanitized version of the exhibits. The court agreed and denied the motion for a mistrial. It stated that the submission of the exhibits was harmless. Later that day, the jury returned its verdicts.
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