State v. Stubbs

• Decision Date: 29 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 38723,38723
• Citation: State v. Stubbs, 239 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1970)
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Douglas McArthur STUBBS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 241

239 So.2d 241

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v.Douglas McArthur STUBBS, Respondent.

No. 38723.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 29, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1970.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Roger H. Grason, Ft. Lauderdale, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a petition for writ of certiorari from the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, which reversed the conviction of respondent, charged with rape, and remanded for a new trial.We issued writ of certiorari and assumed jurisdiction to review the District Court's conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting certain incriminating statements at the trial of respondent and his co-defendants, and to resolve conflict in appellate decisions.

We considered a similar question in Schneble v. State, 201 So.2d 881(1967), reversed on remand from the United States Supreme Court, 215 So.2d 611(1968).In that case, a defendant confessed to homicide, after being told his co-defendant had confessed in detail.We held on reconsideration that the conviction could not stand under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476(1968), since the confession of defendant was the fruit of improper interrogation, meaning in effect it was not freely and voluntarily given; in turn, this meant that the confession of the co-defendant put into evidence material facts which otherwise were not part of the trial; we held that in such circumstances, the introduction of the co-defendant's confession implicating defendant at defendant's joint trial, even with cautionary instruction to the jury to regard the confession only against the co-defendant, was reversible error under Bruton.

In the casewe now decide, the District Court relied on Schneble in reversing the conviction of defendant.This case differs, however, in that the confession of defendant Stubbs was freely and voluntarily given, without showing under Schneble it resulted from unfair interrogation.We note defendant's statement was given first in time before confessions by the three co-defendants in this case.

The District Court of Appeal, Third District, considered a similar situation in Montalvo v. State, 154 So.2d 713(1963), and concluded that where a defendant has made statements implicating himself, admission of a confession by a co-defendant tending to prove the same material facts is merely cumulative and is not reversible error.Montalvo pre-dated the Court's holding in Bruton, but does not appear to conflict with it.

We note that the facts of Bruton were that petitioner and his co-defendant were tried jointly, that the co-defendant confessed implicating defendant, that the confession was introduced at the trial with a cautionary instruction to the jury that it be considered as evidence only against the co-defendant, and defendant was convicted.The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating it was doing so

'(B)ecause of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans''confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. * * *'We therefore * * * reverse.'

It is clear that the rationale of Bruton is simply that when oral evidence, even if reduced to writing, is introduced which may be considered by the jury as evidence against a defendant, the opportunity for cross-examination should be given else the evidence is tainted.However, where the defendant himself has freely and voluntarily given the same evidence in a confession or testimony, establishing the same material facts, evidence given as to the same facts in a co-defendant's confession is merely cumulative, and therefore not grounds for reversal.

We hold that where the confessions of all the defendants affirm substantially the same material facts of the offense charged; where there appears to be sufficient independent proof of the unquestionable guilt of each party; where the confession of the defendant is given freely and voluntarily, and with reasonable independence of confessions of co-defendants; where no unfavorable evidence is introduced at defendant's joint trial separately; and where instructions are given to the jury to disregard statements admitted into evidence against one defendant and not against another; that where these requirements are met, the risk of 'prejudicial spillover' incrimination without cross-examination is reduced to an insignificant level.

The decision of the District Court is quashed, and this cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions to further remand to the Circuit Court to reinstate the judgment and sentence of that Court.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., and BALABAN, Circuit Judge, concur.

ERVIN, C.J., dissents with opinion.

ERVIN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

This case presents for our determination solely a factual application of the harmless error exception to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476(1968), which was announced by the United States Supreme Court in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284(1969).

The rationale of Bruton is that if a co-defendant does not testify and if his confession or extrajudicial statements are introduced in the context of a joint trial, constitutional error occurs because of and to the extent that the codefendant's confession or extrajudicial statements present hearsay evidence inculpating another joint defendant in a form not subject to cross-examination.The Court in Bruton specifically overruled Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278(1957), and concluded that under such circumstances limiting instructions do not pro vide an adequate substitute for the constitutional right of cross-examination.Although the Bruton rule was enunciated in a fact situation where the defendant deprived of the constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination did not himself confess or provide inculpating extrajudicial statements, decisions in the wake of Bruton have made it clear that the existence of the constitutional error described in Bruton is not vitiated where a defendant otherwise deprived of the right of cross-examination due to the introduction of inculpating statements attributed to his nontestifying codefendant, himself confesses.SeeSchneble v. State, ...