State v. Suddith, No. 39
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Writing for the Court | CATHELL. |
Citation | 379 Md. 425,842 A.2d 716 |
Docket Number | No. 39 |
Decision Date | 12 February 2004 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Robert Eric SUDDITH. |
842 A.2d 716
379 Md. 425
v.
Robert Eric SUDDITH
No. 39, Sept. Term, 2003.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
February 12, 2004.
Glenn F. Ivey, State's Attorney and Special Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland; Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General; Michelle W. Cole, Staff Attorney, all on brief), Baltimore, for petitioners.
Mark Colvin, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
CATHELL, Judge.
On March 5 and 6, 2002, Robert Eric Suddith, respondent, was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and was convicted of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine and possession
Respondent filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On April 1, 2003, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court's rulings. The Court of Special Appeals held, based in part on our decision in Pringle v. State, 370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016 (2002), "that the mere presence in a vehicle of drugs and paraphernalia, without more, is insufficient to establish a nexus between the passenger, the drugs, and the paraphernalia." The intermediate appellate court went on to state that the evidence was insufficient to support the inferences that respondent either exercised control over the contraband or knew that the contraband was in the vehicle.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on June 19, 2003, this Court granted the petition. State v. Suddith, 376 Md. 49, 827 A.2d 112 (2003). In its brief, the State presents one question for our review:
"Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of a passenger of a stolen vehicle for possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia, where the drugs and a large quantity of items associated with drug use were strewn throughout the vehicle as a result of the vehicle's flipping three times following the driver's loss of control while fleeing from police?"
We answer petitioner's question in the affirmative and reverse the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. We hold that the jury's inferences from the evidence presented were reasonable and thus sufficient to sustain respondent's convictions for possession of heroin, cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
I. Facts
At approximately 8:40 p.m. on October 18, 2001, Fred Rosario, an officer with the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department, observed a Ford Explorer being driven with its headlights off and he attempted to stop the vehicle. At this time, the Explorer fled the scene, which initiated a high-speed pursuit by the police. During the chase, Officer Rosario recognized that the Explorer matched the description of a sports utility vehicle that recently had been carjacked and reported stolen. The high-speed chase was recorded by a video camera located within Officer Rosario's police cruiser. The Explorer fled through the streets of the District of Columbia and into Maryland, where the chase concluded after the driver of the Explorer lost control of the vehicle and it flipped over three times before stopping.
The officers on the scene of the crash apprehended four persons from the Explorer, including respondent, the driver and two other passengers.2 As none of the four occupants of the Explorer claimed ownership of the vehicle and the vehicle was confirmed as stolen, all four were arrested for the theft of the Explorer.
At trial, respondent moved for a judgment of acquittal based, inter alia, on an argument that the State did not meet its "burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that respondent knew of or possessed the contraband. The trial court, in response, stated:
"Well, I think the issues that you raised are fact driven and must be determined by the fact finder. So as to a matter of law, I would deny the defense motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence, finding that the issue is—one of the issues raised by the defense are issues of fact that must be determined by the fact finder."
The jury found respondent guilty on the charges of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for an appellate court's review of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction was summarized recently by this Court in the case of State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533-34, 823 A.2d 664, 668 (2003), when we said:
"The standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 569 (1979); Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002); White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855, 861-62 (2001); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79, 649 A.2d 336, 337-38 (1994). `Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.' State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998). See McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675, 685-86 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182 (1998) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478, 649 A.2d at 337); Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580, 583 A.2d 1037, 1040-41 (1991); Wright v. State, 312 Md. 648, 541 A.2d 988 (1988).
842 A.2d 719"We give "due regard to the [fact finder's] findings of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses."' Moye, 369 Md. at 12, 796 A.2d at 827 (quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675, 685 (1997) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478, 649 A.2d at 337)). See the following recent cases quoting Albrecht: Anderson v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92, 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305, 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649, 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 861-62. We do not re-weigh the evidence, but `we do determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant's guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.' White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 862. A valid conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence. Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 537, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990). The same standard applies to all criminal cases, including those resting upon circumstantial evidence, since, generally, proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from proof of guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts."
A trial court fact-finder, i.e., judge or jury, possesses the ability to "choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation" and this Court must give deference to all reasonable inferences the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether we would have chosen a different reasonable inference. Id. at 534, 823 A.2d at 668.4 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) (stating that the trier of fact has the responsibility "fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts"); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 460, 682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996) (stating "the trier of fact decides which evidence to accept and which to reject.... [I]t is the trier of fact that must draw the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom," therefore, "absent clear error in its fact-finding, an appellate court is required, in deference to the trial court, to accept those findings of fact") (alteration added); In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 380, 681 A.2d 501, 505 (1996) (stating that "[i]n a criminal case, the appropriate inquiry is not whether the reviewing court...
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