State v. Suiter
| Decision Date | 31 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 26632.,26632. |
| Citation | 67 P.3d 1274,138 Idaho 662 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Patrick S. SUITER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Greg S. Silvey, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Karen A. Hudelson argued. PERRY, Judge.
Patrick S. Suiter appeals from his judgments of conviction for felony malicious injury to a canal and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing officers.1 We vacate and remand.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On October 30, 1999, law enforcement officers responded to a call from a watermaster in Canyon County who reported that Suiter was using a backhoe to dig in a canal located along the northern boundary line of property owned by Suiter's wife. Suiter and his wife had been involved in a dispute with the ditch company that owned, used, and maintained the canal for agricultural purposes. This dispute centered on the canal boundaries and a right of way over the property owned by Suiter's wife. As a result of civil litigation between the Suiters and the company, the company obtained a restraining order prohibiting the Suiters from causing damage to or interfering with the company's use, maintenance, and repair of the canal; the canal bank road; and its embankments.
Upon arrival at the canal, officers saw Suiter operating a backhoe in the canal, transferring dirt from the north bank to the south bank next to his wife's property. Upon the officers' requests, Suiter shut off the backhoe but refused to exit the backhoe to speak with the officers. The officers told Suiter that he was trespassing. Suiter became belligerent and was advised by the officers that he was under arrest. Suiter, however, resumed digging with the backhoe. After unsuccessful attempts to have Suiter voluntarily exit the backhoe and speak with them, the officers used force to remove and arrest him. Suiter was charged with felony malicious injury to a canal, I.C. § 18-7019, and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing officers, I.C. § 18-705. Suiter's cases were consolidated.
In an arraignment before the magistrate, Suiter submitted an application for a court-appointed attorney. The magistrate determined that Suiter was indigent and appointed counsel for Suiter's preliminary hearing in the magistrate division only. The magistrate's order stated that the district court, if it wanted to do so, could take up the issue of continuing court-appointed counsel at a later date. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate reminded Suiter that the appointment of counsel expired on that day and that Suiter would need to request court-appointed counsel when he appeared before the district court.
At Suiter's arraignment before the district court, an indigency hearing was conducted. The district court denied Suiter's request for court-appointed counsel over Suiter's objection. The district court advised Suiter that he could request court-appointed counsel and present additional financial information at his continued arraignment and plea hearing before a different district judge. At the continued arraignment, Suiter again requested court-appointed counsel but was instructed to raise that matter before the assigned trial judge. Suiter filed a written motion for court-appointed counsel. Attached to the motion was a prenuptial agreement and a maintenance, healthcare and protection agreement between Suiter and his wife, relating to their ownership of property and assets. Suiter's motion was denied by the assigned trial judge.
At his pre-trial hearing and at trial, Suiter requested court-appointed counsel but was denied. Suiter represented himself throughout the trial. During the trial, the district court repeatedly admonished Suiter about his conduct before the court and expressed frustration with Suiter's behavior. Suiter asserts that during the trial, the judge directed an obscene gesture at him, after which Suiter moved to disqualify the judge. This motion was denied. After a two-day jury trial, Suiter was found guilty of both charges. The trial judge entered an order disqualifying himself from further proceedings, and the case was reassigned to another district judge.
For malicious injury to a canal, Suiter was sentenced to a two-year prison term, with nine months fixed. The sentence was suspended and the district court placed Suiter on probation for two years. For resisting and obstructing officers, Suiter was sentenced to 180 days in jail. In lieu of jail time, the district court imposed thirty days with the sheriff's work detail and ordered payment of restitution to the ditch company. Thereafter, the sentencing court found Suiter to be indigent and appointed counsel to represent Suiter on his appeal.
On appeal, Suiter argues that the district court erred when it denied his request for court-appointed trial counsel, that he was deprived of his right to an impartial and unbiased judge, and that the jury was improperly instructed on the crime of malicious injury to a canal.
II.
ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. For indigent defendants, this includes the right to court-appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 803-05 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456, 458, 424 P.2d 390, 392 (1967). Idaho Code Sections 19-852(a)(1) and (2) provide that a needy person formally charged with having committed a serious crime is entitled to be represented by an attorney and to be provided the necessary services and facilities of representation at public expense, to the extent the person is unable to provide for their payment. As part of that representation, the needy person is entitled to the services of an attorney at all stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when a person who is not needy would be entitled to receive assistance from an attorney. I.C. § 19-852(b)(1). Neither party disputes that Suiter was formally charged with a serious crime. Rather, the dispute in this case centers around whether Suiter was a needy person, entitled to court-appointed counsel. When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, the appellate court should give deference to the trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 430, 34 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Ct.App.2001).
Idaho Code Section 19-851(c) defines a needy person as one who "at the time his need is determined, is unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation." When determining whether a person is a needy person entitled to court-appointed counsel "the court concerned may consider such factors as income, property owned, outstanding obligations, and the number and ages of his dependents." I.C. § 19-854(b).
In this case, Suiter submitted an application to the magistrate for a court-appointed attorney. The financial statement in the application showed that Suiter was unemployed, but that he received a monthly social security payment of $621; that Suiter had $11 in cash, a truck worth $300, a shotgun worth $90, and no checking or savings account; and that Suiter owed his wife $600 per month for his own maintenance. The statement also indicated that Suiter's spouse made approximately $2,000 per month, had $20 cash on hand, and that she owned real property in her name that she had purchased with money received before her marriage to Suiter. At the hearing on Suiter's application for court-appointed counsel, the magistrate suggested that Suiter would have a community interest in his spouse's income. Suiter responded that his spouse did not seem to think so. The magistrate determined Suiter's indigency and appointed counsel for Suiter's preliminary hearing in the magistrate division only and stated that the district court, if it wanted to do so, could take up the issue of continuing court-appointed counsel. The magistrate noted in its order appointing counsel that the appointment could be revisited to determine whether an agreement between Suiter and his spouse (regarding their income, assets, and services) satisfied the requirements of I.C. §§ 32-916 through 32-919. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate reminded Suiter that the appointment of counsel expired on that day and that he would need to again request court-appointed counsel when he appeared before the district court.
At the arraignment before the district court, the court conducted an indigency hearing and referred to both Suiter's financial statement and the magistrate's order appointing counsel, specifically mentioning the magistrate's notation regarding an agreement between Suiter and his spouse. Based on the information provided during the indigency hearing, the district court determined that Suiter had $16,000 equity in real property that Suiter was in the process of refinancing; that Suiter received a monthly disability payment of $620; that he did not establish the amount of his medical expenses; that Suiter's wife earned take home pay in the amount of $1,500 monthly; that Suiter had firearms worth $650 and a vehicle worth $2,000; that his expenses included $560 for the property payment and $100 each for telephone and electricity; and that he owed $1,100 for groceries. The district court concluded that Suiter was not indigent and denied his request for court-appointed counsel. Suiter objected. The district court stated that Suiter could request court-appointed counsel and present additional financial information at his continued arraignment and plea hearing before a different district judge. At the continued arraignment, Suiter again requested court-appointed counsel but was simply instructed at that time to raise that matter before the assigned trial judge, and a not-guilty plea was entered.
Suiter...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Porter
...a business that presumably benefited the defendant'shusband—legal fees will qualify as such “necessaries.” Cf. State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 662, 667–668, 67 P.3d 1274 (2003) (surveying cases). Although occasionally a spouse or parent meeting the criteria of § 1(b)(ii) may refuse to pay,19 thi......
- State of Idaho v. JENSEN, 36018.
-
Roskelley v. Collection Bureau, Inc.
...of Mr. and Mrs. Hennefer in one action despite their divorce. Defendants' theory relies upon the holding of State v. Suiter, 67 P.3d 1274, 1280 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003), in which the appellate court upheld the lower court's holding that, in determining indigency for purposes of appointing coun......
- State v. Kolander