State v. Sullivan

Decision Date08 March 2001
Docket NumberNo. 69334-0.,69334-0.
Citation143 Wash.2d 162,19 P.3d 1012
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Kelly Russell SULLIVAN, a/k/a Kelly Russell., Sullivan, Respondent.

Schroeter, Goldmark, Bender, Amanda Elizabeth Lee, Seattle, amicus curiae on behalf of Washington Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Washington Ass'n of Prosecuting Attys., Pamela Bethloginsky, Olympia, Russesll Hauge, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Randall Avery Sutton, Deputy, Port Orchard, for Petitioner.

Law Offices of Ronald D. Ness & Assoc., Ramona Coral Brandes, Port Orchard, for Respondent.

SMITH, J.

Petitioner State of Washington seeks direct review of a decision of the Kitsap County Superior Court which affirmed a Kitsap County District Court order dismissing with prejudice a criminal charge of barratry against Respondent Kelly Russell Sullivan, a/k/a Kelly Russell., Sullivan, in violation of RCW 9.12.010. Review was granted on May 18, 2000. We affirm.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented in this case is whether documents designated as "Demand for Particulars" purportedly served by Respondent Sullivan upon law enforcement officers who cited him for traffic infractions "purported to be or resembled judicial process" in violation of the barratry statute, RCW 9.12.010.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 9, 1997, Respondent Kelly Russell Sullivan, a/k/a Kelly Russell., Sullivan,1 was stopped by Bremerton Police Officers [FNU] Johnson and [FNU] Olsen for a traffic infraction.2 Respondent asked both officers to complete "public servant question[naires]" which he handed to them.3 When the officers refused, he asked for a supervisor. Sergeant [FNU] Fuller of the Bremerton Police Department came to the scene.4 Respondent claimed the officers were extorting him into entering a contract in violation of U.C.C. 3-501 [commercial paper], with reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, 1985, 1983 [relating to violation of individual rights by government action], and 18 U.S.C. § 141 and § 142 [repealed July 1, 1944].5 A traffic infraction citation was issued to Respondent.6

On October 2, 1997, Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff Karen Demerick stopped a pickup truck operated by Respondent because the vehicle license had expired in March 1997.7 In the vehicle with Respondent was a male person who identified himself as Tim (or Tom) Duffey.8 Respondent inquired whether Deputy Sheriff Demerick knew she was violating his constitutional rights under the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments.9 She issued him a traffic infraction citation for expired vehicle license and no proof of liability insurance.10

On or about September 9, 1997, Respondent "served" upon Police Officers Johnson, Olsen and Sergeant Fuller documents which he characterized as "Demand for Particulars."11 The three sets of 12-page computer word-processed documents were actually photocopies of the same document, identical in form and content, containing 73 questions somewhat akin to interrogatories.12

On October 10, 1997, Respondent "served" Deputy Sheriff Demerick with one five-page set of documents,13 followed a day later by an additional eight-page document designated as "Demand for a Bill of Particulars."14 Each set of documents varied slightly in form and content. The second document is similar to those Respondent "served" upon the Bremerton Police officers about a month earlier.15

The documents Respondent "served" upon all four law enforcement officers16 are substantially similar. They bore headings similar to captions on most documents submitted to a court. They contained "case" headings indicating (1) "Bremerton Muncipal Court in and for The County of Kitsap, State of Washington/City of Bremerton Plaintiff(s) v. Sullivan Kelly R. Defendant(s);"17 and (2) "Kitsap County District Court Silverdale In and for the County of Kitsap, State of Washington/County of Kitsap Plaintiff, v. Sullivan Kelly Russell Defendant."18

The documents identified the State of Washington and either the City of Bremerton or the County of Kitsap as Plaintiff and Respondent Sullivan Kelly R[ussell] as Defendant and used the numbers of the traffic infraction citations he received as the case numbers.19 The documents are identified as originating from Respondent20 and are signed by him.21

The document Respondent characterized as a "Demand for Particulars" contains these words in all capitals: "THIS IS LEGAL PROCESS, YOU ARE COMPELLED TO RESPOND."22 The "demand for particulars" then stated:

This Demand is to be previewed in the nature of, and in fact is, a demurrer to discover nature and cause of action, and is used to determine the course/right of action for relief/remedy. The following questions are necessary, imperative, and material for the preparation of any dilatory pleadings or pleadings in bar involving this matter.
Demandant will be deprived and prejudiced of Demandant's unalienable rights under Nature's law and Nature's God as recognized under Due Process clause of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the (u) united States of America, Amended 1791 (without the legislative venue/jurisdiction), 1835, Article 1, Section 10-Right of the Accused.
If this demand is not the proper procedure to determine the nature and cause of the Above Case, then Demandant hereby empowers YOU and invokes YOUR Authority under the common law principle of the Brother's Keeper rule to purview this demand into the proper procedure and process as the protection of the Demandant's rights so require.

Following the 73 questions in Respondent's "demand for particulars," these statements were made:

The foregoing demand for Bill of Particulars is not to be construed as discovery, a traverse into any issue(s), a general appearance, a waiver of any rights, or in any way a motion or joinder to the above Case or the tribunal, nor discovery to the merits of the above Case.
Failure by you to timely respond to the Demand for Bill of particulars within ten (10) day's or as a seasonably requested extension will establish, will be construed as an attempt by the officers of the court to withhold full disclosure as to the nature and cause of the action(s) purportedly brought in the above Case, and will make it impossible for the Demandant to meaningfully respond to the process issued or caused to be issued by the officers of the Court and will be used as Prima Facie evidence of Fraud, Bad Faith and Criminal Intent to deprive Demandant of his right of redress, due process, and civil rights as defined in Title 42 Section(s) 1983, 1984, 1986. U.S.C.A.

....

Further, failure to provide a true sworn, accurate and complete Bill of Particulars forthwith shall be construed as an admission of Fraud, a declaration that the Above Case is Nocumentum injuriosum, and constructive intent by the City of Bremerton to enter a nolle prosequi by tacit procuration.[23]

On December 11, 1997, the Prosecuting Attorney of Kitsap County charged Respondent Sullivan in the Kitsap County District Court with one count of barratry in violation of RCW 9.12.010 as follows:

On or about the 10 day of October, 19 97, in the County of Kitsap, State of Washington, the above-named Defendant did (1) bring on his or her own behalf, or instigate, incite, or encourage another to bring, any false suit at law or in equity in any court of this state, with intent thereby to distress or harass a defendant in the suit; and/or (2) serve or send any paper or document purporting to be or resembling a judicial process, that is not in fact a judicial process; contrary to Revised Code of Washington 9.12.010.[24]

The complaint was later amended to indicate violation dates of the "9th day of October, 1997 through the 11th day of October 1997."25 Respondent was arraigned on December 19, 1997.26 Upon his refusal to enter a plea, the court entered a plea of "not guilty" for him.27

On January 28, 1998, Respondent in open court orally requested a bill of particulars in the barratry case.28 On February 10, 1998, the court denied his request, indicating he had already been provided with the information requested.29 Respondent by motion sought to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in Tacoma and to the Kitsap County Superior Court. Both motions were denied.30 His several motions to dismiss the charges were denied.31

On April 28, 1998, Respondent made a motion to dismiss under State v. Knapstad,32 claiming the State could not establish a prima facie case of barratry against him. It was initially denied by the Kitsap County District Court.33 However, Respondent renewed the motion after the Honorable Terry K. McCluskey, Kitsap County Superior Court, on July 14, 1998 granted a Knapstad motion to Timothy Charles Duffey a/k/a Timothy Charles., Duffey in a similar case charging Mr. Duffey with violation of the barratry statute, RCW 9.12.010.34

On July 22, 1998, the Kitsap County District Court, the Honorable Stephen E. Alexander, granted Respondent's renewed motion to dismiss.35 The State filed a timely notice of RALJ appeal on July 27, 1998.36 The appeal was stayed pending resolution by the Court of Appeals, Division Two, of the State's appeal of the order issued by Judge McCluskey in State v. Duffey.37 The Court of Appeals in that case on July 23, 1999 affirmed dismissal of the barratry charge against Defendant Duffey.38 Following that decision, the stay was lifted in Respondent Sullivan's case. An order affirming the District Court's decision to dismiss the barratry charge against Respondent was entered by the Honorable M. Karlynn Haberly, Kitsap County Superior Court, on March 17, 2000.39 On that date, the State filed a notice of direct discretionary review.40 The Supreme Court Commissioner by ruling granted review on May 18, 2000.41

DISCUSSION

Inasmuch as the District Court and Superior Court decisions in this case admittedly were directly affected by the July 23, 1999...

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