State v. Summerville
Decision Date | 05 January 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 5611,5611 |
Citation | 535 A.2d 818,13 Conn.App. 175 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Robert SUMMERVILLE. |
Stephen F. Donahue, with whom was Elaine M. Scanlon, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).
Harry Weller, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were David Cohen, Asst. State's Atty., and Thomas O'Brien, Legal Intern, for appellee (state).
Before BORDEN, DALY and O'CONNELL, JJ.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) 1 and possession of cocaine in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279. 2 He claims that the court erred (1) in limiting his cross-examination, (2) in denying his motion for admission of the results of a polygraph test, (3) in failing to strike the testimony of the state's expert rebuttal witness, and (4) in failing to grant his motions for judgment of acquittal, for a new trial, and for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. We find no error.
The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. On October 12, 1985, the defendant and the victim, who had been friends for several years, met in a bar in Bridgeport. The victim invited the defendant to attend a party in Stamford later that evening. Instead of attending the party, the two checked into a hotel room in Stamford at approximately 11:30 p.m. that evening. Both the victim and the defendant remained in the room for several hours drinking, socializing, and ingesting cocaine.
At approximately 5:30 a.m. the following morning, the defendant summoned a security guard to the room claiming that the victim had suffered a stroke. When the security guard entered the room, he observed the victim on the floor partially covered by a bed sheet. He checked for a pulse but found none. The security guard called the police for assistance. Terrance Shea, a Stamford fireman and emergency medical technician, responded to the scene shortly thereafter. Shea checked the victim's pulse and upon finding none began efforts to resuscitate the victim. Resuscitation efforts continued until the victim arrived at Stamford Hospital, but the victim never responded and was pronounced dead.
At trial, the state produced Arkady Katsnelson, an associate chief medical examiner, who testified that the victim died as a result of manual strangulation. Katsnelson further testified that he found an abrasion on the victim's neck below the left ear which seemed to have been caused by someone's fingernail. Katsnelson also noted a separation of the victim's hyoid bone, a U-shaped bone deep inside of the neck, hemorrhages to the victim's neck, eye, heart, and lungs, and cocaine in the victim's blood and nose.
The defendant called Elliot Gross, the former chief medical examiner in Connecticut, to support his theory that the victim died of cocaine intoxication. Gross, after reviewing the records and examining the larynx, tongue and hyoid bone which were made available to him through the chief medical examiner's office, testified that the victim's injuries and hemorrhages were due to the resuscitation efforts. On cross-examination, Gross conceded that microscopic slides of the areas of hemorrhaging could determine if the injuries had occurred before or after death, but that he did not order such slides in this case.
The state then called William Q. Sturner, chief medical examiner for the state of Rhode Island, as a rebuttal witness. Sturner rebutted Gross' opinion by testifying that the injuries he observed were inconsistent with resuscitation. He based his testimony in large part on his examination of microscopic slides made from the area of hemorrhaging, the type of slides the defendant's expert chose not to order. By examining the microscopic slides of where the hemorrhaging occurred, Sturner was able to determine that the hemorrhages occurred before the victim stopped breathing, and therefore were not the result of resuscitation efforts. Sturner concluded that the death of the victim was by strangulation.
In his first claim of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in limiting the defendant's examination of Sergeant Robert C. Tymon. The defendant claims (1) that his cross-examination of Tymon was impermissibly restricted, and (2) that he should have been allowed to introduce certain hearsay evidence through Tymon on direct examination. We disagree.
Tymon, the officer in charge of the detective squad which investigated the victim's death, testified in the state's case-in-chief about his involvement in the case. On direct examination, Tymon identified the defendant as the person he took to the hospital for treatment. Additionally, Tymon testified that he took fingernail scrapings from the defendant. It is evident from the record that Tymon was called by the state to elicit information regarding the identification of the defendant as the one from whom he took fingernail scrapings.
On cross-examination, the defendant sought to question Tymon regarding the investigation and his interviewing of witnesses. The state objected to the questions on the basis that the questions were outside the scope of direct examination. The defendant's response was simply that questions regarding areas of the investigation were permissible. The defendant did not claim that his questions went to the matter of the credibility of the witness. The court sustained the state's objection and ruled that the defendant could call Tymon in his case.
It is a well established rule that cross-examination is restricted to matters covered on direct. State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211, 224, 514 A.2d 724 (1986); State v. Scott, 11 Conn.App. 102, 107, 525 A.2d 1364, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 811, 528 A.2d 1157 (1987). "A question [on cross-examination] is within the scope of the direct examination if it is designed to 'rebut, impeach, modify, or explain any of the defendant's direct testimony.' " State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 657, 491 A.2d 345 (1985), quoting State v. Zdanis, 173 Conn. 189, 196, 377 A.2d 275 (1977). The trial court is given broad discretion to determine whether a particular line of cross-examination is within the scope of the direct examination. State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 247, 261, 496 A.2d 513 (1985); State v. Apostle, 8 Conn.App. 216, 230, 512 A.2d 947 (1986). A review of the record in this case indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the defendant's cross-examination. 3
The defendant called Tymon on direct examination and inquired about his investigation of the death of the victim. Tymon testified that he had questioned Gordon Anderson of California, who was staying in the room next to the one shared by the victim and the defendant on the night in question. The state objected to any testimony concerning the conversation between Anderson and the witness on the grounds of hearsay. The state's objection was sustained. The defendant concedes that the testimony was hearsay but argues that the testimony should have been admitted under the "residual exception" to the hearsay rule.
"When a defendant offers evidence that is hearsay, his proffer runs counter to our well established preference for having a witness appear personally in court, under oath, so that his testimony can be subjected to cross-examination and his credibility adjudged in accordance with his demeanor." State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385, 390, 521 A.2d 555 (1987). Hearsay evidence, however, can be admissible if it is both reliable and necessary. State v. Sharpe, supra, 195 Conn. at 664, 491 A.2d 345. "The necessity factor, [our Supreme Court has said], is reflected in the prerequisite that the declarant be unavailable." State v. Frye, 182 Conn. 476, 480, 438 A.2d 735 (1980). The moving party has the burden of proving the declarant's unavailability. Id.; C. McCormick, Evidence (3d Ed.1984) § 253. "Absent a showing by the proponent of the proffered hearsay statement of the unavailability of the declarant, the declarant's statement will be excluded from evidence." State v. Frye, supra, 481. In meeting his burden of proving the unavailability of a declarant, the proponent of proffered hearsay testimony must demonstrate that he has used due diligence to procure the attendance of the absent witness. State v. Weinrib, 140 Conn. 247, 251, 99 A.2d 145 (1953). All that is required by the proponent of the hearsay testimony is a good faith effort to procure the declarant's attendance. State v. Aillon, supra, 202 Conn. at 392, 521 A.2d 555.
In this case, the defendant failed to prove unavailability. The defendant's mere assertion that he could not find "any Gordon Anderson in Corbalitos, California" does not amount to a good faith effort. Since we conclude that Anderson was not shown to be unavailable, we need not reach the issue of trustworthiness. State v. Frye, supra, 182 Conn. at 480, 438 A.2d 735.
The defendant's second claim of error is that the trial court erred in denying the admission of the results of a polygraph test. The defendant correctly recognizes that our Supreme Court has consistently held polygraph evidence to be inadmissible, but urges this court to reassess this position. We see no reason to do so at this time. Our Supreme Court has recently rejected the use of polygraph tests. State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 484-86, 522 A.2d 249 (1987). In Miller, the court ruled in accordance with the well established rule of this state that the "questionable accuracy" of polygraph tests serves as a compelling reason for excluding such evidence. Id., 486, 522 A.2d 249. It is not our function to overrule established Supreme Court precedent. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 4 Conn.App. 19, 20, 492 A.2d 207 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986).
The defendant's third claim is that the trial court erred in ruling that the rebuttal testimony of Sturner was...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Summerville v. Warden, State Prison
...the result of resuscitation efforts. Sturner concluded that the death of the victim was by strangulation." 4 State v. Summerville, 13 Conn.App. 175, 176-78, 535 A.2d 818 (1988). In addition to this evidence, the following evidence was presented to the jury at the petitioner's criminal trial......
-
Summerville v. Warden, State Prison
...in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1). 1 The conviction was upheld by this court. State v. Summerville, 13 Conn.App. 175, 535 A.2d 818 (1988). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1) that his trial counsel rendered ......
-
State v. Delarosa
...established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 117, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986); State v. Summerville, 13 Conn.App. 175, 184-85, 535 A.2d 818 (1988). Our inquiry focuses on whether " 'a rational trier of fact could find guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Stat......
-
State v. McNellis
...to say that he "saw something." Under these circumstances, the defendant can hardly claim surprise. See, e.g., State v. Summerville, 13 Conn.App. 175, 183, 535 A.2d 818 (1988). We hold that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a In his fifth claim of error, the defenda......