State v. Superior Court of Spokane County

• Citation: 40 Wash. 443,82 P. 875
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Decision Date: 31 October 1905
• Parties: STATE ex rel. WYMAN, PARTRIDGE & CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SPOKANE COUNTY et al.

82 P. 875

40 Wash. 443

STATE ex rel. WYMAN, PARTRIDGE & CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SPOKANE COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 31, 1905

Mandamus proceedings by the state, on relation of Wyman, Partridge &amp Co., against the superior court of Spokane county and William A. Huneke, judge thereof. Writ denied.

James A. Williams and Denton M. Crow, for plaintiff.

Graves & Graves, for respondents.

RUDKIN, J.

Original application for a writ of mandamus. The relator brought an action in the superior court of Spokane county against A. E Flower and wife, and at the same time caused writs of garnishment to issue against certain insurance companies. Flower and wife suffered a default in the main action, and a final judgment was entered against them. The insurance companies made return to the writs of garnishment, denying liability to the defendants in the main action, and the relator filed affidavits controverting the returns, as required by statute. Thereupon the insurance companies, as garnishees, applied to the court in due form for a change of place of trial of the garnishment proceedings to Kittitas county, on the ground that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be forwarded by the change. The relator resisted this application, on the ground that the provisions of our statute, relating to a change of the place of trial, do not apply to garnishment proceedings, and that the court was without jurisdiction to grant the application. The court overruled the objection, and allowed the application. The relator thereupon applied to this court for a writ of mandate, directing the court below to proceed with the trial notwithstanding the change of venue, basing its right to the writ upon the same grounds as were urged in its objection to the granting of the application.

At the threshold of the proceeding the respondent raises the objection that the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal and that mandamus will not lie. If the contention of the relator is correct, viz., that the superior court of Spokane county had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the garnishment proceedings without power or discretion to order a change of venue, mandamus is the proper remedy. The mere fact that the superior court of Kittitas county, to which the proceedings have been transferred, may erroneously assume jurisdiction and that the proceedings may in that way eventually reach this court by appeal, is not, in our opinion, an adequate remedy. We cannot however, agree with the contention of the relator, that the provisions of our statute authorizing a change of venue where there is reason to believe that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is pending, or where the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice will be forwarded by the change, do not apply to garnishment proceedings. Statutes conferring the right to a change of venue are enacted with a view of affording litigants a fair and impartial trial. They are in furtherance of justice, and should be liberally construed so as not to defeat the right. 4 Enc. Pl. & Prac. p. 380; Buck v. Eureka, 97 Cal 135, 31 P. 845; Packwood v. State, 24 Or. 261, 33 P. 674. In the last case cited the court says: 'These provisions of the statute should receive a broad and liberal, rather than a technical and strict, construction, and the courts ought not to be too astute in discovering some refined and subtle distinction to avoid their operation; for, as was said by Mr. Justice Graves, 'the immediate rights of the litigants are not the only object of the rule, but sound public policy, which is interested in preserving every tribunal appointed by law from discredit, imperiously demands its observation.' Stockwell v. Township Board of White Lake, 22 Mich. 349.'

The relator has cited a large number of authorities, but they have no direct application to the question now under consideration. They discuss the general nature of garnishment proceedings, the court of original jurisdiction to issue the writ, and the right to a change of venue on the ground of residence of the garnishee. In Kelly v. Ryan, 8 Wash. 536, 36 P. 478, Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Theatrical Ass'n,

23 Wash. 517, 63 P 212, the court held that a change of venue in the main action carried the garnishment proceeding with it, and that section 4854, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., which provides that an action against a corporation shall be brought in a county where it has an office for the transaction of business has no application to a garnishment proceeding. In Miller v. Mason, 51 Iowa, 239, 1 N.W. 483, the court held that a garnishee was not entitled to demand a change of venue to the county of his residence. The two cases last cited are not in point here. The county in which the main action is pending is the proper county in which to sue out a writ of garnishment regardless of the place of business of a corporation or the residence of the garnishee, and to that extent the garnishment statute supersedes other statutes requiring certain actions to be brought in a particular county. Thus, notwithstanding the decision in Miller v. Mason, supra, the same court afterwards said...