State v. Superior Court for Pierce County

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PARKER, J.
• Citation: State v. Superior Court for Pierce County, 185 P. 623, 108 Wash. 666 (Wash. 1919)
• Decision Date: 03 December 1919
• Docket Number: 15606.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CHRISTENSEN v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR PIERCE COUNTY et al.

185 P. 623

108 Wash. 666

STATE ex rel. CHRISTENSEN v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR PIERCE COUNTY et al.

No. 15606.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 3, 1919

Department 1.

Original application by the State, on the relation of Lars Christensen, for a writ of prohibition, directed against the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County and Ernest M. Card, Judge thereof, in an action there pending wherein theEureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Company is plaintiff and the Martinolich Shipbuilding Company and relator are defendants, and in which numerous other parties intervened. Writ denied.

W. H Abel, of Montesano, for respondent.

PARKER J.

The relator, Christensen, by his original application in this court, seeks a writ of prohibition directed against the superior court for Pierce county, and the receiver appointed in an action therein pending against relator, prohibiting further proceedings in that action; relator resting his claim of right to such writ upon the ground that the superior court for Pierce county has proceeded and is proceeding in the action without jurisdiction. The controlling facts appearing in the record before us may be summarized as follows:

On May 23, 1919, the Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Company commenced an action in the superior court for Pierce county, under sections 1182, 1183, Rem. Code, against the Martinolich Shipbuilding Company and Lars Christensen, this relator seeking foreclosure of its claim of lien upon two uncompleted vessels, for the construction of which it had furnished material. The Shipbuilding Company, prior to and at the time of the commencement of the action, was constructing the vessels at its shipbuilding plant in King county, for Christensen as the owner where the ships were in its possession until the possession thereof was taken by the receiver appointed in the action, since which time they have remained in the possession of the receiver at the same place. Both the Shipbuilding Company and Christensen appeared generally in the action, and thereafter the case proceeded regularly to trial in the superior court for Pierce county upon the merits, not only for the determination of the lien rights asserted by the Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Company but also for the determination of the lien rights asserted by numerous other claimants, who became interveners in the action. Christensen appeared and participated by counsel in the trial of the case resisting the claims asserted by the plaintiff and interveners upon the merits without making any objections of any nature whatsoever to the jurisdiction of the superior court for Pierce county, until at the close of the trial, after the introduction of all the evidence in behalf of all the parties, when counsel for Christensen moved the court for an order and judgment of dismissal of the action upon the ground, among others, that the vessels against which the liens were sought to be foreclosed were and had been at all times situated in King county, and that therefore the superior court for Pierce county was without jurisdiction of the subjectmatter of the action. This motion was by the court denied, and thereupon, the case being argued upon the merits, judgment of foreclosure was rendered in favor of the Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Company and the interveners; the court embodying in its judgment an order of sale of the vessels to satisfy the several lien claims. That action had reached this stage when this proceeding was commenced in this court.

Counsel for relator, Christensen, invoked the provisions of section 204, Rem. Code, reading as follows:

'Actions for the following causes shall be commenced in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated:

'1. For the recovery of, for the possession of, for the partition of, for the foreclosure of a mortgage on, or for the determination of all questions affecting the title or for any injuries to real property;

'2. All questions involving the rights to the possession or title to any specific article of personal property; in which last mentioned class of cases damages may also be awarded for the detention and for injury to such personal property.' It is contended that subdivision 2 of this section has the effect of vesting in the superior

...