State v. Superior Court of Spokane County

• Citation: 47 P. 31,15 Wash. 668
• Parties: STATE EX REL. AMSTERDAMSCH TRUSTEES KANTOOR v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SPOKANE COUNTY ET AL.
• Decision Date: 30 November 1896
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

47 P. 31

15 Wash. 668

STATE EX REL. AMSTERDAMSCH TRUSTEES KANTOOR v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SPOKANE COUNTY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 30, 1896

Application on the relation of the Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor for a writ of prohibition against the superior court of Spokane county and Norman Buck, judge. Writ granted.

Binkley Taylor & McLaren and Graves, Wolf & Graves, for relator.

Wm. H Plummer, Samuel R. Stern, Cyrus Happy, and W. T. Birdsall for respondents.

ANDERS J.

On September 5, 1896, the prosecuting attorney of Spokane county, upon his own relation, filed an information in the superior court of that county against Simon Oppenheimer and others, including the relator herein, alleging that the defendants were acting as a corporation within this state, under the name and style of the Northwestern Milling & Power Company, without being legally incorporated, and setting up certain facts showing that they had failed to comply with the law in relation to corporations, and had no right to act as a corporation within the state, and praying, among other things, for the appointment of a receiver of the property, effects, and assets held, or at any time claimed to be held, by said alleged corporation, with the usual powers of receivers in such cases. Upon the filing of the information, the court, pursuant to the prayer of the relator, appointed one Fowle as receiver of the property described therein. By the terms of the order, all persons in possession of any of said property were commanded to deliver the same to the receiver so appointed, "in fear of the pains and penalties attached to the contempt of this court, upon whatever pretense of authority, court, or judicial action such persons may claim the right to, or interest in, the premises; and any person or persons asserting any lien or claim to or interest therein are hereby remanded to this court herein for the assertion or protection of any alleged claim or rights in the premises." The relator herein, claiming to be in possession of certain of the property over which the receiver was appointed, and of which he was directed to take possession, and claiming to hold the same as a purchaser at a judicial sale under a decree of the superior court of Spokane county, appeared specially by counsel, and suggested to the court that the order for a receiver was void and of no effect in so far as it directed the receiver to take possession of the property alleged in the information to have been transferred to the Northwestern Milling & Power Company by the Spokane Water Power Company on May 20, 1895, and thereafter, by said company, mortgaged to the relator herein, and by it purchased at a sale on foreclosure of said mortgage, for the reason that the relator was not a party to the suit in which the receiver was appointed, save by virtue of its being an alleged stockholder in said alleged corporation, and in this action could not plead and protect its rights as owner of said property, or be heard in respect thereto; that it was entitled to the possession thereof pending the time for redemption, under the laws of this state, and could not be divested thereof save by judicial proceedings instituted for that purpose; and that a receiver could not be appointed without notice. The court declined to vacate or modify the order appointing the receiver as requested, or in any manner whatsoever. The relator thereupon applied to this court, and obtained therefrom an alternative writ of prohibition directed to said superior court, and Hon. Norman Buck, judge thereof, commanding it and him to desist and refrain from any further proceedings in the matter of the appointment of said receiver, so far as it relates to the property described in the writ, or so far as the same relates to this relator, until the further order of this court, and to show cause before this court, at a specified time, why they should not be absolutely prohibited and restrained from further proceeding in said matter. Upon the return day of the writ, the respondent the superior judge appeared specially by counsel, and moved the court to vacate the alternative writ heretofore issued, and to dismiss this proceeding, on various grounds, the principal one of which is that this court is without jurisdiction herein.

It is earnestly contended on behalf of the respondent that, under the constitution and laws of this state, the superior court had exclusive jurisdiction of the action instituted therein by the prosecuting attorney, and was fully authorized to appoint a receiver therein, and that this court has no power or authority to interfere with or control the action of the superior court in respect thereto. That the superior court had jurisdiction of that action must be conceded, and, if it had authority to make the order complained of, the respondent's contention must prevail, even though this court has jurisdiction generally to issue writs of prohibition, for this court would under no circumstances undertake to interfere with lawful acts of a subordinate tribunal.

The first question for our determination is whether this court has jurisdiction of the matter now before it. In section 4 of article 4 of the state constitution it is provided that "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers, and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, excepting that its appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars ($200), unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine, or the validity of a statute. The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. ***" And in section 6 of the same article it is provided that "the superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity, and in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to $100, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law. *** The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court. *** Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective counties. ***" It thus appears that the jurisdiction of the supreme court and of the superior courts of this state is expressly defined by the constitution, and reference must therefore be had to that instrument in order to determine the question of jurisdiction in any particular case; and it will be observed that, by the terms of the constitution, both this court and the superior courts are empowered to issue writs of prohibition.

But it is claimed on behalf of the respondent that the supreme court can issue such writs only when necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This contention of the respondent seems to be based upon the assumption...